The Russian Economy: Prospects for Putin 4.0 by Kudors, Andis & Hermanis, Jānis
 The Russian 
Economy: 
Prospects for Putin 4.0
Editors: Andis Kudors, Jānis Hermanis
 The Russian Econom
y 
íÜÉ|êìëëá~å|ÉÅçåçãóKéÇÑ===N===OQKMOKOMOM===OOWPSWRO
 Centre for East European Policy Studies 
University of Latvia Press
Riga, 2020
 The Russian 
Economy: 
Prospects for Putin 4.0
Editors: Andis Kudors, Jānis Hermanis
UDK 32(470+571)
 Ru766
     
This project was implemented by the Centre for East European Policy Studies in cooperation 
with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in the Baltic States and European Commission Represen-
tation in Latvia 
Editors: Andis Kudors, Jānis Hermanis
Assistant to the Editor: Anna Lasmane
Authors of articles: Mārcis Balodis, Maria Domanska, Aleksandr Golts, Mārtiņš Kaprāns, 
Kai-Olaf Lang, Marius Laurinavičius, Vladimir Milov, Dmitry Oreshkin, Vita Spivak, 
Kirsten Westphal
English language editor: Translation agency “Valodu koks”
Layout: Andra Liepiņa
Cover design: Agris Dzilna
© Authors of articles, 2020
© Centre for East European Policy Studies, 2020
© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020
© European Commission Representation in Latvia, 2020
https://doi.org/10.22364/ceeps.repp.20
ISBN  978-9934-18-510-6
Table of Contents
Jānis Hermanis 
Foreword .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    5
Andis Kudors
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
Part I: Domestic Development
Maria Domanska
State of Russian Economy and its Influence on Putin’s  
Politics at the 4th Term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Vladimir Milov
Russia’s Dependency on the Energy Sector: How Long? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    27
Dmitry Oreshkin
Putin’s Vertical and the Regions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    41
Alеksandr Golts
Military Expenditure During Putin’s Rule  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   61
Part II: International Dimension
Kai-Olaf Lang, Kirsten Westphal
Russia and the European Union – The Changing Role of Energy  .  .  .  .    75
Vita Spivak
Russia-China Economic Relations under Putin Version 4.0 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    95
Mārcis Balodis
Eurasian Economic Union: Numbers and Trends  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   109
Marius Laurinavičius
Money River from Russia to the West. How Toxic is it? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    125
Mārtiņš Kaprāns
Russia’s Economic Narratives Towards the Baltic States:  
Structural Elements and the Potential of Ideological Alignment  . . . . .   143
Andis Kudors, Jānis Hermanis
Conclusion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    157
Attachment: State of the Russian Economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   163
Author credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   177
5Foreword
Russia’s international role and its developmental trends have always been 
the  subject of widespread debate, as it is a  country with a  particular mentality. 
In May 2018 Vladimir Putin has assumed the office of the President of Russia for 
the 4th time. As he begins his term, the president has also defined a number of 
rather ambitious economic and social goals that Russia should achieve over the next 
six years. However, Putin has held power long enough so his potential could be 
judged not only by his promises, but also by the results of his political activities so 
far. Putin has previously said that the collapse of the Soviet Union is the biggest 
geopolitical disaster of the  last century. This quote says a  lot about today’s true 
goals, ambitions and foreign policy priorities of Russia. Such expressions are more 
of a yearning for the past than a desire to change for the  sake of development.
The USSR was once one of the two most influential world powers. By contrast, 
Russia, the  legal heir of the  Soviet Union, has today lost much of its former 
influence, including in the economic sphere. Russia’s share of the global economy 
is currently only 3.1 percent. The Russian economy ranks sixth in the world (in 
terms of GDP PPP; eleventh in terms of nominal GDP) with China, the United 
States, India, Japan and Germany ahead of it. Russia’s presidential decree of May 
2018 stipulates that the  country should reach the  top five of the  world’s largest 
economies by 2024.
Since the  collapse of the  USSR, Russia has undergone significant changes. 
In the  1990s, when Yeltsin was president, country’s economy shrank almost 
every year. According to the  International Monetary Fund, Russia’s share of 
the global economy fell from 5.2 percent to 3.1 percent between 1992 and 1999. 
Against this background, it was easy to denigrate the  economic, political and 
social transformation of Russia under Yeltsin’s presidency as a  submission to 
the conspiratorial interests of the West. The effect of ’shock therapy’ in Russia – 
a  country without democratic traditions  – has certainly proved more harmful 
than, for example, in Western Europe.
When Putin became president, Russia experienced rapid economic growth 
(on average 7 percent per annum) for almost 10 years, largely due to the significant 
rise in oil prices. This relatively successful period has not only secured an increase 
in Russia’s share of the  global economy (from 3.1 percent to 3.9 percent), but 
also boosted president Putin’s popularity. In 2007, Time named Putin Person of 
the Year. However, further development was no longer so convincing. As a result 
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of the global financial crisis, Russia’s economy fell by 7.8 percent in 2009, followed 
by a more moderate growth period than at the beginning of the century. Following 
the military conflict in Ukraine, sanctions by the EU and the United States were 
imposed on Russia and the  following drop in oil prices led to a  further decline 
in its economy in 2015. Russia experienced a sharp fall of its currency exchange 
rate, consumer price inflation and the depletion of the government reserve fund 
accumulated during ‘the good times’.
Lately, Russia has been able to return to weak economic growth due to 
global economic development and higher level of oil prices. The FIFA World Cup 
also provided a  temporary boost to the  economy in 2018. Meanwhile, Russia’s 
share of the global economy has fallen to 3.1 percent in 2019, the same level as 
before Putin took office. In addition, the IMF forecasts that this share will fall to 
2.8 percent in 2024, meaning that Russia’s position in the  global economy will 
deteriorate as a result of Putin’s rule.
Russia undoubtedly has great potential for development. It has an extensive 
natural resource base, and virtually every element of the  Mendeleev table is 
available in the country. Russia is estimated to hold about 30 percent of the world’s 
natural resources. According to the World Bank’s estimates, Russia’s total natural 
resources value reaches $ 75 trillion, 3 times the annual gross domestic product 
of the United States.
The experience of countries around the  world shows that the  economy is 
undergoing gradual structural change over time, and that the level of development 
of the  countries is linked to their economic model. Lower income countries 
have a high share of the primary sector, which includes the extraction of natural 
resources and raw materials. Middle-income countries have an increased share of 
the secondary sector (including the production of goods using materials supplied 
by the primary sector), while the tertiary sector (comprising a variety of services) 
dominates the  advanced economies. The  technological level of the  countries 
concerned, the  quality of the  educational system, investment in research and 
development, etc., are essential for moving towards a higher level of development.
Russia can be considered as a  country with a  high share of the  primary 
sector. Both Russia’s economy and its budget are highly dependent on commodity 
prices (especially oil and gas) in the global markets. The mining industry’s share 
of the Russian economy in 2018 was 13 percent. The share of natural resources 
and raw materials in 2018 was more than 60 percent of all Russian export 
revenues. These conditions are beneficial in times of global economic growth and 
increasing demand for raw materials. However, such an economic model is also 
associated with increased vulnerability and impedes its long-term development. 
Increased returns from the  primary sector dampen business interest in other 
‘tradable sectors’, in particular industrial production, leading to increased imports 
and limited domestic export potential. It also contributes to the concentration of 
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resources in the hands of a narrow elite group, income inequality and corruption. 
This is called ‘a resource curse’. Some resource-producing countries (such as 
Canada and Norway) have managed to avoid this curse with well-targeted policies. 
The negative spill-over effects of the energy sector can be mitigated by promoting 
transparency in public administration and utilizing resource export revenues for 
public investment, development of other sectors and economic diversification.
Russia would need to change its economic model and ensure a technological 
breakthrough. Such a  desire has been seen in Russia before, with President 
Putin repeatedly talking about the  country’s far-reaching plans. What hinders 
their implementation? Here comes the  sacramental question of American 
commentator David Remnick: “Can Russia Change?” (Foreign Affairs, 1997, 
No. 1). In the 1990s, this country at least tried to break the umbilical cord with its 
past of dictatorship and imperialism, while in recent decades we have seen more 
nostalgia for worship of the  ‘great past’, its symbols and values. Unfortunately, 
this is also reflected in Russia’s international behaviour, where, according to 
Lithuanian foreign minister Linas Linkevičius, it is no longer ‘a superpower but 
a super-problem’. Russia is a country with its own specific ambitions, seeking to 
translate international norms and treaties in a way which is only good for itself – 
a  similar policy is currently being pursued by US President Donald Trump. 
Putin’s ability to deliver an economic breakthrough is questioned by 
a  number of indicators of development potential, where Russia lags far behind 
other leading nations. Russia currently ranks 46th in the  Global Innovation 
Index. According to the World Bank, its R&D expenditure (1.1 percent of GDP) 
is twice as low as the  OECD average (2.4 percent). Expenditure on education 
(2.6 percent of GDP) is also below the OECD average (4.4 percent). Meanwhile, 
Russia spends relatively much on military spending (3.9 percent of GDP), and is 
one of the few countries in the world to spend more on defense than education. 
Russian messianic aspirations, particularly manifested in the  post-Soviet space, 
and its desire to engage in military conflicts outside the  country, places an 
additional financial burden and deprives it of resources to deal with domestic 
issues. Disproportionate consumption of resources is also evident in other areas, 
such as Russia’s most expensive winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, which 
cost € 50 billion, equivalent to one quarter of Russia’s annual budget. This shows 
that Russia is focusing more on creating an impressive external image than on 
fundamental changes to improve the welfare of its citizens.
It would be important for Russia to create favourable conditions for foreign 
investment, but the opposite has happened in recent years – after the annexation 
of Crimea and Western sanctions, foreign investment has declined. Potential 
investors are also deterred by the  very high level of corruption  – according 
to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Russia ranks 
138th (among 180 countries, on a par with Iran and Lebanon).
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Putin has now been under Russian leadership for longer than the former 
leader of the USSR Brezhnev, associated by many with a prolonged period of 
stagnation. How will Putin 4.0 differ from all previous ones? Is Russia capable 
of a rapid economic breakthrough in order to increase its global role and improve 
the quality of life of its people? Are the national development goals set by 
President Putin realistic or is it just an illusion? What are the major obstacles 
and challenges that need to be overcome in order to deliver quality change and 
achieve the goals set? the answers to these questions will be explained further 
in this book.
Rīga, January, 2020
Jānis Hermanis
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Introduction
Vladimir Putin, addressing the  Federal Assembly, government, regional 
authorities, courts, public figures and media on 15 January 2020, said at 
the  beginning of his speech that “there is a  clear demand for change in our 
society today.” Demographics, education, health were topics that Putin paid 
particular attention this time. The President concluded his speech with: “Russia 
is facing historic breakthrough challenges (proryvnye istoricheskie zadachi), and 
addressing them is an important contribution for everyone. Together, we will 
definitely make a difference in our lives for the better.” For the Russian elite, life 
is already quite well off in material terms. Were constitutional changes really 
intended for the  sake of the  common people in Russia, or was it to preserve 
Putin’s system of power?
Putin began building his power system during the first term of the presidency 
by taking control over major financial flows from the  sale of energy resources 
among other things. This was done by sending his trusted persons Alexei Miller 
and Dmitry Medvedev to Gazprom. Igor Sechin had and still has to run Rosneft. 
The second important step in the establishment of the power system was to take 
control over major television channels, as in the  early 21st century the  most 
effective way to the  minds and hearts of the  broad Russian population was 
through the TV screens. Propaganda has helped to maintain power, but it does 
nothing to help create a sustainable economic model for the country. The words 
‘technological breakthrough’ were also often heard when Putin became head of 
state for the  fourth time in 2018. Listening to Putin’s speeches of recent years, 
one feels as if he has not been in power for twenty years and is not responsible 
for the missed huge opportunities for modernization of Russia brought about by 
high oil prices. Instead, Putin’s power vertical has provided centralized power and 
a fabulous income for some of Putin’s trusted billionaires, not for a large society. 
Dmitry Medvedev, when becoming President of Russia in 2008, set out an 
ambitious plan for his presidency to fight corruption. It has already been realized 
after one year that such ambitions should not be set, as a  serious fight against 
corruption would require dismantling, or at least severe shaking of the  entire 
Russian system of power and prosecuting elite figures close to Vladimir Putin. 
The next goal, defined by Medvedev in 2009, was the modernization of Russia. 
Unfortunately, it was limited to the  economic dimension, not the  political 
one. And  even in such a  limited way, it was not implemented. The  creation of 
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the Skolkovo Innovation Center is not enough, even if it works well; the peculiarities 
of the development of Russia’s regions do not allow introduction of new practices. 
If the current situation is quite acceptable for Putin’s elite as providing for them 
not only power but also wealth, the  real victims are the Russian people, whose 
social benefits and prosperity are like a distant mirage. In a number of life quality 
indicators Russia, a country rich in energy, metals and minerals, lags far behind 
Western Europe and the United States – countries that Kremlin’s propagandists 
are relentlessly disparaging and mocking.
Medvedev’s updated economic modernization was, in part, a  facade name 
of Russia’s attempt to plug holes in the  state budget with a  framework of 
“cooperation with the EU to modernize Russia”. A real economic transformation 
would require political changes to ensure the independence of the judiciary and 
the liberalization of the internal energy sector, which would increase competition 
and foster the  development of an entrepreneurial culture. The  Kremlin was 
afraid that Mikhail Khodorkovsky and similar businessmen would compete with 
the  center for power in the  process of liberalization, so no regional activity on 
their own was allowed. Labor productivity is boosted by internal competition 
in capitalism, but it has been in part replaced by efforts of businessmen to find 
favor with the president, governors and other local authorities of modern Russia. 
The system in which Putin’s friends receive special favors, such as the diversion 
of taxpayers’ money to counter the effects of Western sanctions, is not conducive 
to the  functioning of the  free market. Russia could attract more investment 
(including innovative projects) if foreign investors were not afraid of raiderism 
(deprivation of business through legal, semi-legal and illegal methods) and 
‘telephone laws’ (influencing court decisions by telephone calls from high-level 
government officials). Without fundamental political reforms, such an objective 
cannot be achieved.
The history of Russia shows the  campaigns of modernization and 
industrialization that have been carried out from the  top down, as is already 
accepted in totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Peter the  First made a  rapid 
change, with men having to shave their beards and start following European 
fashion in clothing. Innovations were introduced through ruling with an iron 
rod – it was dangerous to say ‘no’ to the emperor. Neither Stalin’s industrialization 
took into account anything, including human lives. Will Putin implement such 
modernization? Even if he wanted to, he could not do it, because much of today’s 
Russia’s population is not like under Peter the  First, and therefore they would 
not submit. Will the 21st century Russia’s leader follow Western modernization 
scenario? Rather not, as political change would make him and his circle of 
confidence lose power. So, the forecast is simple – there will be no real political 
and economic modernization of Russia while the Putin system persists.
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People in Putin’s circle of confidence regard political reforms against 
the  backdrop of the  consequences changes introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev  – 
the  collapse of the  Soviet Union. Gorbachev tried to ventilate the  barn, but it 
collapsed. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka once said that the “power, as 
grandfather Lenin taught, must be held firm.” the Kremlin has analyzed the course 
of the  Russian Revolution and the  modern social revolutions. Indeed, the  last 
acting USSR leader Gennady Yanayev had trembling hands during the  press 
conference after the coup of August 1991. Whether the fact that hands of today’s 
Russian leader do not tremble will help to avoid shocks, just the  time will tell.
This book has been produced by an international team of researchers. In 
the first article of the collection, Maria Domanska, a Polish researcher, examines 
Russia’s political model, Vladimir Putin’s system of power, which also determines 
how the country’s economy works. Domanska examines how legal nihilism prevails 
in Russia and the  disregard for private property rights affects opportunities to 
modernize the economy and attract foreign investment. Vladimir Milov, a Russian 
politician and energy expert, will look into the  accelerating changes in global 
energy demand. He puts a question: Is Russian power ready to seriously develop 
other sources of income and diversify its economy? High oil prices have allowed 
Vladimir Putin to maintain the  minimum income he needs during his reign, 
thus preventing revolution in the  country, and allowing to postpone necessary 
reforms. Political inactivity of citizens and massive propaganda by the authorities 
have ensured that the power elite has the status quo unchanged.
German experts Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal review in their article 
the Russia-EU relations in the field of energy supply. Researchers delve into both 
the  history of these relations and the  impact of the  annexation of Crimea on 
EU-Russia relations. The article also examines how energy trade will eventually 
be affected by the EU’s commitment to green energy. Alexander Goltz, a military 
expert, examines the dynamics of Russian military spending in his article. Defense 
spending has been a  very important item in Russia’s federal budget for several 
years. Goltz analyzes how the  lack of transparency has affected corruption and 
ineffective use of public funds. 
Russian regional policy and development expert Dmitry Oreshkin discusses 
Kremlin policy towards Russian regions in his article. During Vladimir Putin’s 
reign, regional policy has facilitated the flow of resources to the center, preventing 
the  regions from effectively managing themselves. Oreshkin examines how 
centralized economic policies have led to dramatic differences in living standards 
between Russia’s regions, Moscow and St. Petersburg. From the point of view of 
the existing Russian authorities, such a model is convenient because poor regions 
are easily manipulated and retain their political loyalty, but in the long run it poses 
risks to the integrity of the country. China expert Vita Spivak writes in this book 
on Russian-Chinese economic relations. She examines how Russia is showing 
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a positive attitude towards China by giving it access to strategic areas, including 
military technology and the  energy sector. However, small and medium-size 
Chinese investors face the suspicion and inaction of Russian local officials. 
Mārcis Balodis, a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies, 
looks at Russia’s dominant position in the  Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
where other member states are unable to balance regional hegemony. Following 
the  illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, even Russia’s closest allies to the  CIS 
integration projects  – Kazakhstan and Belarus  – felt some discomfort that did 
not facilitate real and credible integration into the  EEU. Moscow’s pressure on 
Belarus is growing as the Kremlin no longer wants (and is unable) to subsidize 
Alexander Lukashenka’s regime. Russia buys Belarusian loyalty with reduced oil 
and natural gas prices, but with each price dispute the atmosphere becomes more 
heated.
A Lithuanian expert on Russian cleptocracy and hybrid warfare instruments, 
Marius Laurinavičius focuses on the destructive impact of money flowing from 
Russia to the  West. Laurinavičius draws readers’ attention to the  fact that 
political parties, churches, universities, football clubs and charity projects in 
several countries are being funded from Russia to increase Moscow’s influence. 
Mārtiņš Kaprāns, a  media expert and communications scientist, analyzes 
how economically-saturated narratives are used by official Russian-organized 
propagandists to influence audiences in the  Baltic States. Propaganda and 
misinformation initiated by the  Russian authorities reach the  Baltics through 
extensive Kremlin-controlled media. Propagandists purposefully avoid looking 
at facts that show that the Baltic economies are growing faster than many other 
European countries for years, not to mention the CIS countries.
There are many more economic issues we wanted to explore, but the scope of 
the project sets its limits. The book is a compilation of two approaches; research 
methods of both political science and economics help to understand current 
events and trends in Russia. Will Russia succeed in modernizing its economy 
during Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidency? Is Russia prepared for the  eventual 
change in the  EU’s demand for energy as a  result of the  EU turn to greener 
consumption? Does Putin’s power system promote innovation and balanced 
regional development? Answers to these and other questions have been sought 
by article authors from Russia, Poland, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia.
I would like to thank the  project partners Peer Krumrey, Director of 
the  Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) in the  Baltic States, Krists Šukevičs, 
FES Project Manager, Andris Kužnieks, Acting Head of the  Representation of 
the European Commission in Latvia, and all the scholars – authors of the articles.
Riga, January, 2020 
Andis Kudors
Part I: Domestic Development 
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State of Russian Economy and its Influence 
on Putin’s Politics at the 4th Term
Maria Domanska
Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (2012–2018) brought about 
numerous negative changes in Russian political, economic and social reality. After 
mass protests in 2011–2012 that accompanied Putin’s return to presidency after 
a  four-year absence, the  Kremlin decided to crack down on human rights and 
civil society organizations. War against Ukraine and ensuing Western sanctions 
weakened Russia’s position in the  international arena, while financial-economic 
crisis of 2014–2016 and subsequent stagnation together with a  poor quality of 
state governance had their repercussions on the  domestic scene. The  first two 
years of Putin’s fourth term in office (the final consecutive term he is permitted 
under the  current constitution) have witnessed growing frustration among 
the  society, serious fluctuations of public support for the  authorities, and an 
increase in the number of local protests of mainly socio-economic background. 
As  the  prospects of economic development remain disappointing, the  Kremlin 
may face some, albeit not dramatic, challenges in the run up to the next presidential 
election in 2024.
Political foundations of Russian economic model
Factors that determine the shape and logic of Russian economic model are 
predominantly of political character and stem from the  very nature of Russian 
authoritarian regime. The  political-economic system is inefficient in terms 
of development, but relatively effective in terms of control. State interests are 
identified with personal and group interests of the ruling elite. Real mechanisms 
of decision-making and ruling the  country, which are informal in nature, are 
based on personal or group ties in politics and business. State-business relations 
are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the  key 
interest of the  political elite which is to maintain and reproduce the  current 
system in a long run.
State of Russian Economy and its Influence on Putin’s Politics at the 4th Term
M. Domanska
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This system can be described as1: 
• neo-patrimonial, due to specific understanding of the  state and its 
resources by the  ruling elite as a  de facto property of a  narrow group 
of decision-makers, in which the central role is played by the President. 
By this logic, the  boundaries between the  private and the  public are 
systemically blurred. Political power is converted into access to lucrative 
assets and corrupt revenues. Profiting from specific areas of economic 
activity depends on the  arbitrary decisions of the  leader and his 
entourage, and mostly constitutes payment for one’s loyalty or service. 
• patronal, due to the predominance of informal networks within it. Formal 
institutions and written law often serve as smokescreens concealing 
the  real mechanisms of power where informal rules are of primary 
importance.The true extent of the state institutions’ competence, as well 
as social status and the scope of the rights, duties and privileges assigned 
to the representatives of the elite and ordinary citizens, are determined 
not as much by universal  – institutional and legal  – relationships, as 
by personal or business bonds based on loyalty and protection. It leads 
to widespread clientelism as an organizing principle of social-political 
relations across the state, and to the dominance of ‘manual mode’ of state 
governance.
• kleptocratic, due to being consumed by systemic corruption resulting 
in significant losses to the state budget2 and in the general population’s 
continued low standard of living. It is manifested in its most colourful 
forms in the  direct and large-scale embezzlement of state property by 
selected members of the elite.
• ‘Chekist’, due to the  concentration of the  decision-making powers 
in the  hands of politicians with roots in the  special services (led by 
the  President, a  former KGB officer), with their particular mentality 
and methods which have been transferred to the basis of state policies. 
The  core value in this system is an absolute primacy of control and 
supervision over economic development, which assumes the  use of 
political repressions as a standard mechanism of state governance. 
All factors mentioned above impede economic growth. Politics and economy 
are intertwined in a feedback loop where political clout makes it possible to gain 
economic assets which in turn help solidify political power. It leads to a mafia-
like model of state governance (sometimes overlapping with organized crime), 
where widespread pathologies are not only tolerated but constitute an inherent 
part of the system. Such a model can work only at the cost of the general public.
This logic results in bad investment climate as investors’ money are never 
safe: legal protection of property rights is often purely illusory and investing in 
Russia is burdened with a significant risk of hostile takeovers. As a consequence, 
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the Russian business and political elite members are strongly attached to natural 
resource rent as a  relatively easy and quick way to enrichment. Needless to 
say, huge amount of money flows out of Russia every year and is most likely 
transferred to tax havens – according to some surveys, over one trillion dollars 
may have been siphoned off from Russia between 1994 and 20183. This is done 
not only in order to evade taxes but also out of a  desire to protect assets from 
Russian jurisdiction. 
The scale of such operations makes one to raise a question about the actual role 
and effectiveness of Russian state institutions. Characteristic feature of Vladimir 
Putin’s rule since early 2000s was a  constant increase of the  state control over 
economy, as well as excessive bureaucracy and the tightening grip on the public 
sphere. The estimated share the state had in the economy was 35% in 2005 and 
70% in 20154. The  strengthening of redistribution functions of the  state and 
the excessive development of the bureaucratic apparatus have weakened control of 
the way public funds are spent and made citizens and business circles dependent 
on budget funds (above all through social transfers and non-transparent public 
procurements). The  situation of private business entities worsened after 2014 
when, due to Western sanctions and economic crisis, a hard battle for dwindling 
resources began. Currently the state-owned enterprises keep expanding at the cost 
of the  private business companies, including through informal ‘nationalization’ 
of the latter5.
However paradoxical it may seem, this overgrown state is largely privatized. 
One of its main functions is to conceal and legitimize traditional patrimonial 
practices. The  ‘state’  – understood as a  system of public institutions which are 
depersonalized and autonomous vis a  vis people holding political power  – is 
constantly and intentionally being weakened, while the  phenomenon of ‘crony 
capitalism’ keeps flourishing. The top managers of big state companies – like Igor 
Sechin, the CEO of Rosneft, or Viktor Chemezov, the CEO of Rostec, are de facto 
tenants and beneficiaries of rich ‘fiefdoms’ made up of state funds and assets. 
Huge amounts of state budget money are most likely transferred to their private 
accounts (usually through a  complex system of multi-layered, opaque public 
procurement schemes). The same refers to Kremlin-supported private oligarchs 
parasitizing on lucrative state contracts (most salient examples are Putin’s cronies: 
Rotenberg brothers, Gennadi Timchenko and Yuri Kovalchuk) and high-ranking 
officials entangled in political corruption6. As the  so-called ‘Panama Papers’ 
published in 2016 revealed, not only the  illegal off-shore schemes of stealing 
national property revolve round Putin’s inner circle but most probably one of 
their beneficiaries is Russian President himself, although no concrete evidence 
has been presented against him.
While some big state and private businesses negotiate their privileges through 
obscure bargains with the ‘collective Kremlin’, the situation of the rest of companies 
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in Russia  – either big, medium or small  – is much more vulnerable. Learning 
the  lessons from two Ukrainian ‘colour revolutions’, where some businessmen 
directly supported anti-governmental protests, Russian authorities are determined 
not to allow free business to emerge. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, 
suggesting that the  state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, there is no 
will to devise a  systemic solution to their most urgent problems. They include 
systemic violations of the  property rights, abuse of criminal law provisions in 
investigations into economic crimes, arbitrary actions by control and prosecution 
bodies, as well as the partiality of courts which frequently manipulate the course 
of the proceedings, as a consequence of which businesspeople increasingly often 
lose cases brought against them by the authorities. The proportion of acquittals 
in cases involving economic crimes remains below 1%. According to government 
estimates, the  operation of the  supervision system leads to business losses that 
reach 5% of GDP annually. Over 70% of entrepreneurs claimed in 2016 that 
the level of risk associated with doing business had risen since President Vladimir 
Putin started his third term in office in 20127. Under such conditions Russia 
stands virtually no chance of succeeding in the global technological competition: 
bottom-up development of advanced technologies that could contribute to 
economic growth is often suppressed by politically-motivated repressions aiming 
to take control over every single sphere of social-business activity.
Current macroeconomic indicators and Russia’s developmental 
prospects
After a  two-year financial-economic crisis that hit Russia in 2014–2016, 
the  country has been struggling with stagnation that  – according to most 
assessments  – will last for long. Average annual GDP growth in 2014–2018 
oscillated around 0.5%8, while the  official forecast for 2019 is at 1.3% and for 
2020 – at 1.7%9. According to the 2016 outlook by Russian Ministry of Economic 
Development, average annual growth up to 2035 will not exceed 2%. More 
recent document, published in 2018, presents more optimistic scenario (annual 
growth of 2.7% in 2020–2024 and 3.0–3.2% in 2025–2036)10. However, the  lack 
of viable domestic sources of growth under the current economic model makes 
the previous forecast much more realistic. The prospects for Russia may be even 
worse, including the risk of GDP decline, if pessimistic forecasts of 2020 global 
recession come true11.
The objective assessment of Russia’s actual economic situation and its 
prospects is becoming increasingly difficult. Due to probable political pressure 
from the  Kremlin the  Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) seems 
to practice a  sui generis ‘creative accounting’ with regard the  compiling and 
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interpreting statistical data. Its aim is to show the  society that socio-economic 
situation is stable. More credible data are usually offered by the  Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank – within their spheres 
of competence. 
Russian creative statistics
According to Rosstat’s updated figures as of February 2019, in 2015 
Russian GDP fell by 2.3% and in 2016 it grew by 0.3%. These figures differ 
significantly from those published initially (–3.7% and –0.6% respectively) 
and even from subsequent updates made afterwards. The  GDP growth 
indicator for 2017 was also slightly revised from initial 1.5% to 1.6%. Official 
2018 GDP growth rate of 2.3% is highly controversial as it was earlier 
assessed at 1.8% by the Ministry of Economy on the basis of preliminary 
Rosstat’s data. The reasons of such sudden improvement of figures remain 
unclear as Rosstat was not able to present compelling justification for 
surprisingly good production rates in selected industrial sectors. 
While some hindsight revisions of statistical data can be attributed to 
certain objective factors, including changes in methodology, in this case 
the scale of the change, the unprofessional manner of presenting the data, 
and their selective inclusion in the Rosstat reports undermine the credibility 
of the presented figures and their explanatory value12.
One of the most salient features of Russian economy remains its dependence 
on energy exports as the  main source of budget incomes. While the  Ministry 
of Finance declared in December 2017 that the  share of energy revenues in 
the federal budget should decrease to 33% by 2020, so far it has actually oscillated 
at a much higher rate (39.6% in 2017 and 46.3% in 2018, in comparison to 18% 
in 1999). Raw materials, mainly oil and gas, also prevail in Russian exports: in 
2018 their share reached almost 64% (in comparison to 45% in 1999)13. Revenues 
from raw materials let Russian government gather financial resources to cushion 
the  effects of unfavourable economic trends. Due to measures taken in recent 
years (including cautious budgetary spending based on relatively low predicted 
oil prices), in 2018  – for the  first time in seven years  – the  state budget was 
executed with surplus of 2,7% of GDP14. Taking into account that the  Central 
Bank and National Wealth Fund have also increased their financial reserves15, 
currently there are no major risks for the budget sustainability in the short-term 
perspective16. Most forecasts of expected average oil prices in the  coming years 
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remain within a range of US $ 50–70/bbl, while the budget for 2020–22 is based on 
conservative estimates of the average price of crude oil well below US $ 50/bbl17.
Energy exports contributed to a  large extent to Russian uninterrupted 
prosperity in the period of 2000–2007 due to steadily growing oil prices. Constant 
injections of ‘easy money’ from the raw material rent to the real sector and social 
transfers allowed the Russian elite to avoid systemic reforms and, regardless of this, 
to maintain high production and employment levels. As a result, all social groups 
benefited from the oil prosperity, though to a different extent. However, the over-
significance of energy sector in Russian economy led to serious underdevelopment 
of other sources of economic growth and gradually Russian economic model 
began to malfunction. In 2012–2013 (after a short recovery from the 2008–2009 
economic crisis), when oil prices stopped rising, although still remaining high, 
the GDP growth started to slow down18. Dependence on raw materials not only 
hinders Russian prospects of innovative development but also makes the country 
highly vulnerable to external factors which the Russian authorities have limited 
influence on: fluctuations of prices and trends on export markets which do not 
favour Russia (including the strategically important European market)19. 
One of indicators of Russia’s low growth potential is the dynamics of capital 
flows and foreign direct investment. Over the past 18 years (except for 2006–07) 
Russia has seen a  net outflow of capital. Foreign investments entering Russia 
in that period, meanwhile, have been focused in the  energy sector, confirming 
the  Russian economy’s dependence on it20. FDI into Russia accounted for only 
0.2 percent of GDP from 2015–2018, putting it at the  bottom of the  list of 
emerging markets21. In 2018 there was a  record foreign capital outflow of net 
6.5  bln USD from Russian companies (the highest level since 1997) and this 
trend continued in 201922. According to the enterprises, main internal constraints 
of industrial growth are insufficient demand and a  lack of clarity in the current 
economic situation and its prospects23. Foreign investors keep indicating to 
‘unpredictability, administrative barriers and political processes’ as the  main 
reasons for the decline in foreign investment in Russia24. Taking into account bad 
investment climate the only viable way to galvanize economic growth seems to be 
the pumping of state financial reserves into the real sector of economy. In 2018 
the  investment growth was generated mainly by the  completion of the  Crimea 
bridge construction and 2018 World Cup sport infrastructure and once these 
flagships of public investments were completed the  investment level in the first 
half of 2019 significantly decreased25. 
While Western economic sanctions did have impact on Russian financial 
and economic situation, especially in 2014–2015, Russia was able to adapt to 
the sanctions regime gradually. The overall impact of sanctions so far imposed on 
Russia on its GDP growth remains moderate (around 0.5% of GDP)26, and they 
do not constitute an imminent threat for Russian economic-financial stability. 
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However, the sanctions – especially those imposed by the US – will undermine 
the  long-term prospects of Russian innovative growth due to the  restrictions 
on trade and investment cooperation and an export ban for certain goods and 
technologies, including in the energy sphere.
With hindsight it becomes clear that the main victim of economic stagnation 
has been neither the state budget nor even the real sector of the economy27. It 
has been above all the  Russian society  – especially its poorest strata. Proof of 
this can be found in the dynamics of real disposable income of the population: 
in 2019 they keep falling for the sixth year in a row. There is also a significant 
number of people whose income is lower than the minimum subsistence level 
(12.7% or 18.6 million people in the  second quarter of 2019)28. Official data 
regarding inflation and unemployment (both below 5%) speak very little about 
the market reality. The share of households’ spending on basic material needs, 
like food and clothes, keeps growing. At the  same time there is a  growth in 
the  population’s indebtedness that reached the  maximum level since 2013, 
while 60% of those indebted find it difficult to meet their financial obligations29. 
Growing number of those surveyed claim they take loans in order to satisfy their 
basic material needs. 
In an attempt to conceive a flywheel to revive Russian economy, in May 2018 
Vladimir Putin announced a new developmental strategy for the period up to 2024, 
based on thirteen ‘national projects’ co-financed by the state budget. It focuses on 
the modernization of economy, infrastructure investments, creating a business-
friendly climate, and improvement of the  quality of public services. However, 
taking into account the  systemic political barriers for economic development, 
widespread maladministration and misuse of public funds, and the unwillingness 
of private companies to participate in ‘the national projects’, one can assume that 
they will prove to become another ‘Potemkin village’ rather than an opportunity 
to take a  leap into a  brighter future. According to some assessments, the  real 
impact of this newly-announced strategy on economic growth will reach mere 
0.1–0.2 percentage points during the next five years30. 
Influence of the economy on politics. Current situation and 
a forecast for 2020–2024
The persistent lack of economic growth may influence political reality in 
Russia twofold:
• growing disappointment of citizens with their declining living standards 
may further weaken public support for the  Russian government and 
Vladimir Putin. It will manifest itself in a  growing number of local 
protests of socio-economic or political character. 
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• dwindling economic resources and shrinking corruption rent, in 
the  light of limited opportunities of business expansion abroad due to 
Western sanctions, may provoke growing intra-elite rivalry over assets 
and increase personal risks for those who do not pertain to Putin’s 
innermost circle. 
In recent years a  visible trend of growing number of local protest actions 
(including political protests in Moscow that gathered tens of thousands of people 
during the summer of 2019), as well as gradually increasing society’s awareness of 
political sources of economic problems has been observed. This trend correlates 
with decreasing impact of the TV state propaganda on Russian public together 
with growing demand for political and civil rights and socio-political changes 
revealed by recent sociological surveys31. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of mass anti-governmental demonstrations across 
Russia in the  coming years still remains low as several factors may effectively 
hamper any major anti-governmental mobilisation. They include paternalistic 
mentality and atomisation of the large part of the Russian public, as well as high 
degree of economic and psychological dependence of the  citizens on the  state 
(almost half of the population directly relies on the state budget: among them – 
more than 46 million pensioners and at least 14 million people employed by 
the public sector32, not counting those from the private sector who depend fully on 
public procurements). In cases of economic difficulties Russians usually embark 
on a strategy of passive adaptation and individual survival strategies rather than 
taking to the streets33. According to recent surveys by Levada Centre, only about 
10% of Russians believe they can significantly influence the course of events in their 
country; they are also – predominantly – not ready to bear social costs of desired 
reforms. Moreover, what prevents the increase in protest activity among Russians 
is their rational fear of repressions along with the lack of an appealing alternative 
to the existing regime. Demands for systemic changes could pose a challenge to 
the  regime only if they begin to be regularly expressed by the  groups regarded 
as the  government’s social backbone (so far mostly passive), like public sector 
employees, pensioners, the  working class, and not by the  middle class (so  far 
the  most active social stratum) calling for the  democratisation of the  system.
In spite of narrowing down the group of beneficiaries of Russian economic 
model (due to intra-elite rivalry and growing costs of Western sanctions), 
the probability of mutiny among business and political elite remains low. The elite 
members feel ever more uncomfortable about shrinking amount of resources to 
share and their endangered personal safety due to the  so-called ‘fight against 
corruption’34, however they still perceive the existing system of power as offering 
them more benefits than engendering costs. What is more, the  high level of 
mutual distrust will most probably restrain the elite members from a  ‘collective 
action’ against the president. 
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Against this background any deep systemic reforms remain off the Kremlin’s 
agenda. Although the lack of such reforms will result in gradual and unstoppable 
degradation of Russian economy and the  living standards of the  public, 
such scenario is still perceived by the  Kremlin as less risky than an overall 
transformation of the  system which would undermine the  vital political and 
business interests of those currently in power. Instead, the policy of small, tactical 
adjustments to the  system will be continued. In the  coming years the  Russian 
government will most probably continue to resort to selective money transfers 
to the  groups of population most painfully hit by economic malaise, and to 
seeming improvement of the  state governance quality as a  compensation for 
lowered living standards. ‘The safety net’ provided by state financial reserves 
and raw materials export revenues will most probably create a  sufficient room 
for manouvre for the  government to address flexibly the  most urgent needs of 
socio-economic character and to prevent domestic destabilization. As regards 
the  quality of state governance, ‘the technocratization’ of federal and regional 
elites (replacement of politicians with easily changeable ‘managers’) can constitute 
an effective means of ‘crisis management’ in a short run, but it will have limited 
long-term impact on social moods in the  light of inherent anti-development 
features of Putin’s regime. Further prevention of major intra-elite turbulence may 
require the intensification of the ‘fight against corruption’ in order to discipline 
the elite members, as well as more frequent turnover of state officials on different 
levels of the state apparatus.
In the view of the above, unless external factors bring an economic shock to 
Russia, major domestic turbulence seems hardly probable during Putin’s current 
presidential term. Nevertheless, the  growing discontent among the  public and 
the elite can have some impact on the behind-the-scenes bargains over possible 
power succession in 2024. Increased intra-elite tensions can lower the  quality 
of state governance (including ‘the crisis management’ in case of local socio-
economic emergencies), which in turn may further erode social support for 
the regime. As a last resort the Kremlin may intensify repressions against its real 
and hypothetical opponents, however this method of ruling is the  most costly 
and the least effective in the long term. In any case, politically motivated logic of 
securing the authoritarian regime will continue to have priority over economic 
calculations at least until 2024.
Conclusion
Russian economic model is designed above all to serve political and financial 
interests of the  ruling elite. Economic calculations and free market rules play 
secondary role in this game; they are subordinated to the overriding goal which 
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is to maintain and reproduce the  current authoritarian system in a  long run. 
Politics and economy are intertwined in a  feedback loop where political clout 
makes it possible to gain economic assets which in turn help to solidify political 
power. By this logic, political control is regarded by the Kremlin as much more 
important than economic development. 
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Russia’s Dependency on the Energy Sector: 
How Long?
Vladimir Milov
The idea that Russia needs to diversify its economy away from overly 
dependence on the oil & gas export revenues has been dominating the national 
discourse for the past decades – as a matter of fact, it had first originated from 
the  program documents of the  Communist Party of the  Soviet Union, which 
had realized the  negative effects of such dependence since the  emergence 
of “big oil” as Russia’s main source of export revenues in the  1970s. Massive 
government rhetoric on this issue has yielded zero practical results – instead, as 
shown above, Russian dependence on oil & gas revenues has grown in the past 
20 years by some key criteria (see below for details). This can be easily explained 
by the  fact that Vladimir Putin’s system of governance clearly benefits from 
significant oil  & gas export revenues, and moreover, its sustainability depends 
on it  – cash from energy exports allows building substantial financial reserves 
which are key to maintaining stable macroeconomic environment and financing 
state-sponsored investments, or so-called “national projects” (major priorities of 
Putin’s government economic policy), plus to enrich Putin’s cronies who have 
built their businesses and personal wealth on redistribution of oil & gas rents. 
So, there’s, in fact, a  little practical motivation for Putin’s government to change 
the  oil & gas status quo. In rhetoric, everybody in Russia is constantly talking 
about the  need to diversify the  economy and reduce energy dependence  – in 
reality, majority of the elite is happy with the status quo, so little changes occur.
Real life, however, presents new challenges to the  oil & gas dependence 
paradigm that is currently dominating Russia. First, the  growing global 
competition in the  oil & gas markets has wiped off larger part of the  super 
profits that Russia used to enjoy back in the 2000s when the current political and 
economic systems had originated. It is hard to imagine a scenario under which oil 
prices will come back to the level of above $ 100 per barrel for a prolonged period 
of time, and Gazprom currently sells natural gas to Europe at $ 200–250 per tcm, 
not the $ 300–400 anymore which it used to enjoy ten years ago. Competition, 
which is driven by the  shale oil & gas revolution in the  U.S., development of 
global LNG trade, European Union policy of reforming its energy markets – is 
a  long-term sustainable factor, which won’t allow returning to the  rent-seeking 
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model of Russian economy build in 2000s. Oil & gas sector is not a  source of 
super profits and rents to the extent it used to be, and will never be again.
Second, new strategic threats are looming: the prospect of fast replacement 
of internal combusting engines (ICEs) with electric vehicles (EVs) in automotive 
transport raises the  prospect of “peak oil demand”  – fundamental changes in 
the  global oil market which will end the  era of relatively expensive oil due to 
falling automotive demand for forever. This issue is discussed in more detail 
below, but the  experts are currently arguing mostly about “when” the  EV 
revolution in automotive transport will create a  glut at the  oil market and put 
an end to expensive oil  – 2025, 2030, and 2035  – but not “if ” this is going to 
happen, which is more or less a  certain perspective now. Russia seems to be 
totally unprepared for this kind of situation, which has a  potential to serve as 
a replica of oil price collapse of 1985 – that has contributed greatly to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.
These two trends at the international energy markets – growing competition 
and looming demand revolution  – may have profound effect not only for 
the Russian economy, but also for the whole model of the current Russian state 
and system of governance, as it would most likely deprive Russia from significant 
oil & gas export rents, the  control over which and redistribution of which is 
the essence of the system built by Vladimir Putin during the past 20 years.
This pressure is also complicated by the  third problem – Russian oil & gas 
production is getting more expensive over time, as traditional mature fields 
become depleted, and the production moves to regions with substantially higher 
costs. This is also a game changer of sorts: the Russian government already has 
to provide huge tax discounts to oil & gas companies to develop new fields, 
which will inevitably bring down budget revenue from the  oil & gas industry 
in the  coming years as production from new, more expensive fields replaces 
relatively cheaper output from matured Western Siberian fields (this issue is 
discussed below in more detail).
All in all, the rent-oriented model of the Russian state built during the past 
20 years is already dead. Even though it technically lingers on, some important 
new signs of change are visible on the surface:
• Russian Federal budget for 2020–20221, country’s main financial 
guideline document (currently undergoing a  process of adoption by 
the  State Duma which is supposed to be finished by end-November), 
envisages unprecedented fiscal consolidation under the currently enacted 
“budget rule”, which is basically explained with the fact that the country 
needs to prepare for harder times and consolidate the available modest 
rents (from relatively modest-priced $ 60/barrel oil and $ 200+/tcm gas) 
in the  “rainy day fund”, instead of spending this money today for 
development purposes; 
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• Gazprom’s biggest construction contractors and Putin’s closest cronies, 
Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko, have either sold or are in 
the process of selling back to Gazprom their lucrative gas infrastructure 
construction businesses2, which have delivered them generous profits in 
the past 10–15 years, meaning that they don’t see a perspective for major 
new rents in form of capital expenditure spending on construction for 
the coming years anymore.
These issues are considered below in more detail, but the bottom line is that 
even the key actors in the Russian elite are preparing for the worst.
However, in terms of open public recognition of the oil & gas dependence 
challenge, Russian elite is remarkably falling behind and is not truly catching up 
with the real-world developments. Despite some alarmist voices3, there’s a lot of 
denial potential new challenges to the current rent-oriented model, and the key 
political figures continue to reiterate the  old mantras that “the world won’t be 
able to go on without the good old hydrocarbons” and that the newly emerging 
trends – be it competition from shale oil & gas or growth in renewable energy 
production or the  perspective of EV revolution in automotive transport  – are 
“a bubble” (see separate paragraph below on such a  denial of future energy 
market trends). This has the capacity to lead Russia into a major economic crisis 
connected with collapse of the oil & gas revenues in the coming from medium 
to longer term period, to the  similar magnitude as compared to the  collapse 
of the  international oil prices since 1985, which had eventually contributed to 
the fall of the Soviet Union.
Assessing Russia’s current dependence on the oil & gas sector: how 
much?
There are different criteria which can be used to assess the actual dependence 
of Russia on the  oil & gas sector. Frequently, a  share of oil & gas industries in 
GDP is used, which looks quite modest in nominal terms. Russian oil & gas 
industries make up just about 8–10% of the Russian GDP (depending on oil price 
fluctuations). However, some economists argue that not all of the  value added 
generated by the oil & gas sector is accounted for through such a direct count, 
and part of it is counted as “trade operations”, which allows to estimate the real 
share of oil & gas in GDP as not less than 25% (see “Potemkin’s GDP” by Christof 
Ruehl and Mark Schaffer4).
In reality, two other factors illustrate Russia’s deep dependence on the oil & 
gas revenues better than the  GDP share merit: the  share of oil & gas related 
income in government budget revenue and the share of oil & gas in total exports. 
The first one in total budget revenue shows how deeply the stability government’s 
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finances is dependent on income from oil & gas industries, and how vulnerable 
Russia’s budget is to potential oil & gas price shocks. As can be seen in graph 1 
below, the dependence is particularly strong for the federal government budget: 
after the taxes on the oil industry were significantly raised in 2005, the share of 
oil & gas revenue in the total federal budget revenue was always within 40–50% 
range, as opposed to 10–20% in the early 2000s, when oil prices were low, and 
the  level of taxation of the  oil industry was relatively modest. Similar picture 
exists for the  “consolidated” budget (budget of the  general government that 
includes not only federal budget, but also regional budgets and budgets of tax-
financed state funds like Pension fund and medical insurance fund): since 2005, 
the share of oil & gas revenues has stayed within 20–30% range as related to total 
income of the consolidated budget, as opposed to 5–10% before 2005.
Graph 1: Share of oil & gas budget revenues* in Russia’s state budget  
in 2000–2018
* Includes mineral extraction tax for hydrocarbons and export duties for oil, gas and 
petroleum products from 2004 onward; sum of various taxes on mineral resources 
production and export duties before 2004.
Sources: Rosstat, “Russian Statistical Yearbook”; Federal Treasury, data on yearly 
consolidated budgets.
As can be seen from the  graph 1 above, the  dependence of Russia’s 
government finances on the oil & gas revenue has grown considerably since early 
2000s, despite all the rhetoric of Vladimir Putin’s government about the need to 
“diversify the economy” away from the overly dependence on energy industries.
Share of oil & gas revenues in Russia’s total exports is even greater: as can 
be seen from graph 2 below, since 2004, it had stayed within 50–70% range, 
fluctuating along with the  level of international oil prices, but always exceeding 
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50%. This is also essentially higher than the beginning of 2000s, when the share 
of oil & gas revenues was 50% or below, which is another indicator showing 
increasing dependence of the  Russian economy on its energy sector under 
Vladimir Putin.
Graph 2: Russian oil & gas exports* as % of the total exports, 2000–2018
* Includes revenues from exports of crude oil, petroleum products, piped natural gas, 
and LNG.
Source: Russian Federal Customs Service, “Exports of Crucial Goods from Russia”.
Extremely high share of oil & gas revenues in exports is important since 
it makes the  current accounts balance overly dependent on the  fluctuations of 
the  oil & gas prices. Sharp drop in prices may cause significant devaluation 
of  the  Russian currency, the  ruble, which undermines consumer purchasing 
power (since Russian consumer market is still significantly dependent on imports 
of consumer goods and materials for their production) and leads to decline in 
real household incomes  – as have happened since collapse of the  international 
oil prices in 2014 (Western financial sanctions depriving Russian companies and 
banks of opportunity to borrow at the  international financial markets have also 
contributed, but the effect of the oil price decline was obvious, too).
Given the  figures shown above, it is clear that the  dependence of Russia 
on the  oil & gas export revenue is critical for some major elements securing 
the stability of the country’s economic system: the sustainability of government’s 
finances and ruble’s exchange rate are both critically dependent on the inflow of 
oil & gas money into the country.
Such critical dependence is actually the one reasonable explanation behind 
the  Russian Government’s somewhat awkward budget policy of the  moment 
(which is also sealed in the  newly adopted federal budget for 2020–20225): 
the  Government seems to be very much ready to tolerate the  slowdown of 
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economic growth to below 2% on the  background of significant tax increases 
(increase of VAT rate from 18% to 20% in 2019 and other tax increases which 
add to permanently growing tax burden on the  economy) at the  time when 
budget maintains strong surpluses (a total RUR 4 trillion surplus is envisaged 
for the  federal budget for 2020–20226). Russian economic Minister Maxim 
Oreshkin openly admits why such policy is been carried out: to get prepared 
for the  situation when the  oil prices fall to $  40 per barrel or below, even at 
the expense of slashing economic growth rates7.
Risks and challenges
Major future risks to the Russian economic system over reliant on oil & gas 
export revenues were briefly listed above, and below we consider them in more 
detail.
Competition at the global energy markets: No more super profits
Basic approaches to the current economic policy (first of all, budget system 
built on extracting excessive rents from the  oil & gas industry) have emerged 
during the  era of historically high oil prices, when the  price of a  barrel was 
above $  100 or near. However, as we have seen since the  oil price collapse of 
2014, any attempts to bring the oil prices back near that levels are failing due to 
fundamentally changing situation at the  global oil market. Since the  U.S. shale 
oil revolution, a  new major player has emerged at the  international oil market 
(American shale oil producers) which only benefit from any efforts to artificially 
hold back oil output by Russia and OPEC, and keep pumping more oil. This 
supports the glut at the  international oil markets and prevents prices from ever 
coming back closer to $ 100 per barrel: growth in prices opens the opportunity 
for further increases of shale oil output, which replaces cuts by OPEC and Russia. 
The spectacular failure of the OPEC-Russia oil output cut agreement of 2016–2019 
to bring oil prices to higher levels again illustrates just exactly that mechanism. 
(Graphs on the dynamics of the international oil price and U.S. shale output can 
be provided if necessary, but I don’t think they’re particularly relevant for this 
paper as these developments are well known.)
Another factor is the  increased competition at the  European natural gas 
market (which will remain key target market for the  Russian gas for decades) 
which has led to significant decoupling of gas export prices from the oil prices, 
and revenues from gas exports shrinking even to a  greater extent as compared 
to oil. Graph 3 shows how the  differential between European gas import 
prices and Brent oil prices has increased: whereas in 2006–2010 prices of oil at 
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$ 60–70 per barrel have corresponded to natural gas import prices in Germany at 
the level of $ 46–50 per barrel of oil equivalent ($ 280–305 per tcm), in the recent 
years, German gas imports prices have never exceeded $  40 per barrel of oil 
equivalent (or were below $ 250 per tcm).
Graph 3: European natural gas prices are less linked to oil than they used to be
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
Graph 4 shows that Gazprom’s average gas export prices to Europe in 
the recent years have never been able to recover to a level above $ 250 per tcm, 
as opposed to $  350–400 per tcm range that Gazprom has enjoyed back in 
2011–2014:
Graph 4: Gazprom’s average European gas export price, $/tcm
Source: Gazprom’s IFRS financial reports.
As a  result of that, Gazprom has been recently reporting shrinking profits 
due to weak gas exports prices, despite the record sales of gas to Europe in terms 
of volumes8.
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All this means that Russia may never again see the  super profits from 
exporting oil & gas at the  levels it had before 2015, when oil was above $  100 
per barrel, and the  amount of revenues from oil & gas exports would remain 
relatively low by the standards of the past 15 years.
Into the renewable energy future: “Oil shock” is on the way
Yet even another looming challenge is the  potential oil demand revolution 
which may not only bring the  oil prices further down, but actually put them 
under an eternal cap, when we shall never again see oil above $ 30–40 per barrel, 
with the  prospect that prices may fall to even lower levels. Currently, main 
consumer of oil is the  transport sector, and about 60% of the  oil consumption 
by the transport sector is automotive demand. However, here we see a process of 
rapid replacement of the internal combustion engines (ICEs) with electric vehicles 
(EVs), which at some point may lead to the situation when EVs would eventually 
begin to dominate the global automotive sector, the largest oil-consuming sector 
by far, leading to collapse of demand for petroleum products. Such a  prospect 
in the  recent years has intensified the  discussion about “peak oil demand”  – 
a turning point for the global oil market when international demand for oil will 
stop to grow, and will only begin to decline further. Oil will still continue to be in 
demand for some extent, but peak demand will lead to emergence of a significant 
oil glut at the markets which will lead to oil price collapse.
There’s a  discussion among economists and industry experts as to when 
such an EV revolution in the  automotive sector will happen, and it is beyond 
the  scope of this paper to discuss this issue in detail. However, despite the  fact 
that most oil companies expect demand to peak between the  late 2020s and 
the  2040s, and the  International Energy Agency does not expect a  peak before 
2040, forecasts exist that EV revolution leading to peak oil demand may be as 
close as mid-2020s9.
In any case, recognition of looming peak oil demand is becoming a mainstream 
in the  global oil markets and, as usually with the  technological revolutions, 
conservative forecasts have a chance of not living up to the actual reality. Russia 
has to be prepared for that – given the fact that it had already experienced similar 
oil export revenues collapses in the  past (in the  1980s). Some of the  members 
of the  Russian elite seem to recognize these risks. For instance, German Gref, 
former economic Minister and key driver of the economic reforms of the 2000s, 
currently chairing Russia’s biggest bank Sberbank, has been increasingly focusing 
on the  looming “oil shock” for the  Russian economy, bringing oil prices below 
$ 40 per barrel in his public speeches10.
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In denial: Russia’s rulers just don’t realize the seriousness of the problem
Despite the some levels of recognition of potential oil shock looming and its 
dire consequences to the Russian economy (see the reference to German Gref ’s 
remarks mentioned above11), generally, Russian authorities are in deep denial of 
the dangers that lay ahead. In their public speeches, top decision making figures 
continue to repeat the  following mantras, which are becoming irrelevant by 
the minute:
• That “abandoning hydrocarbons is dangerous for the civilization” (recent 
speech by Vladimir Putin12);
• That renewable energy is strategically not competitive, its prospects are 
exaggerated and it harms the environment (also Vladimir Putin13);
• That prospects of rapid expansion of EVs in automotive transport are 
exaggerated and oil would continue to dominate in the next 20–30 years 
(Igor Sechin, CEO of oil company Rosneft14);
• That the U.S. shale oil & gas revolution is “a bubble” and will not be able 
to sustain itself (Vladimir Putin15 and Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller16).
This denial is not just rhetoric. It is actually reflected in the  government’s 
practical policy, which is still currently aimed at accumulating significant 
financial reserves for years to come, basing mainly on the income from oil & gas 
export revenues, and at attempting to revive the Russian economy not through 
encouraging private investment, but mainly through massive state-financed 
investments through the  so-called “national projects” (source: materials for 
the  Federal budget for 2020–202217). The  funding for these “national projects”, 
to a  larger extent, is also expected to come from the oil & gas export revenues. 
The  development of alternative sectors of the  economy (manufacturing, high-
tech), which can potentially substitute oil & gas in the future, is not particularly 
successful, because it is not built on encouraging private initiative, private 
investment and international competitiveness, but instead on injecting some 
oil-related money into a  narrow number of state-appointed monopolies  – an 
approach which will never work, as explained below in more detail.
Such policy approaches put Russia in grave danger in the face of the above 
explained potential future developments which have the potential bring oil & gas 
prices even further down, and totally deprive Russia of the oil & gas rents which it 
had enjoyed before, and on which its current economic system is essentially built. 
Apart from destabilizing the budget system, falling oil & gas export revenues will 
also cause further devaluation of ruble, hitting domestic consumer purchasing 
power and constraining economic growth (how these effects have worked in 
2014–2016 is explained in the working paper “The Russian economy IN FOCUS: 
recovery is further away than some might think” published by the  author of 
the present paper in 201718).
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Alternative reality: is Russia prepared?
What Russia would do if it experienced oil & gas price shock as explained 
above? What else can Russia produce besides oil & gas? Does it do anything to 
diversify its economy away from the  overly dependence on its energy sector?
One can’t say that there have been made no attempts to develop the alternative 
sectors of the economy. However, they all have turned to be mostly unsuccessful, 
and for a  very clear reason: Vladimir Putin’s economic model, instead of 
stimulating private initiative, private and foreign investment, competition, private 
sector-driven innovation, instead focuses on development of “strategic sectors” 
by appointing a dominating player (essentially, a monopoly), often state-owned 
(which undermines the effectiveness of its governance), creates huge barriers for 
outsiders for entry in these sectors, and forces other state-linked companies to 
buy its products (thus eliminating stimulus for the non-oil & gas products to be 
competitive – the state players will be forced to buy them anyway, so why bother). 
The  classical examples of the  recent attempts and failures of that kind include:
• Civil aircraft manufacturing. In the  early 2000s, Russia has scrambled 
several competing projects for developing new civil aircraft, and 
appointed one project, Sukhoi Superjet (SSJ) aircraft, to be country’s 
flagship aircraft manufacturing effort. Competition was eliminated, 
massive state aid was injected into the  project, and domestic airlines 
were forced to buy SSJ aircraft. Result: SSJ failed to market internationally 
due  to operational ineffectiveness and failures in maintenance and 
spare parts delivery system, currently has no international marketing 
prospects, the very few international consumers which dared to purchase 
it are now returning the remaining aircraft back19, and project’s survival 
depends solely on forced orders to buy more SSJs for the  Russian 
state-owned airlines (Aeroflot and corporate airlines of ministries 
and state-owned companies).
• Shipbuilding. Putin’s Government has been announcing plans to massively 
develop shipbuilding sector in Russia since the  early 2000s, but these 
plans have never materialized, the  country is not on the  radar screens 
among major players at the  international shipbuilding markets. Most 
recent effort includes development of the Zvezda wharf in the Far East 
sponsored by Rosneft, which has received massive aid from the National 
Weakth Fund and is intended to substitute the  imports of vessels and 
offshore platforms for the Russian oil & gas industry. However, at this 
moment Zvezda has failed to market any of its vessels internationally, 
and its portfolio of contracts is still far short of the project’s profitability 
target, and only consists of contracts with the  Russian oil & gas 
37
V. Milov. Russia’s Dependency on the Energy Sector: How Long?
producing companies or state agencies20 which were forced to conclude 
them under the direct pressure from the authorities, including Vladimir 
Putin personally21.
• Agriculture and food. Russian Government has put high hopes into 
development of import substitution in the  agricultural and food 
industries after a  self-imposed food import embargo for the  Western 
nations in 2014. However, although some notable import substitution 
has indeed happened at the  Russian food market since then, it hadn’t 
resulted in emergence of internationally competitive food exporters, 
and domestic market import substitution was associated with loss of 
effectiveness and growing prices22. Russia continues to export only most 
primitive agricultural products like wheat or sunflower oil. The  newly 
emerged “national champions” in food production, like Miratorg, 
were also heavily subsidized by the  state, failed to successfully enter 
the  international markets, and their growing domestic supplies have 
mostly resulted in growing prices for the  international consumers23.
• ICT goods. Despite the  vast intellectual and cadre potential (a very 
significant number of Russians are actually employed by the ICT goods 
producers worldwide), Russia is non-present at the  international ICT 
goods market. By share of ICT goods exports in total goods exports, 
Russia stands among the  worst nations in the  world  – just 0.6%, as 
opposed to over 5% for the European Union, 9.5% for the United States, 
11.7% world average, and over 27% for China24.
To sum up, in the  economic system built by Vladimir Putin  – highly 
monopolized, with huge barriers for private initiative and competition and heavy 
involvement of ineffective bureaucracy  – it is almost impossible to expect that 
any other sectors of the economy apart from the oil & gas will be able to develop 
internationally competitive products in the  nearest future. Domestic market, 
as can be seen from the  examples of Sukhoi Superjet, shipbuilding industry, 
agricultural and food industries, are too small to create meaningful sectors 
significantly contributing to the development of national economy. In other words, 
to create large competitive sectors beyond just oil & gas significantly contributing 
to the GDP, Russia needs access to export markets with competitive products – 
mere “import substitution” by force of government-imposed barriers and state 
aid just isn’t enough, and is counter-productive in terms of wrong incentives 
created by monopolization and strangling private initiative and competition. 
Highly monopolized, state-controlled and overly regulated economy just can’t 
deliver internationally competitive products, as we have been able to see across 
many sectors of the Russian economy in the past 20 years.
The usual complaints of the Russian authorities on “high entry barriers” to 
the international markets “imposed by the developed nations” are just lame excuses. 
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There have been very successful examples of development of such industries 
across the globe beyond just the developed world in the past 20–25 years. Brazil 
was able to produce the world’s third largest aircraft manufacturer, Embraer, from 
scratch – after it was nearly bankrupt 25 years ago. Philippines and Vietnam were 
able to make it into top 5 of the world’s biggest shipbuilding nations. Countries 
with the largest shares of ICT goods exports as % of their total exports25 are Hong 
Kong, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, China, etc. All these successful 
cases have included opening the  relevant industries to private capital, foreign 
direct investment, aiming at international competitiveness as opposed to creating 
“sheltered” territory for the monopolies by ordering the economic agents to buy 
their products by force (as Russia does). Putin’s economic policies of the  past 
20  years have been the  exact opposite of creating internationally competitive 
industries.
Conclusion
It is not easy to predict, whether Russian economic policy approach would 
change in the  future or not, in order to address the  looming “oil price shock” 
challenge and to develop competitive non-oil & gas industries, as it much depends 
on the  political changes in Russia. Under the  current Putin’s system, it is very 
hard to foresee a reversal of the economic policies aimed at creating barriers and 
transferring the  whole sectors of the  economy under the  control of a  handful 
of state-affiliated monopolies. Moreover, the  very economic policy currently 
seems to be captured by these monopolies, which clearly stand behind the  idea 
of “national projects” – currently the main economic policy idea of the Russian 
Government, which is essentially about giving these state-affiliated monopolies 
more taxpayers’ money, so they can finally build something. As we have seen 
from past couple of decades, there’s no chance that such approach will work, 
which is already openly doubted even by some top people within the  Russian 
authorities, including the above mentioned German Gref26.
This means that Russia remains very much open to the  threat of either an 
outright “oil price shock” similar to that of the 1980s, or, at least, to continuing 
permanent contraction of the oil & gas super profits due to increasing competition 
and slowing demand. What are the  consequences? Current Russian official 
forecast for 2020–2024 incorporated into the  Federal budget for 2020–202227 
envisages a  scenario under which Urals oil price will not exceed the  range of 
$ 43–46 per barrel (“conservative scenario”). This scenario envisages that the annual 
GDP growth will not exceed 2.5% per year to 2024, and that real household 
incomes growth will not exceed 2% per year. Obviously, oil slipping below $ 40 
may mean worse scenarios, including outright contraction of the  economy for 
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years to come, heavy devaluation of ruble and declining real personal incomes 
for years ahead, budget deficits which will erode already accumulated financial 
reserves, and the whole set of other negative economic consequences. The current 
economic policy seems all too ignorant of these challenges and prospects, which 
strategically weakens Russia for decades to come.
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Both supporters and critics of the  Putin regime usually overlook one 
of  its important attributes. This is an endless conflict between the  priorities of 
the authorities, seeking to consolidate resources in the Center, and the need to 
develop other territories, which, on the  contrary, undermine the  material basis 
of the  authorities themselves. One wall of the  corridor is set by the  subjective 
desire to dominate, the other by the objective degradation of the socio-economic 
environment.
Hence the  state management’s oscillatory trajectory within this corridor 
of values, which looks like an alternation of the  eras of centralization and 
decentralization. In terms of economic geography, the  process is described as 
a change in the ‘sectoral’ method of managing the economy to the ‘territorial’ one 
and vice versa. The sectoral approach involves the concentration of powers and 
administrative institutions in the capital, from where ministries and departments 
manage the  activities of their specialized enterprises (often located thousands 
of kilometers from Moscow) and have little care about the  development of 
the  regions where these enterprises are located. The  territorial approach, on 
the contrary, seeks to transfer powers ‘onto the spot’ for the sake of comprehensive 
land optimization.
The cycles of centralization coincide with periods of political and economic 
mobilization, the  strengthening of autocracy. The  territorial approach acts as 
a  forced reaction to the  impoverishment of territories and reduction of their 
economic returns. The problem is not unique in world practice, but it is especially 
acute for Russia with its enormous size. In the political dimension, these cycles 
are close to the alternation of the phases of ‘freezing’ and ‘thaws’. The process can 
also be described as a  change in the  phases of unitarization and federalization.
In 1917, Lenin and Trotsky, seizing power over a  country with the  fastest 
industrial growth rates1 and a  huge (despite the  devastating consequences of 
the  First World War) economic, territorial, demographic and infrastructural 
potential, began with unlimited centralization, mobilization and predatory 
seizure of resources from inhabited territories. Their goal was to strengthen 
the  dictatorship of the  proletariat for the  further development of the  World 
Revolution. Bourgeois Russia was perceived by them as an object of conquest 
and submission, its management was carried out by decrees of direct action 
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and repression. There was no question about any territorial development and, 
especially, investment in the regions. 
By 1922, devastated territories lost the  ability to feed not only themselves, 
but also the  Bolshevik nomenclature. The  threat of losing control of the  army 
(the pillar of the  regime) and mass famine forced the  revolutionary leaders to 
think about the New Economic Policy (NEP). In fact, it was a rather ‘old’ one – 
with partial restoration of property rights, market relations, convertible currency 
and investment interest. The  period of total power administration and hyper-
centralization of 1917–1922, reaching material limits, ended with the unexpected 
Leninist directive: “Do not dare to command!” For the Bolshevik managers this 
was a shock: they knew nothing but command. 
But the  economy advanced. 1924–1925, the  first year after a  real turn 
to the  NEP and the  advent of the  ‘gold dime’, yielded a  57 percent increase 
in industrial production (up to 4.9 billion rubles) compared to 1923–1924. 
Consumer market prices decreased by almost 20 percent, labor productivity by 
1925 reached the pre-war level, as well as real wages. By 1926, the total volume of 
industrial production rose to the pre-war level2. As for agriculture, the monstrous 
Leninist famine receded already in 1923. In 1925, as Nikita Khrushchev writes 
in his memoirs about Yuzovka (present-day Donetsk), “In the autumn there was 
literally a bounty of goods and agricultural products – vegetables, watermelons, 
melons and poultry... And all this wasis cheap. The  standards for prices were 
maintained then on the  pre-war level. Before the  war, a  pound of meat cost in 
Yuzovka and vicinities 15 kopecks. It cost 15 kopecks also in 1925 and in 1926. 
Until 1928 there was an excess of meat”3. The second half of the 1920s, right up 
to the start of collectivization, was accompanied by a boom in the delayed births. 
The population increased on average by 3.5 million people per year.
Naturally, the Soviet government cannot reconcile itself with such a course 
of events. Monetary resources in the  form of a hard currency are flowing from 
the  hands of revolutionary dictators into the  hands of private entrepreneurs, 
who, firstly, are more active and resourceful, and secondly, unlike the  party, 
produce products oriented to solvent demand. What if not food is the primary 
subject of effective demand? With each economic turnover, the  ‘class enemy’ 
accumulates financial resources, the  economy reorients from mobilization rails 
to market-consumer ones. Economic decisions go from the  hands of the  Party 
Center to the  local entities: the private entrepreneur develops business where it 
is more convenient for him, and not where directives order him to. The  space 
for administrative-power outrage is narrowing. The Bolsheviks and the Chekists 
feel like a fifth wheel in a coach on the side of the road. Industry produces what 
the  consumer market needs (it mainly needs food products, clothing, building 
materials) instead of what the  dictatorship wants (it needs weapons to export 
the revolution). In addition, the Soviet government, unlike the private trader, is 
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not able to present solvent demand for its strategic interest. Insolvent demand – 
as much as you like, but you won’t get carried away with a private produce... In 
short, it is a defeat of the Bolsheviks in competition for material resources. And 
with that, in accordance with the Marxist dogma, in competition for power.
In administrative terms, this is manifested in the  reduction of the  role 
of centralized special services. On 6 February 1922, at the  same time with 
the decision to switch to the NEP, the Cheka was transformed into the GPU (Chief 
Political Directorate), which was accompanied by a sharp drop in the number of 
‘organs’. On 15 November 1923, the  GPU under the  NKVD (Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs) was transformed into the OGPU under the Council of People’s 
Commissars (the  Soviet government). If at the  end of 1921 the  main Soviet 
special service had 90 thousand official operatives, then by the time the GPU was 
formed, their staff had been reduced to 60 thousand, and by 1 November 1923 to 
33 thousand. The number of ‘seksots’ (secret employees), during the initial period 
of transition to the NEP (1921–1923) decreased from 60 to 13 thousand4. Stalin 
was the System reply as well as a new wave of repressions and hyper-centralisation.
The next Soviet-style half-cycle of the weakening of centralism begins after 
the  death of Stalin and is associated with the  name of Khrushchev (as well as 
the undeservedly forgotten Georgiy Malenkov), when the collective farmers were 
allowed to increase the  area of their personal plots several times and the  tax 
pressure was reduced. At the same time, the redistribution of power in favor of 
the  regions takes place: territorial economic management bodies are formed  – 
the so-called Sovnarkhozs (1957) – essentially regional governments. The reaction 
to the concessions is a new surge in economic growth – along with frightening 
signs of territorial independence. Khrushchev, a  loyal disciple of the  Leninist-
Stalinist apparatus school, is trying to sit on two chairs. He wants to unleash 
the  local economic initiative, reduce the bloated armed forces and bureaucracy, 
improve the  living conditions of the  people (mass construction of five-story 
apartment buildings) and at the same time strengthen the authority of the party 
and the consolidation of resources. A striking example is the centralized campaign 
imposed by him for the mass introduction of corn along with a very expensive 
program of militarization of space. Curtailment of economic growth in the  late 
1950s, the grain crisis of 1961–1962, the brilliant flight of Gagarin into the outer 
space, and the hunger riot in Novocherkassk, which was bloodily suppressed in 
a typical Bolshevik manner are contradictory results of the epoch.
The party-power apparatus finds a way out of the ambiguous era in a palace 
coup, with abolition of the  local economic councils and the  establishment of 
a  more centralized Brezhnev model with emphasis on improving the  living 
standard of the nomenclature and population. The great luck with the discovery 
of oil fields in Western Siberia allowed this version of industry management to 
stay afloat for almost twenty years.5 But in the end, even against the backdrop of 
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oil abundance, stagnation, shortages of commodities, inflation, and resentment 
among the population emerge amid growing claims to the Center.
The capital, which is swelling by leaps and bounds, serves as a constant source 
of concern for the top party leadership, which with one hand tries to restrain its 
growth with the help of administrative bans and issuance of residence permits, 
while with the other brings into the city the so-called ‘limiters’ – working hands 
from the  provinces, attracted by branch departments according to the  agreed 
limits for construction, transport, utilities and other works. Hypertrophy of 
the Soviet capital is a logical consequence of the super-centralization of political 
and economic life, when other cities are obviously unable to compete with 
the Center in terms of economic and sociocultural comfort.
The story ends with a  half-restructuring, similar to the  Khrushchev’s 
model, when the  upper elites (including the  KGB leadership in the  person of 
Yuri Andropov), became convinced of the  futility of tightening the screws, and 
once again tried to fix the  ‘vertical’  with the  hands of the  ‘vertical’ itself. An 
unexpected, but logical result was the collapse of the unified political space due 
to the Center’s shortage of material, ideological, organizational, human and even 
power resources. The trouble came from where nobody expected.
Having 63,900 tanks (more than the rest of the world altogether!), the Soviet 
government was not able to use them either to maintain power control over 
the political space, or to combat the economic crisis. In particular, since it had 
nothing to feed the tanks’ crews. As for Lenin in 1922, there was nothing left to 
feed the Red Army.
On 16 January 1991, the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense V. Arkhipov asked 
the Kremlin leadership to allocate him 8 million German rations for distribution 
to Soviet militaries and their families. The  bitter irony is that those rations 
(daily ration of military personnel) were sent to the USSR by the Bundeswehr – 
a strategic adversary – as humanitarian aid.6 Three days later, Arkhipov asked for 
an additional transfer to the Ministry of Defense of another seven thousand tons 
of long-term storage bread in tin cans received from the Bundeswehr. If military 
personnel and members of their families suffer from a  shortage of products 
(the  subject of primary party concern in the  system of Soviet priorities), then 
there is nothing to say about ordinary citizens.
The next cycle of forced decentralization spun out of control due to subjective 
(Gorbachev’s indecisiveness, ambitions of regional leaders) and objective (deep-
rooted false ideas about the  structure of the  economy, shortage of qualified 
personnel, inflation, militarization, the collapse of communist ideology, the war 
in Afghanistan, dropping oil prices, etc.) factors. The  result was the  collapse of 
the USSR.
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Putin’s counter-reform
After a  surge of regional anarchy of the  1990s (and simultaneous market 
reforms as saving tool), the  renewed and rejuvenated nomenclature presented 
the  reins of power to Vladimir Putin, who, according to the  standard scenario, 
began with centralization. The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, 
in addition to structural reforms, the  transition to market economy, to private 
property and convertible currency, dragged the  country through a  series of 
technological revolutions that were fundamentally impossible in the ‘forbidding’ 
ideological environment of the  USSR: mass computerization, introduction of 
cyber technologies, the Internet, mobile telephones, individual motorization, etc. 
Another imperceptible revolution was the  liberation of the  cities that became 
more vivid and began to shake off the long Soviet stagnation. Since the renewal 
was accompanied by the  collapse of the  previous industry branches, focused 
almost entirely on the military industry, the cities (especially not the largest ones) 
experienced a painful phase of structural decline before the new post-industrial 
upswing.
Modernization spread in accordance with the classical law of the spread of 
innovations – from the capital region (in our case, Moscow) through the largest 
secondary urban centers – and then farther on up to fading out on the conservative 
periphery. In the  super-asymmetric socio-economic space inherited from 
the USSR, the gain from renewal naturally concentrated in the capitals. Peripheries 
(both social and geographical) did not have time or could not receive noticeable 
bonuses. It is clear that it became the supporting zone for the new nomenclature 
revenge, which delayed and even reversed the  barely begun growth of second-
level cities. The  reforming of the  Russian universe along the  track of European 
values once again turned out to be incomplete and half-hearted.
Liberal reforms from the  very beginning were understandable and fruitful 
only for urbanized and Europeanized (or rich in raw materials) regions with 
a  total number of less than a  third of subjects of the  Federation. Most of 
the  regions, including ethnic autonomous entities (‘national outskirts’ in terms 
of the  Soviet era), were and remain deliberately uncompetitive.  The reforms of 
the 1990s meant for them only an even more pronounced lag behind the leaders. 
Discrepancies in the size of the tax base among the regions amounted to and still 
are measurable in dozens of times.
Differences at the  municipal level are even more catastrophic. In cities 
(this is especially true for almost 400 so-called ‘single-industry towns’, built 
in the  Soviet era around one, most often military, factory), the  chances of 
getting out of poverty without outside help are close to zero. The  return to 
centralization and the supreme redistribution of resources was caused not only 
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by the desire of the apparatchiks and security forces to regain their status and 
strengthen control, but also by the  natural desire to bridge the  growing gap 
between the  territories. The  fear of another split was very great  – especially 
against the  backdrop of the  conflict in Chechnya, which spanned the  entire 
second half of the 1990s.
‘Collective Putin’, perceiving reality through the  prism of Soviet priorities, 
was doomed to return to unitarianism. The process of counter-reforms originated 
in the  Kremlin  – and  could not help but arise because of the  effect of path 
dependency. If not Putin, then Luzhkov, Primakov, especially Zyuganov or 
Lebed  – any of the  real contenders for power after Boris Yeltsin would have 
followed the same path. At the same time, the backward vector received the most 
powerful electoral support on the remote periphery – in fact, on the same lands 
that at the  beginning of the  1990s served as the  supporting zone of   Gennady 
Zyuganov and the old party nomenclature.
Graph 1: Presidential elections 1996 in RF. Presentige gap between votes 
for Yelstin vs Zyuganov 1ST round
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The so-called ‘red belt’ of the  most conservative communist regions of 
the  mid-1990s model, twenty years later, in 2016, was transformed into a  ‘blue 
belt’ of consolidated support for Putin and his party United Russia.
In 1996, Boris Yeltsin was the  president of the  largest cities and the  most 
urbanized and Europeanized (in terms of values, not in geographic sense) 
territories; the head of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, on the contrary, 
was more likely a ‘president of the province’, including the ethnic autonomies. By 
2016, the  ‘party of the  province’ was United Russia with Putin as its informal 
leader. As always with regional analysis, there are several territories that do not 
obey the general rule – but it would take too much time to analyze each specific 
exception and its reasons.
Due to the  inertia of territorial processes, the  negative economic 
consequences of the  restoration of centralism-verticalism made themselves felt 
only in the second half of the 2000s, after the crisis of 2008–2009. Prior to that, 
the  renewed Russian economy was growing steadily at a  pace of 5–7 percent 
per year. Which, of course, was contributed by a steady increase in world prices 
for hydrocarbons. After the  crisis, the  growth rate decreased to 1.5–2 percent, 
which was considered by the Center as an acceptable price for unitarization and 
restoration of political control.
Graph 2: Support for United Russia. Persentage of registered voters. 
St. Petersburg – 13%, Moscow – 13.3%
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The reaction of the regions
The regional response to the  2009 economic crisis was rather interesting. 
The  independent economic campaign of FBK (Financial and Accounting 
Consultants, not to be confused with FBK by Aleksey Navalny – Anti-Corruption 
Foundation!) In the analytical report Priorities of Regional Budgets – 2010 notes 
the  general features of the  economic strategy of the  regions in the  context of 
lower incomes.
The first was a sharp increase in payments under the item General Government 
Expenses amounting for almost 40 percent – from 219.7 billion Rubles in 2009 
to 307.2 billion in 2010. At the same time, the total expenses of regional budgets 
for the  first post-crisis year decreased by 10.6 percent. The  meaning of these 
figures becomes clear if we keep in mind that within the  framework of this 
budget line, the lion’s share of the expenditures goes under the item Servicing of 
State and Municipal Debt. In other words, the  regions, to stay afloat, rushed to 
the federal Center for extraordinary financial assistance. Which is quite rational: 
in the  absence of other sources of financing and   economic growth, assistance 
can come only from Moscow, which thanks to the prudence of the Minister of 
Finance Kudrin really had accumulated a serious dollar airbag by then: this was 
economic unitarianism in action. The difference with the  era of the  collapse of 
the Soviet vertical is that Putin’s version of unitarism is less ideological and more 
professional.
The second common feature of the  economic behavior of the  regions was 
a sharp increase in opaque budget items such as  Other National Issues or  Reserve 
Funds. The  regional elites, having received additional financial injections from 
Moscow, sought to maximize the  discretion in their utilization, beforehand 
transferring this sphere as closed for the population (and to a  large extent even 
for the Center!).
At the  same time, the  planned regional expenditures fell by 33.3 percent 
under the National Economy item, 18.8 percent under the Housing and Communal 
Services, and 14 percent under the  item Inter-budgetary transfers (usually this 
means helping municipal budgets from regional ones).
So, we can talk about the greatly increased dependence of regional budgets 
on the  Center with a  simultaneous desire of local elites to spend the  funds as 
covertly as possible and save on investment, utilities and social obligations – in 
particular, on budget support for small and medium-sized cities. From here, real, 
not declarative priorities of the  regional economic policy of the  Putin’s era are 
easily derived:
1. Limitation of the economic independence of the regions and their growing 
dependence on the Center.
2. The growing concealment of local budgets in the interests of regional elites.
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3. Lack of interest among the regional elites in investment activity with shifting 
the burden to the most unrequited and politically weak link: the population 
and weak provincial towns. 
Moscow news 
A logical continuation of the  process was the  proposed appeal by Putin to 
the Federal Assembly on 15 January 2020 – the idea of destroying the guarantees 
of urban self-governments enshrined in the  1993 Yeltsin constitution and 
returning them to the Soviet vertical model when the Center (Central Committee 
of the CPSU) leads the regions (Regional Committees of the CPSU), then come 
cities (CPSU City Committees), and finally the District Committees. The Yeltsin 
reforms, reminiscent of a timid attempt to implement the principles of Magdeburg 
rights in Russia, were safely buried by Putin, first at the level of everyday political 
practice, and since 2020 already at the level of constitutional norm.
Those who follow the process are not surprised. In December 2011, the so-
called Kozak-Khloponin decentralization commission presented to the  then 
president Dmitry Medvedev a report on the transfer of more than one hundred 
powers from the federal to the regional level.7 But in March 2012, Vladimir Putin 
became president, the illusory ‘Medvedev thaw’ ended and the commission along 
with its report was forgotten. On the contrary, in 2013 the share of the personal 
income tax remaining at the municipal level was reduced from a total of 20 percent 
to 15 percent for urban districts and to 10 percent for municipal districts. Since 
even before this, many medium-sized cities and regional centers – alphabetically 
from Angarsk to Rybinsk – were demoted to the status of urban settlements with 
corresponding cuts in their rights and budgets, the  general trend is obvious. 
Grassroots initiative and responsibility are suppressed in order to strengthen 
the power of higher levels of the authority hierarchy. 
It is not difficult to predict the medium-term consequences: increased borrowing 
by the  regions, slowdown of local economic growth, and the  accumulation of 
social and communal problems. But that ensures privileged access to resources 
(and, therefore, political loyalty!) for the  most influential lobbying groups that 
redistribute funds coming from above. First of all, these are the largest business 
structures at the federal level with direct access to the Kremlin: oil, gas, pipeline, 
defense, and infrastructure companies. As well as a  regional bureaucracy built 
into the unitary vertical, carrying out administrative control on the ground.
The structure of Putin’s territorial management in a  hybrid (intermediate) 
form replicates the  vertical-branch (“sectoral”) model of the  Brezhnev era, of 
course, adapted to the  demands of the  time. But the  underlying principle has 
not changed much: access to resources controlled by the Center in exchange for 
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loyalty. An inevitable element of the model is corruption and income polarization 
between groups embedded in the  vertical and the  rest of the  population. Both 
territorially and socially. Moscow is again tearing itself away from the  rest of 
the country, the nomenclature estate from the rest of the population.
An important update, unlike the Stalin era, was a system of encouragement 
and motivation for members of the  power corporation. Under Stalin, fear 
came first. With regard to the  regions, this meant the  obligation to tear out 
the  established amount of tribute at any cost from your body and return to 
the  Center the  established amount of tribute  – under mortal threat. Today, 
the system is much more humane and relies more on a positive incentive, which 
can be defined as corruption buying up loyalty.
However, as under Stalin, the model implies the suppression of local initiatives, 
discipline and unquestionable submission to the Center. However, now we are no 
longer talking about the total drainage of resources from the territories (the role of 
an income provider is reserved for a small number of oil and gas ‘Klondikes’), but 
rather about a centralized distribution of benefits goods depending on the ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ behavior of local elites.
The paradoxical consequence of such a system of priorities is the  irrational 
(from the point of view of European thinking) manner of behavior of the Russian 
regions. The  poorest territories in the  elections demonstrate the  highest and 
cohesive support of President Putin and United Russia!
For analysis, we take 10 constituent entities of the Federation with the mini-
mum values of the share of the ‘middle class’ in 2019 (the 11th row in the table 
is added as an unnecessary illustration of the  trend). The  ‘middle class rating’ 
was compiled by the information agency RIA Rating according to the official data 
of Rosstat and shows the  proportion of families in the  region who are able to 
purchase a car and apartment that correspond to the size of the family8. And let us 
compare them with the top ten regions that showed the highest electoral support 
for United Russia and President Putin in the 2016 and 2018 elections – according 
to official data of the  Central Election Commission of the  Russian Federation.
The percentage of support is calculated not from the number of voters who 
have voted, as usually, but from the total payroll of the regional electorate. With 
this approach, the  final indicator also includes an assessment of the  turnout 
(activity) of regional voters, that is, it reflects the ability of the regional leadership 
to ensure mobilization of the  electorate  – even if only virtually. The  names 
of  the  regions that fall into all three lists are highlighted. There are seven of 
eleven of them, and all of them – amazingly! – turn out to be ethnic autonomous 
republics within the  Russian Federation. Only a  statistical accident prevented 
the Republic of Tuva from entering this list – in the ranking of the ‘middle class’ it 
took 14th place from the end (6.6 percent) and therefore did not get into the ten 
or 11 worst ones. But it is convincingly among the best in terms of the electoral 
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support of the Kremlin: clans associated with defense minister Sergei Shoigu, an 
ethnic Tuvinian, exercise control here.
Table: Economic development and electoral mobilization of regions
The share of the middle 
class, percent
(Last 10 regions)
Support for Putin-2018, 
percent of the list of voters
(First 10 regions)
Support for United  
Russia-2016, percent  
of the list of voters
(First 10 regions)
1. Ingushetia  1.9 Tuva 86.1 Chechnya  91.4
2. Chechnya  2.5 Kabardino-Balkaria 85.6 Dagestan  78.3
3. Dagestan  2.9 Chechnya  83.7 Karachay-Cherkessia  76.3
4. Kabardino-Balkaria 4.1 Dagestan  79.4 Tuva 74.1
5. Karachay-Cherkessia 4.4 Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug 78.6
Mordovia  70.0
6. Kalmykia 4.9 Karachay-Cherkessia 76.5 Kabardino-Balkaria  70.0
7. Crimea 5.5 North Ossetia  73.3 Tatarstan 67.1
8. Ivanovo region 5.6 Kemerovo region 71.0 Kemerovo region 67.1
9. North Ossetia  5.8 Ingushetia  68.2 Ingushetia  59.0
10. Orel region 6.1 Chukotka Autonomous 
Region 67.7
North Ossetia  57.4
11. Mordovia  6.3 Mordovia  66.4 Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug 49.9
Source: https://riarating.ru/infografika/20190813/630131892.html;  
http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom. Electoral support in terms of the list 
of voters was carried out by the author based on data from the Central Election 
Commission of the Russian Federation
Almost all the regions that are on the list are among the so-called ‘electoral 
sultanates’, known for rough and outright falsification of results. The  official 
election results here reflect not so much the  mood of voters as the  desire of 
regional elites to curry favor with the Moscow leadership.
It is worth noting that the most advanced, urbanized and Europeanized regions, 
where the  socio-cultural environment shows great resistance to electoral fraud, 
on the contrary, have the highest middle class share. And, accordingly, a reduced 
willingness to support Putin and his party. So, in the 2016 State Duma elections, 
United Russia (again in terms of the list of voters) in St. Petersburg received only 
13 percent, and in Moscow and the Novosibirsk region – 13.3 percent. 7  times 
less than in Chechnya and 6 times less than in Dagestan.
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A conclusion can be suggested here, which confuses many democratically 
minded opponents of Putin. In the  context of real post-Soviet Russia (and not 
that fictitious Russia as visioned by capital city’s fighters for civil liberties!), in 
order to maintain political control, the  Kremlin does not have to worry about 
a serious elevation of citizens’ standard of living. On the contrary, in some cases 
this is directly harmful to it: the  richer, more educated and more independent 
the  masses of voters, the  more difficult it is for leadership to manipulate them 
and receive electoral support.
The opposite is true regardingAnother thing is the  standard of living 
and satisfaction level of regional, law enforcement, media and administrative 
elites! They just have to feel completely satisfied. It is no coincidence that with 
the negligibly small tax revenues in the Chechen Republic, the per capita income 
of its budget due to Kremlin transfers is 15 percent higher than the  national 
average. True, this is only a calculated figure obtained by dividing the allocated 
budget amounts by the  number of the  local inhabitants. How much of this 
money actually reaches the citizens, and how much it gets stuck in the hands of 
the  local nobility, can be judged by the  ‘middle class’ rating presented above – 
Chechnya has the last but one place among 85 regions. The last place is held by 
neighboring Ingushetia, also known for the  incredibly united electoral support 
of the  Moscow leadership. It is not difficult to see behind this a  rollback to 
the  instinctive priority of the  territorial management of the  Brezhnev era: “let 
the  regions be better poor, but obedient (and live off transfers from the  Kremlin) 
than rich, but uncontrolled.”
Since the  second half of the  2000s, regional differences in gross regional 
product (GRP) per capita have been somewhat reduced due to the redistribution 
of oil and gas excess revenues to lagging territories through budget transfers. This 
in itself is normal. The question is only to the extent. Today it is already clear that 
the Center too slowed down the growth of advanced subjects of the Federation for 
the sake of supporting and preserving the weak economic policy of the  lagging 
territories. The periphery has strengthened in its backwardness, having received 
illusory relief not due to its own achievements, but thanks to the ‘pay for loyalty’. 
The  result was a  twofold decrease in the  number of ‘donor regions’ (federation 
entities that do not receive federal subsidies for ‘budget equalization’). Even in 
the  ‘dashing 90s’ in the  country there were 20–25 regional ‘donors’; now there 
are just 12–13 of them left.
The boundaries of the possible
During the  market reforms in the  cities (primarily the  largest ones, led by 
Moscow and St. Petersburg), their status have noticeably increased – which was 
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accompanied by an increase in separation from country’s general socio-economic 
fabric. This was inevitable  – not only the  natural agglomeration effect worked 
out in favor of the  cities (concentration of qualified personnel, post-industrial 
initiatives and innovations, a  relatively favorable legal environment), but also 
the  materialized inertia of the  Soviet era. As a  result, only 3 of 85 subjects 
of the  Federation (Moscow and two oil and gas regions of Western Siberia  – 
Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Districts) provide 55 percent of 
the revenues of territorial taxes to the Federal budget. If you add Petersburg to 
them, the contribution of these four will be 60 percent.
At the  same time, incoming taxes were divided between the  Center and 
the  regions in a  proportion of about 50  :  50 during the  Yeltsin era,   but under 
Putin, the ratio changed to 60  : 40, or even 62  : 389. Not in favor of territories, 
of cource. More precisely, if we connect the  municipal level to this conditional 
calculation, the  proportion of the  distribution of budget revenues in the  triad 
of Center – regions – municipalities looks more like 60 : 35 : 5, while defenders of 
budget federalism consider the formula 30 : 40 : 30 to be fair10. 
The Kremlin is trying to compensate for the  imbalance through so-called 
‘national projects’. They, like the  Soviet ‘industry programs’ are developed in 
Moscow and funded from Moscow. Perhaps, a different way is no longer possible, 
because dozens of constituent entities of the  Federation and hundreds of cities 
have such a low level of economic development, human resources, transport and 
social infrastructure (respectively, the  tax base) that they have no chance to get 
out of structural poverty on their own. Rather, there is a chance to disappear from 
the face of the earth as in the Soviet era ‘unpromising settlements’ disappeared. 
It also makes no sense to feed these failed territories with treasury investments – 
the  funds will be spent ‘inappropriately’ – that is, eaten or stolen. It remains to 
keep them afloat with subsidies and hope to get on the  list any of the  ‘target 
programs’ that will bring funding, management, design and personnel from 
the Center. The problem of regional poverty and hyper-centralism in Russia has 
acquired a chronic self-reproducing character, stretching over several generations.
In fact, the  ideology of centralized ‘national projects’ grows in an implicit 
form from the  Stalinist perception of the  territory of Russia as a  kind of 
phenomenological ‘void’, which must be filled, structured, colonized and mobilized 
by the life-giving will and energy of the Leader and the Center. The difference is 
that before the Bolsheviks and in the first years of their rule, the socio-economic 
space in fact (contrary to Soviet propaganda!) was still full of life  – in terms 
of infrastructural, economic, demographic potential  – down to the  cultural 
background, including work ethics. The  Bolsheviks had what and whom to 
mobilize, inspire and guide. But after them there remained a  devastated land 
with an underdeveloped road network, broken demographic growth, a ‘wooden’ 
non-convertible Rubles and a  management structure that is centralized to 
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the point of absurdity. To paraphrase the famous apocrypha about the A-bomb, 
we can say that Stalin inherited the country with two competing capital cities of 
the  European level (St. Petersburg was much stronger than Moscow in all key 
respects), but left it in possession of one. Moreover, the  one pushed far back 
eastwards from the ‘window to Europe’.
There is nothing left to squeeze out of the devastated socio-cultural space. Of 
course, except oil, gas and some other natural resources. The Center is forced to 
carry out the exact opposite task – not to squeeze resources out of the country 
for the  sake of militarization, mobilization and territorial expansion  – but, on 
the contrary, to pump funds into its own territories so that they do not suffocate 
or fall off. It turns out badly: it’s like a giant vacuum cleaner built and fixed by 
generations of Soviet engineers to exhaust resources from the country, which now 
is used to solve the opposite task of allocating resources to regions. There is a lot 
of dust and noise, but the material result is not impressive.
The idea to revive Russia’s territories through ‘national projects’ invented at 
the Center or inspirational decrees (in particular, the widely known Putin decrees 
of May 2012) works just as poorly as did “historical decisions of the  CPSU 
congresses” – because they stem from quite similar priorities. The national project 
Demography, updated in May 2019 and put on the first place in January 2020 by 
President Putin’s address to the  Federal Assembly, is not feasible in the  same 
way as promises to build communism or party’s appeals to introduce advanced 
achievements of science and technology into socialist industry.
In only January–October 2019 the  population of the  Russian Federation 
decreased by 260 thousand.11 the  version of May 2019 of this national project 
requires a reduction in the rate of population decline in 2020 to 127.4 thousand, i.e. 
about twice. In 2024, it is planned to stop the fall and move on to growth. Against 
this optimistic background, Rosstat presented in December 2019  the basic scenario 
of the demographic forecast, where by 2027 a twofold acceleration of the natural 
population decline is set to 583.5 thousand people per year. The scenario assumes 
a decrease in the population of the Russian Federation from 146.7 million in 2019 
to 143 million in 2036. This is 1 million worse than the  same Rosstat foresaw 
in October! the tasks set by the government are obviously unrealistic – and this 
follows from the figures proposed by government forecasters. Absurdity?
In 1900, about 75 million people lived in Tsarist Russia (in terms of its 
modern borders). In the  United States, at the  same time, the  population was 
76 million. In 2019, it became 147 million in Russia (roughly speaking, a twofold 
increase in 120  years), and in the  United States 329 million  – an increase of 
more than 4 times. Moreover, the  rates of urbanization and the  associated 
‘demographic transition’ in the  reproductive behavior of Americans are higher 
and were achieved much earlier than in Russia... No other country in the world 
had such a  catastrophic twentieth century as Russia. It is already impossible to 
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get out of the  negative demographic trend that was laid back in the  Stalin era. 
The same can be said about territorial development.
The super-centralized model constructed by the  Bolsheviks for ideological 
reasons (concentration of resources to carry out the  struggle for the  World 
Revolution, for militarization and expansion) today has turned into a  material 
factor in the  organization of the  socio-cultural and economic environment: 
the distribution of cities and population, the geography of transport infrastructure, 
etc. The  rejection of centralization is fraught with degradation and backsliding 
territories. Maintaining centralization is fraught with stagnation, the accumulation 
of regional problems and a  loss in international competition. What remains to 
Kremlin is to maneuver in a narrowing corridor of opportunity, masking failure 
with propaganda and falsification of economic and electoral statistics. The familiar 
Soviet way – although, again, in a softened and hybrid form.
In terms of gross domestic product per capita by purchasing power parity 
(data from the  International Monetary Fund, 2018), Russia ranks 49th in 
the  world ($ 29.3 thousand), behind Lithuania (38th place, $ 34.6 thousand), 
Estonia (39th place, $ 34.2 thousand) and Latvia (47th place, $ 29.9 thousand)12. 
The  task of catching up with Portugal in terms of per capita GDP, with which 
Putin came to power 20 years ago, has not been fulfilled: in 2018, Portugal ranks 
42nd with per capita GDP of $ 32.0 thousand.
Even more striking manifestations of stagnation become visible when looking 
at the  internal structure of the  state. Having the  same level of education, and 
taking the same position, you can be relatively wealthy in one region, and very 
poor in the other. The average per capita income in Moscow in the 3rd quarter 
of 2019 is 74,341 Rubles (more than 1,000 Euros), but in the Republic of Tyva – 
14,776 rubles (about 210 Euros). 30 percent live below the  official poverty line 
in Ingushetia, 24 percent in Kabardino-Balkaria and the Altai Republic, and less 
than 7 percent in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan13.
Demands of territories are growing, and the Center’s ability to satisfy them is 
declining. Most regions did not manage to form independent sources of growth. 
Since 2015, the periphery (where it is not under the control of electoral falsifiers) 
has been showing growing irritation, which manifested in the federal (2016) and 
regional (2018) elections. Especially painful figures are shown by the  lands of 
Eastern Siberia and the  Far East  – despite the  fact that there are all conditions 
for economic growth based on self-reliance.
Unfortunately, the growth did not take place; years of favorable oil and gas 
prices and investment conditions have been wasted. The  outflow of qualified 
population to the  relatively prosperous large-urban regions of the  country’s 
European part is growing, primarily to Moscow. There is a  kind of ‘reverse 
frontier.’ the  descendants of those who two or three (sometimes four to five, if 
we keep in mind Stolypin migrants) generations ago moved to the East to develop 
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new lands, today, clenching their teeth, make their way back to Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. And often straight to Berlin, London or, New York. 
Strengthening the economic and political role of the Center is conceived in 
the Kremlin: (a) as a defense against separatism and (b) as a basis for strengthening 
the armed forces. Which, in turn, serves as the basis for ‘raising from the knees’, 
aggressive propaganda and attempts to regain the  lost geopolitical influence. 
The  idea that the  collapse of the USSR was a delayed consequence of just such 
Stalin-Brezhnev priorities is deeply alien to these strategists.
At the  same time, they have learned for themselves a  number of concrete 
lessons from the  collapse of the  USSR and the  gravest mistakes of the  late 
Brezhnev and Gorbachev era, trying not to repeat them. The  Putin’s vertical is 
more flexible and more rational than the Soviet one. It may well hold out for a few 
more years – apocalyptic forecasts of the  imminent fall of the regime represent 
a wishful thinking. Therefore, there is no reason for optimism. 
By the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century the innate disease of 
the Soviet system of priorities manifests itself with renewed vigor. The principle 
of  integrated development of territories once again predictably lost to the prin-
ciple of strengthening the  omnipotence of the  Center. This, although at a  new 
level, predetermines understandable problems for the  coming years, as well as 
the expected attempts to resolve them with the help of ‘manual control’. Personnel 
leap frogging of the regional leadership, attempts to appeal to strengthen discipline, 
protectionism, tough methods of suppressing protests emerging in the local areas, 
increased propaganda and censorship in the  hope of switching public opinion 
from economic problems to searching for external and internal enemies.
Conclusion: Medium term prospects
Frightened by the  territorial split of the  Soviet Union and dependent on 
Soviet geopolitical instincts, ‘collective Putin’ is doomed to resist the  ideas of 
decentralization and federalization. He will fight to strengthen the Center, perhaps 
even more desperately than his Soviet predecessors. Therefore, the general features 
of the regional policy for the coming years are not so difficult to predict. As well 
as related problems.
This is the dominance of centralization, freezing of status quo and militarization 
amid a painful rejection of any attempts to optimize territorial management and 
delegate authority downwards, which in itself deprives the  system of flexibility 
and increases the  risk of a  subsequent split against the  background of the  next 
attempt to catch up with development. Putin’s Russia has returned to the Soviet 
path dependence and is unlikely to get out of it until the  next major crisis. 
The process will go on against the background of a steady general depopulation 
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and with an increasing outflow of the population to a few growth areas – mainly 
to the largest cities. Or straight abroad.
The polarization of the  social and geographical space and the  deepening 
of the  abyss between growing million cities and the  stagnating second/third-
rate territories will continue. In 2019, the Russian Federation had 15 cities with 
a population of over one million people – from Moscow with 12.6 million people 
to Volgograd with 1.0 million14. For comparison: the United States with a twice as 
large total population and half as large territory, has only 10 million cities – from 
New York (8.4 million) to San Jose (1.0 million). But there are 304 cities with 
a  population between 100 thousand and one million. There are only 156 such 
cities In Russia and there is no reason to hope for an increase in their number. 
The  normal hierarchy of the  population distribution system has been eroded.
Advanced large-urban areas will grow in much the  same way as their 
counterparts around the world do – fortunately, they have enough of their own 
resources in addition to the  distribution policy of the  Kremlin. Legalistic, 
moderate opposition sentiments will also draw in there, since the  conservative 
line of ‘collective Putin’ contradicts the  interests of super-cities. At the opposite 
pole of the political space, geographical and social periphery will expand (based 
on federal subsidies). Today, due to the  falsifications and complete economic 
dependence of the  ‘electoral sultanates’ on the  Center, it serves as the  political 
pillar of the Kremlin – but in the event of economic or social difficulties, it can 
break out in fire of the most radical and anti-legalist protests.
But the  most destructive, long and seemingly inconspicuous process will 
develop in ‘central Russia’ somewhere between super-cities and the national super-
periphery. The result will be the desolation and abandonment of ‘medium’ cities 
and territories between areas of super-urban growth. Against the  background 
of the  huge size of the  country and the  ongoing concentration/outflow of 
the  population, this threatens with the  loss of economic and social cohesion 
of the nation.
In the ‘middle cities’ and the stagnating province, which have neither resources 
nor hopes to receive them, social, environmental and utilities (water supply, 
heating, waste processing) problems will accumulate. As a  result, there may be 
a local outbreak of aggression along the lines of ‘garbage protests’ that suddenly 
appeared at the  federal level. Motivation to work erodes. The  deviant behavior 
and uninhabited ‘dead zones’ are expanding. Stagnation and lagging behind 
the requirements of the time for the infrastructure skeleton – transportation – is 
above all. This will greatly complicate the increasingly urgent task of re-developing 
abandoned and feral lands  – even if someone would deal with it in the  future. 
Although who would?!
As a  result of polarization, there are ethnic and religious conflicts between 
people who come from very poor national entities that are continuing their 
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demographic growth (republics, autonomous regions) and developed territories 
that host these people. Instead of the  mythical threat of a  colored revolution, 
there is a more dangerous, but still unrealized (invisible from Moscow) threat of 
sliding to the living standards of the Third World – for a significant part of Russia’s 
‘middle territories’. Instead of being burnt in the romantic fire of the revolution, 
the nation can drown in the by-products of its own vital activity.
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Military Expenditure During Putin’s Rule
Alеksandr Golts
Russia consistently ranks at the top of the  list of countries with the highest 
military spending. Although military spending is only the  second largest item 
in the  budget and is inferior to the  total expenditure on social needs, Russia’s 
spending on education and medical care is on average twice as inferior to similar 
expenditures of developed countries. In Russia, poverty persists, humiliating 
a country that considers itself a “great power”. But at the same time the military 
spending corresponds to that of the most developed countries. It’s no doubt that 
this approach will remain for all the years Vladimir Putin is in power.
Spending on defense, security and law enforcement are main items of 
the  Russian Federation budget. All twenty years, when Vladimir Putin headed 
the  country, these expenditures steadily grew by 10–15 percent annually. In 
2006–2011, spending on defense, security and law enforcement averaged exactly 
25% of budget spending. In 2012–2017 they already reached 30.7% of all federal 
spending. Spending on defense, national security and law enforcement peaked 
in 2016. It reached 5.674  trillion rubles (defense spending was 3. 895 trillion). 
This accounted for 34.6% of all federal budget expenditures. In 2018, military 
spending fell significantly – to 2.827 trillion1.
Approximately the  same defense budget should remain in 2019–2021. 
According to Anatoly Popov, Director of Finance Ministry Department for budget 
policy in the sphere of the state military and law enforcement services and the state 
defense orders, during this period “together with the  secret part, the  expenses 
for law enforcement, defense and security make up 30% of the  state budget 
expenditure”2. The funds allocated to the Russian Defense Ministry in 2020 will 
amount up to 1.894 trillion rubles, while in 2021 the expenditures of the military 
Department will be reduced to almost 1.574 trillion and will increase slightly to 
1.609 trillion rubles in 2022. The main part of the expenses of the Russian MOD 
will be directed to ensuring national defense. In 2020, 1.056 trillion rubles will be 
spent for this purpose. At the same time, this item of expenditure will grow – to 
1.077 trillion in 2021 and to 1.096 trillion in 2022. Basically, the amount will be 
increased by spending on the Armed forces of the Russian Federation, included 
in the  section “National defense”. Next year, 973  million rubles will be spent 
on them, a  year later  – 995 billion rubles, in 2022 this amount will grow to 
1.024 trillion rubles3. 
Military expenditure during Putin’s rule
A. Golts
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At the  same time, the  announced figures cannot be considered final. In 
accordance with the established practice, the 2018 Federal budget implementation 
was accompanied by two adjustments – in July and in November. The allocations 
for the “national defense” section established initially by the  law on the Federal 
budget for 2018 were increased by 28 billion rubles to 2.797 trillion rubles in July 
and by 31 billion rubles (by 1.1%) to 2 trillion 828 billion rubles (2.7% of GDP) 
in November. It is safe to assume that this practice will continue.
Secrecy rejects the control
Russian leaders use two arguments to explain their apparent preference for 
military spending. First, they claim that Russia is in a hostile environment, that 
a new military confrontation with the West and an arms race have been imposed 
on it. Therefore, increasing military spending is the only way to ensure the security 
of the  country. The  second argument is that investments in the  weapons 
production have a  multiplier effect and turn into economic growth. Deputy 
Defense Minister Tatyana Shevtsova considers the  investment of the  military 
budget the main driving force of the economy: “the Defense budget is a factor of 
stability and further development of the domestic industry, which, thanks to firm 
orders from the Defense Ministry in the coming decades will be able to update 
the  technological base and create a  significant number of new skilled jobs ... 
companies, one way or another involved in the production of military products, 
of which 1339 enterprises included in the unified register of the defense industry, 
form the  basis of domestic industry, about 1 thousand  – work with them in 
cooperation, the rest supply materials and components.”4
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu prefers to laugh it off when asked if Russian 
military spending is excessive.5 Let’s, he says, not reduce costs, but increase 
revenues. However, the problem is not only in the size of the military budget, but 
in how spending is justified. There is no civilian control over military spending 
(as, indeed, over all defense and law enforcement activities) in Russia. The society 
knows almost nothing about the effectiveness of these costs.
It is obvious that in recent years the Russian Army has become much more 
effective. It has gained the ability for rapid deployment, as demonstrated during 
the  Crimea annexation, the  “secret war” in Donbas and the  operation in Syria. 
In addition, during the implementation of the 2011–2020 Rearmament Program, 
for the first time in the history of modern Russia, it became possible to establish 
the  production of if not state-of-the-art, then at least new weapons. According 
to official data, by the end of 2019, they will amount to 68.2 percent of the total 
volume of all armament6. Of course, sustainable and abundant funding has played 
an important role.
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However, it is impossible to draw objective conclusions how effectively these 
huge funds are spent. The reason is the paranoid desire of the Russian authorities 
for secrecy. According to the budget classifier, the government presents in the open 
part of the  budget (the secret part should be known only to the  members of 
the Duma and the Federation Council defense committees– it is not known how 
much information about the  military budget is available even to them) only 
a dozen sketchy figures. These figures exist in the budget under titles “National 
defense”, “Armed forces of the Russian Federation”, “Mobilization and non-military 
training”, “Mobilization preparation of economy”, “Nuclear weapons complex”, 
“Implementation of international obligations in the sphere of military technical 
cooperation”, “Applied scientific research in the field of national defense”, “Other 
issues in the area of national defense.” Direct and indirect military expenditures 
can be also found in other sections – from “Main national issues” and “National 
economy” to “Physical culture” and “Culture and cinematography”. According to 
Vasily Zatsepin, these expenditures in 2018 amounted to 1.4 trillion, that is, about 
half of all defense spending7.
The so-called “open” budget items provide very little information. In fact, 
the public is provided with a few meaningless figures every year that can neither 
be verified nor evaluated. Well, what’s the  use of the  fact that public was told 
that the Armed forces next year will spend 2,138 trillion rubles, and the “security 
agencies” (even without detailing the departments) will get 300 billion? Analysts 
who do not have “access” to classified materials can only state whether the total 
costs of a  particular item increase or decrease compared to previous years. It 
is almost impossible to know from these figures how the  huge funds will be 
spent. The  Russian Parliament has abandoned the  function of civilian control 
over military spending. The  activity of parliamentarians is limited to periodic 
demarches to the government with the requirement to increase a particular item 
of military spending. For instance, criticism of the military budget of 2020 was 
concentrated on the  fact that the  State Duma Committee on defense disagreed 
while discussing the budget with insufficient expenditures on pensions for military 
veterans, financing of military mortgages and purchases of fuel and lubricants8. 
At the  same time, the parliamentarians did not even try to revise the  structure 
of military spending, redistribute funds.
Having made secret all meaningful financial information in the field of defense 
and security, the Kremlin paradoxically began to lose control over how finances 
are spent. Freed from any control except departmental, officials began to lie 
outright. Sometimes the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry get into frankly stupid 
situations. Traditionally, the results of the Defense Ministry activities are summed 
up annually during the  MOD board session. Each year the  Defense Ministry 
head reports on the achieved successes do not coincide with the plans that were 
voiced a year ago. At the end of 2018, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported 
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on the implementation and even over-fulfillment of the defense orders. However, 
if one opens the speech of the MOD head at the end of 2017 at the similar board 
session, and the  picture changes dramatically. According to the  plans, in 2018, 
the  troops were to receive 203 aircraft and helicopters, but they received only 
126. Strategic Air Force received not six, as planned, but five strategic bombers. 
The Navy was supposed to get 35 ships and support vessels, but it had received 
only 25. It was planned to receive the  strategic submarine “Knyaz Vladimir”, 
then its delivery was postponed to 2019. It turns out that the defense orders for 
the most important items were fulfilled at best by 70 percent9. In 2017, the data 
on military spending that Russia reported to the UN was 1.7  trillion rubles less 
than those indicated in the state budget.10 At the same time, no one is ashamed of 
the fact that the figures announced by the military Department do not fit together. 
In these conditions, control can be carried out only at the departmental level. 
That is why once every six months, Vladimir Putin arranges multi-day meetings 
with the heads of the Armed Forces and the Military-industrial complex. Only in 
this way, he manages to compare the data coming from different agencies, each 
of which corrects them in their own interests, and then deliberately distorts for 
propaganda purposes.
Corruption – natural feature of military budget
It is secrecy that is the basis for the corruption that reigns in the execution 
of the state defense order. The authorities are trying to curb it, creating numerous 
supervisory agencies designed to monitor each other’s activities. In the summer of 
2015, a special law was adopted, which obliged companies to store budget funds 
exclusively in banks determined by the government. At the same time, the funds 
that financed the  execution of the  state defense order had to be “painted” in 
a  special way, which would prevent their theft and misuse. After all, according 
to Deputy Defense Minister Tatyana Shevtsova, “there was a situation when we 
sent advances to the main contractors (of a particular project – A. G.), and they 
did not pass them on through cooperation (chain of suppliers  – A.  G.) They 
put money on deposit, issued a  loan, but did not send them to the  enterprises 
that cooperate ... The  funds provided for the  production of weapons could 
remain in the accounts of the company for six months, while the company and 
the suppliers were waiting for these advance payments to produce products.”11 It 
is clear that the money did not just lie on deposits, most likely, with the consent 
of top managers of the  defense industry, these funds were scrolled. However, 
the new system did not stop the  theft. It is no coincidence that two years later, 
Vladimir Putin toughened criminal penalties for crimes in the  implementation 
of the defense order12. 
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 In the end, the government decided to concentrate all the funds of the de-
fense order in one bank – Promsvyazbank. Its activities will be completely classi-
fied under the pretext of protection from Western sanctions. “Monopolization of 
banking services carries risks for defense industry enterprises of increase of im-
proper expenses as it deprives main contractors of possibility to use at their choice 
a  competitive authorized bank.”13,  – Vladimir Gutenev, the  head of the  Duma 
Commission on legal support of the development of military-industrial complex 
organizations of the Russian Federation stated.
According to the  Chief military Prosecutor’s office, the  damage from 
military corruption crimes for 2018 exceeded 7 billion rubles, while more than 
2,800 officials were brought to disciplinary responsibility under the  acts of 
the Prosecutor’s office, and 28 of them were dismissed due to loss of trust14. In 2018 
criminal cases in connection with corruption were opened against officials in 
the Department of contract audit of the Defense Ministry, the Military Academy 
of the General staff and the 46th MOD Central research Institute. All cases were 
united by overstating the  value of contracts.15 In particular, it was claimed that 
the  space industry and the  defense industry companies (including Rostech, 
Almaz-Antey, UAC and others) detected thefts of more than 1.6 billion rubles 
intended for the modernization of the production base and the  latest advanced 
weapons development16. For example, an unnamed enterprise in the  Vladimir 
Region supplied products for the needs of the Ministry of defense at a price of 
332 thousand rubles per unit when their real cost was 9 to 11 thousand rubles. 
That is, the price was 30 times inflated17. Among other examples – the activities 
of “Stankoprom” industrial holding. None of the  three projects for the  serial 
production of machines, for the  implementation of which in 2015–2016 
the budget allocated more than 1.8 billion rubles, was completed and not a single 
machine was produced18.
According to reports of state news agencies, the  Prosecutor General was 
going to introduce legislative initiatives, the implementation of which would allow 
fighting corruption in the defense industry with new instruments. In particular, 
the Prosecutor General offered to give the preliminary investigators the right to 
initiate criminal procedures against crimes committed in the sphere of the state 
defense order, without naming the  injured party. It was also proposed to oblige 
the military representations of the Ministry of Defense to verify the accuracy of 
the actual cost of the companies that violated the conditions of implementation 
of the state defense order. 
The essence of these initiatives is obvious. Corruption in the  defense 
industry is characterized by collusion between the  supplier and the  customer, 
which is a particular department of the Defense Ministry. Therefore, the MOD 
department is not eager to declare itself the  injured party and inform the  law 
enforcers about the violations. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that representatives 
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of the  military acceptance may not be aware of the  repeated overestimation of 
the product prices. With the state imposing increasingly brutal measures, Putin 
is forced to admit impotence in the face of pervasive corruption. It has been said 
a hundred times: “Work in a transparent way; this is a huge, nation-wide project 
that involves huge funds.” But no, they steal hundreds of millions. Hundreds 
of millions. Several dozens of criminal cases have been opened, investigations 
conducted, and people are in jail. But it still has been impossible to bring that 
place to order”19 he stated, describing the situation with constructing Vostochny 
Space Launch Centre.
The inefficiency of the defense industry
Corruption is not the  only problem of the  military industry. The  Russian 
military industry produces mainly repeatedly modernized weapons developed 
in the USSR 40 or 50 years ago. This is the main battle tank – T-72B3, Su-34 and Su-
35 combat aircrafts, which are clones of the Soviet Su-27 fighter, most of the artillery 
systems. And widely advertised military projects – such as the Armata tank (T-14), 
do not go into mass production because of the weakness of the domestic military 
industry. So initially there was a state order for the production of 2300 copies of 
the  T-14 until 2020.20 Later it was 15 times reduced  – to 132  combat vehicles.21 
If the decision on mass production is still taken, then it is a voluntary approach, 
when the  real circumstances are simply not taken into account. According 
to the  Rearmament program, it was supposed to produce 16 Su-57 fighters of 
the  5th  generation in 2020–2027 (which meant the  actual rejection of serial 
production). And suddenly Vladimir Putin made a sensation, saying: “the involved 
companies reduced the cost of the aircraft and arms by almost 20 percent, and we 
received an opportunity to buy many more combat systems of this class, virtually 
all of them are of the new generation. We agreed that we would purchase 76 aircraft 
of this type without an increase in costs during the same period.”22 One can only 
guess how reducing the cost of each aircraft by 20 percent can increase the number 
of aircraft purchased almost five times! After all, nothing was said about increasing 
the total funding of the Rearmament program. 
The inefficiency of the defense industry is primarily due to its organization. 
In 2001–2010, all defense manufacturers were assembled into a dozen vertically 
built state corporations – the United aircraft Corporation, the United shipbuilding 
Corporation, Rostekh, Tactical missile weapons Corporation and others. In fact 
all this system is a caricature of the famous “nine” – nine Soviet military-industrial 
ministries. In these corporations there is a huge bureaucratic superstructure, and 
each relatively efficient company is doomed to sponsor several companies close 
to bankruptcy.
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At the  same time, manufacturers of specific types of weapons and military 
equipment are monopolists (such situation did not exist even in the  USSR). 
Naturally, in this situation, the manufacturer makes the price unthinkably high. It 
includes all inefficient spending, the need to maintain both bankrupt enterprises 
and the  bureaucratic vertical. As a  result, one Armata tank costs more than 
250  million rubles, approaching the  cost of a  combat aircraft. And the  price of 
each Su-57 is more than 100 million dollars. 
Another reason for the  failures is the  inability to establish production 
cooperation in principle. In the  USSR, only the  final assembly plants belonged 
to the defense industry. And components (in Su-27 there were 1500 such parts) 
were produced by the  civil companies. It had nothing to do with reasonable 
economics. After all, in order to produce a  limited number of components 
the manufacturer had to keep (and pay for) additional production capacity and 
labor force. The cost of this was included in the cost of civilian products. It raised 
the cost and reduced the quality of civil goods. It is no coincidence that USSR had 
to establish Gosplan (a body that held a very high position in the Soviet decision-
making hierarchy) that was required to balance the prices of civilian and military 
products artificially. With the advent of the market economy, the defense order 
with its relatively small production volumes, dependence on military officials, 
senseless secrecy measures, which only complicated civilian production, became 
unprofitable. Complex chains of industrial cooperation crumbled. 
Eventually, the  richest military-industrial corporations began to build 
additional facilities for the components production. The way it was done, the air-
defense corporation “Almaz-Antey”, built two new plants. And those who do 
not have such opportunities, produce components in a  semi-amateurish way at 
the  final assembly plants. That does not allow running large series and makes 
the products themselves as costly as if they were made of gold. So comes KnAPO- 
Komsomolsk-on-Amur aviation plant, the main manufacturer of the Su-35 and 
Su-57. If clones of the Soviet fighter or the tank still can be produced somehow, 
then serial production of new weapons with fundamentally new components, as 
we see on the example of “Armata”, is not possible to organize. 
The low efficiency of the domestic defense industry is evidenced by the poor 
financial condition of the companies. The military industry companies have about 
two trillion rubles debts, said supervising “defense” Deputy Prime Minister Yuri 
Borisov, admitting that companies are unable to pay off these loans.23 This makes 
the defense industry the fourth most indebted (after financial services, wholesale 
trade, real estate transactions) sector of the  economy. The  credit bubble in 
the military industry is especially dangerous, since these trillions were distributed 
only by a  few authorized government banks, and now will be concentrated in 
“Promsvyazbank”. 
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The main trouble is not even in the size of loans, but in the fact that about 
a third of the total debt is not repaid, they only serve interest. According to Borisov, 
defense enterprises spend about 200 billion rubles each year to pay interest. At 
the  same time, “the main body of the  loan will never be repaid”, the  Deputy 
Prime Minister believes24. Earlier, he compared the work of the military industry 
with an attempt to move on an exercise bike: no matter how much pressure 
on the  pedals is exerted, you still will not come anywhere. The  main client of 
the defense industry – the Russian Ministry of Defense – does not observe any 
problems with manufacturers. 
The way out of the  situation Borisov suggests is simple: the  state should 
simply write off the debts of defense companies in the amount of 600–700 billion, 
so that they do not live “starving”25. Thus, Russian citizens, whose taxes directly 
or indirectly (through taxes of state-owned companies) form the  state budget, 
will have to pay twice – first in the form of funds released under the state defense 
order, and then – when writing off the debts of the defense industry – to finance 
military production. In 2016, the  Ministry of Finance has already allocated 
800 billion rubles for early repayment of loans issued to defense companies, in 
2017  – another 200 billion26. In the  interpretation of the  officials the  military 
industry over-indebtedness is a  kind of natural disaster. No one even tries to 
explain how it turned out that with seemingly regular and full funding military 
enterprises cannot repay loans from their profits. 
Yuri Borisov wisely did not name the reasons for these difficulties. According 
to him, in 2010–2011, it is unclear why “the rate of attracted loans was 10, 11, 
12 percent”. At the same time, it is well known that these years the unprecedented 
23 trillion rubles state arms program was launched. On the one hand, the Russian 
authorities could not afford to disrupt this program, as all the  previous ones. 
After all, this time the  rearmament was to be the  most important element of 
military reform. But on the other hand, at this very moment the state, which was 
struggling to get out of the 2008 economic crisis, did not have the means to invest 
four dozen extremely expensive projects at once. In this situation, then-Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin made a decision that even the most cautious economic 
experts call “exotic”. Either on his own initiative, or at the suggestion of the heads 
of authorized state banks (who decided to take advantage of the  moment and 
provide themselves with a huge income for decades to come), the Prime Minister 
decided that the  state program will be financed by these banks under state 
guarantees. Banks set extortionate interest rates.
However, if it came down only to prohibitive interest for profitable production, 
the problem would be solved by payments in 2016–2017. Meanwhile, the situation, 
as we see, is regularly repeated. Obviously, the  reason is not only in the  desire 
of the  state banks to get high interest rates. Probably, it is the  low efficiency of 
production, and, as a consequence, the increasing cost of specific weapons systems. 
69
A. Golts. Military expenditure during Putin’s rule
This was acknowledged by Vladimir Putin during the  meeting of the  Military-
industrial Commission: “shortage of capital is the result of many things including 
under-utilized capacity due to reductions in orders and the  costs of financing 
R&D; research expenses were not accounted for in the  planning documents”27.
But if the current military production is inefficient and unprofitable, maybe 
the officials are right, claiming that it can be the engine of economic development 
of the country. One of the main economic ideas that Vladimir Putin periodically 
expresses is that the potential of the Russian military-industrial complex can be 
used for the production of civilian products. The President states that the peak 
of the rearmament program has passed, and production facilities should be kept 
to maintain “mobilization readiness”: “I want to say that the  economic ability 
to increase the  production of defense products and services quickly is a  vital 
element of military security. All strategic and simply large companies, regardless 
of the  type of ownership, must be able to do this... Instructions were issued to 
modernise production, to create a reserve of material and technical resources”.28 
the  President has already outlined plans for conversion  – however, this term 
itself has never been mentioned, in order not to remind of the infamously failed 
previous attempts (first under Gorbachev, then  – under Yeltsin) to transfer 
military industry to civilian production. Putin demands that share of high-tech 
civilian and dual-purpose goods in defense companies’ output must increase 
to 17 percent by 2020, 30 percent by 2025 and 50 percent by 203029. The  most 
curious thing is with what measures Putin intends to achieve the result.
First, the  President ordered to develop “legislation that will determine 
the range and the share of civilian products to be purchased by natural monopolies, 
state corporations and federal government bodies. As we agreed, they should 
become the  key purchasers of such products at the  initial stage”30. In addition, 
he ordered to draw up a  clear program of “diversification” of production, “to 
represent how much and what civilian products will be produced by each defense 
company and to what markets it plans to deliver”31. Putin did not forget about 
the need of a financial support for the program.
In fact, this system has to fix on legislative level how much civilian products 
a particular state-owned company should produce, and then, relying on the same 
laws, force another state-owned company to buy these products. In essence, it 
is a  return to the  planned economy in one of the  most important sectors of 
industrial production. Logically next step will be to revive Gosplan  – the  body 
which will artificially “assign” prices for goods and subsidize the purchase of raw 
materials. Naturally, such industrial organization should exclude any competition, 
especially from foreign manufacturers. Consequently, the  military industry is 
doomed to carry out the conversion in the conditions of strict autarky.
It is not so difficult to predict what will happen if these plans are implemented. 
The process of “internal” consumption of resources and finances, when neither 
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productivity nor quality increases, will be included. The money will be paid for 
products that no one needs. When the consumer cannot refuse buying the product, 
no technological breakthroughs, of course, can happen. The manufacturer is not 
interested in the use of more advanced technologies. After all, the buyer has no 
chance to refuse the purchase. And the quality and compliance with international 
standards are evaluated by the departmental commission. This is a direct way to 
repeat the  crisis of overproduction in the  sphere of military production, which 
once finished off the Soviet economy in 1980s.
It is important to note that in all the  other world, the  main breakthrough 
technologies have long been born not in military laboratories. In the  face of 
the scientific and technological revolution, the pre-paid demand for high-tech in 
the  civilian sector  – smartphones, video equipment, increasingly sophisticated 
computers and electric vehicles  – far exceeds any conceivable state investment 
in military technology. It is due to demand that the largest Western corporations 
finance military developments today. State investment began to play a secondary 
role. Technology is now coming not from the military sector to civilian, but vice 
versa.
Conclusion
As a result of the military reform, the Armed forces received quite modern 
organizational models. However, in the  sphere of financing the  army and 
organizing the  military industry, the  Kremlin prefers long-outdated schemes. 
Russia spends disproportionately large amounts of money on military purposes. 
They are spent without any public control. As a  result, these expenditures are 
inefficient. Their essential part is stolen. This money is lost due to inefficient 
organization of the  defense industry. However, strengthening military power is 
an absolute priority for Vladimir Putin. It is safe to assume that in the  future 
Russia will spend more and more of its national wealth on military purposes. At 
the same time, less and less money will be spent on purposes indirectly related 
to military power: health and education, fundamental science. Thus, excessive 
military spending by Russia can only bring a short-term effect.
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Part II: International Dimension
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Russia and the European Union – 
The Changing Role of Energy 
Kai-Olaf Lang, Kirsten Westphal
Energy and trade exchange have always been key elements in the  relations 
between the  Russian Federation and the  European Union. Irrespective of all 
political uncertainties and setbacks, economic cooperation and, in particular, 
energy relations seemed to be something like the hard core of mutual interaction. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that relations in the field of energy have usually 
formed a highly important component of the various concepts that both sides have 
regarded as frameworks for cooperation – from the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement over the Four Common Spaces to the Partnership for Modernization. 
However, especially after the  EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, when 
many countries with a difficult past regarding Russia and the Soviet Union had 
joined the community, the differences within the EU arose considerably: Whereas 
some member states continued to regard cooperation with Russia in the field of 
energy as something like a glue, which stabilizes EU-Russia relations, or even as 
a  locomotive of collaboration, which will create positive spill-overs into other 
areas, a  substantial number of member states holds energy cooperation with 
Russia to be a source of dependency and a security risk. 
Irrespective of these discrepancies within the  EU, both sides, the  EU and 
Russia are considerably varying in their approach to energy policies. The EU is not 
only an energy consumer and a customer of Russia, whereas Russia is an energy 
producer and a key supplier of the EU, there are also distinct preconditions for 
energy policy and the functioning of energy sectors: the EU is a market-orientated 
and rules-based entity, while Russia has a political economy with a state-guided 
energy system. For the mutual relationship this means among other things that 
energy cooperation is also the encounter of a regulatory power with a geopolitical 
power. Finally, EU energy relations are increasing part of the foreign and security 
policy context between the EU or the West and Russia, with the conflict in Ukraine 
since 2014 being a  catalyst of such a  development. Hence, EU-Russia energy 
relations are increasingly politicized, asymmetric and securitized. Against this 
backdrop this paper examines EU-Russian energy relations between 2000 and 
2019. In a first step, the paper provides figures and facts about the development 
of hydrocarbon imports from Russia to the  EU. Then, it takes a  historical 
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retrospective and explores the  ups and down of EU-Russian energy relations. 
The  official energy dialogue between the  Russian Federation and the  EU was 
inaugurated in 2000. Since then, natural gas trade has received most of attention 
because of its historical relevance as part of the rapprochement and détente during 
the Cold War, diverging historical experiences in Eastern and Western member 
states and the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises. Since the annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and the  ongoing fights in Eastern Ukraine, the  geopolitical dimension of 
natural gas trade and pipelines has become predominant. And finally, it concludes 
with some considerations about the prospects of mutual relations. 
The characteristics of EU-Russia energy relations
Energy relations between Russia and the  EU are based on hydrocarbons. 
European Member States and Russia/the Soviet Union have a  long-standing 
energy relationship which originated in the 1950s for oil deliveries and for natural 
gas supplies in the 1970s. Russia’s exports of hydrocarbons to Europe have shaped 
the relations. Yet, this has to change, because both have committed themselves to 
address climate change under the Paris Agreement of 2015. 
EU-Russia energy trade. Some basic figures 
Quantifying Russia’s position in the energy landscape can be done straight-
forward1: Russia is and will remain among the  biggest energy exporters in 
the  world. It produces 12.1 percent of world oil and 17.3 percent of gas and 
5.6 percent of coal.2 Accordingly, Russia is the most important energy supplier to 
the EU with 43 percent of its gas, 30 percent of its crude and 42 percent of its oil 
products originating from Russia in 2017 (see graphs below). Last but not least, 
the  share of Russia in the  EU uranium supplies accounted for 18 percent3 and 
uranium enrichment services for 25 percent.4 This is of strategic relevance, given 
the fact that the replacement of specific fuel rods cannot easily be realized. Russia 
is also a major supplier of coal to the EU. At the same time, the EU is the major 
destination for Russian energy exports (see graphs below).
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Graph 1: EU-28: Natural gas imports from Russia (in bcm)
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Source: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_
european_gas_markets_q4_2017_final_20180323.pdf
Graph 2: EU-28: Share of total natural gas imports from Russia  
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Graph 3: EU-28: Crude oil product imports from Russia (mln. tons)
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Graph 4: EU-28: Share of Russia crude oil and oil product imports  
(% of extra EU-28 imports)
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Even though the close energy relationship between EU and Russia stretches 
beyond natural gas, namely, to oil, hard coal, nuclear fuel cycle and the  power 
sector, the  EU-Russian gas relations receive most of the  political and public 
attention as these supplies are pipeline-bound. This creates closer and more 
rigid (inter)dependencies. Crude oil and hard coal are traded globally. Electricity 
cooperation is decisive for modernization of the network and generation capacities, 
related to renewables and energy efficiency. Yet, the  trade between the  EU and 
Russia is limited to Finland and the  Baltic States. The  plans to de-synchronize 
the Baltic States from the former Russian/Soviet UPS/IPS and synchronize them 
with the  ENTSO-E grid by 2025 will diminish cross-border electricity trade.
Graph 5: Russian Federation: Share of total electrical energy exports  
to EU-28
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Russia is a  hydrocarbon exporting country, and the  energy sector is of 
systemic relevance for the Russian economy and Russian politics.5 the revenues 
of oil and gas exports account for almost half of all foreign currency earning and 
for almost a third of all state revenues.6 the Russian oil and gas sector accounts for 
more than a third of the GDP; Russia’s state-dominated behemoths, Rosneft and 
Gazprom, alone provide 14 percent.7 the fiscal break-even point is 40 US Dollar 
for 2019/2020. All revenues from taxation and export duties, which exceed 
an oil price of 40 US Dollar per barrel are feeding the  national wealth fund. 
The accumulated sum is increasing again.8 Russia has mentioned to consolidate 
its budget in difficult times. 
The development of EU-Russian energy relations
The first period: Towards convergence?
Before the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was inaugurated, the relationship was 
based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). It was signed in 1994 
and came into force in 1997. The PCA is a fundamental agreement, concluded for 
ten years, that structures EU-Russian cooperation and defines the main areas for 
common activities among those energy with a reference to the European Energy 
Charter and its norms. Since 2007 it is renewed every year. The PCA was based 
on the  declaration of common values such as democratic governance, human 
rights and the  commitment to market structures. The  “respect for democratic 
principles and human rights (...)”9 and the compliance with political conditions, 
norms, rules, and regulations of the  OSCE and the  GATT/WTO were defined 
as a  precondition to political and economic cooperation. Article 65 on energy 
affirms the principles of the market economy and the European Energy Charter, 
as well as emphasized environmental issues.
The European Energy Charter was signed in 1991 and the consecutive Energy 
Charter Treaty was agreed in 1994. The  Energy Charter Treaty transfers WTO 
rules to the energy trade and thus set regulations and standards for a liberalized, 
transparent and non-discriminatory energy market.10 It was very much driven 
by market liberal ideas and negotiated from the  standpoint of a  buyer. Yet, 
the Treaty with the Transit Protocol would have obligated Russia to implement 
the principles of freedom of transit without distinction of the origin, destination 
or ownership of the energy, and of non-discriminatory pricing. This had not been 
perceived as being in the interest of Russia and the country refused to fully apply 
the Energy Charter Treaty due to the Protocol on Transit. However, the Energy 
Charter Process served as a major channel to discuss energy issues for more than 
fifteen years. 
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The year 2000 became a  crystallizing point in EU-Russian relations: when 
Vladimir Putin took office from President Yeltsin, he developed and strengthened 
a pragmatic policy course towards the EU. 
A sign for the  pragmatic and economy-driven policy course became 
the advent of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue 
was set up in September 2000. At the EU level, the degree and structure of outside 
dependence become first and explicitly made situation of the discussion at some 
point of the  instruction of the  Green Paper ‘Towards a  European strategy for 
the  security of strength supply’ in autumn 2000,11 which had also heightened 
the  awareness of the  importance of energy deliveries from Russia. In autumn 
2000, the  then President of the  EU Commission, Romano Prodi, announced 
the plan to double gas imports from Russia and to increase oil imports. Energy 
cooperation moved upwards on the agenda of mutual relations.
The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue12 has had a  two-fold objective from 
the beginning: First and foremost it was intended to gear the flows of energy trade 
and investment, but second also to overcome certain antagonisms between the two 
differently structured markets. Second, the dialogue was directed at developing 
the  ‘energy partnership’ in order to achieve a  situation of mutual advantage. 
Therefore, the dialogue was organized as a multi-level attempt to govern energy 
relations by integrating participants from the political and the economic side into 
the several working groups and round tables. 
The EU and Russia had defined short and long-term issues for the  Energy 
Dialogue: the  functioning of markets and their harmonization, sustainable 
development, predictable and stable supply.13 Already at that time, the principles 
of market transparency and competition were emphasized by the EU as well as 
the  issue of long-term contracts and their destination clauses. Pilot projects on 
energy savings in Archangelsk were kicked off. The safety of infrastructure was 
mentioned as a  common concern. Under the  header of ‘predictable and stable 
supply’, a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, which links the UK with Russia via 
Germany has been defined as a priority axis within the trans-European networks. 
An interconnected electricity network was a  common priority. The  joint use of 
the  two satellite navigation systems GALLILEO and the  Russian GLONASS in 
order to reinforce the  safety of infrastructure and production was a  long term 
objective. Last but not least, the improvement of the investment climate in Russia 
was an important issue because of the  high investment needs identified at that 
time, as well as to develop new production sites to meet the growing European 
demand.
During President Putin’s first term, foreign policy was characterized by an 
‘economization’ of Russian foreign policy, which means a reappraisal of the relations 
with other newly independent states and a re-evaluation of the cooperation with 
the EU as the main trading and economic partner.14 In this situation, the idea of 
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‘a single economic space’ with the European Union emerged and was translated 
into the  ‘four common spaces’ at the  St. Petersburg EU-Russia Summit in May 
2003. Energy was part of the economic space.15 Yet, this formal declaration had 
to be filled with substance and this proved to be more complicated. 
2004 was a decisive year: the EU’s enlargement took place, and the EU and 
Russia agreed on Russia’s accession to the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol. These 
processes went on in parallel. The  bilateral negotiations between the  EU and 
Russia on a protocol for the accession of Russia to the WTO revealed conflicting 
positions: the EU raised the crucial issues of the application of international WTO 
standards, the opening of Russian markets and their liberalization with a special 
focus on the energy sector. This disclosed profound dissensions between the two 
partners on how and whether to institutionalize and structure the  ‘common 
economic space’. On the one hand, the EU had leverage over Russia, as its consent 
was needed concerning the conditions of the accession, notably the provisions of 
the Russian energy sector. On the other hand, Russia had intertwined the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol with the EU’s support of Russia’s bid for accession to the WTO. 
With regard to environmental and climate policies, the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by Russia on 22 October 2004 was a landmark in the Energy Dialogue, 
as both committed themselves to climate protection measures. As the  Russian 
ratification was crucial for its coming into force after the US withdrawal, the EU 
pushed Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, it was less a consequence 
of Russian commitment to fight climate change, than a result of a package deal. 
In other words, it reveals that the  do ut des principle and the  wish to produce 
a  mutually beneficial situation worked in the  bilateral negotiations on Russia’s 
WTO accession – the EU had already signed the protocol in May 2004. Already 
by that time, a competition over zones of – then economic – influence became 
visible on the horizon.
It was at that time when it became clear that Russia was first and foremost 
interested in maintaining and securing its strategic position as the major single 
energy supplier to the EU. With this objective, Russia has put pressure on the EU 
to extend the  acceptance of the  existing long-term contracts for gas supplies. 
Because of the  structural characteristics of the  gas infrastructure and the  huge 
investments which have to be undertaken to build pipelines, the  EU finally 
accepted the  Russian arguments.16 In turn, Russia had to relent its position on 
the  destination clause that was originally linked to the  long-term contracts in 
order to determine the destination of the gas sold to the EU and to avoid a re-
selling on the EU market. Russia exerted pressure on the EU to give up any plans 
of limiting imports to the EU or to member states from a single non-European 
supplier to 30 percent of the overall consumption.17 Moreover, Russia has been 
interested in advanced technologies and financing. 
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All in all, the  EU-Russian energy dialogue had been successfully used by 
Russia to ‘monopolize’ its position as a strategic energy supplier, as the EU gave 
up two important principles of diversification by accepting the Russian demand 
for the  maintenance of long-term contracts and the  absence of quantitative 
restrictions on fossil fuel imports. This was later extended to the  new member 
states in the Joint Statement on EU enlargement.18
The second period: Diversity and divergence
After EU enlargement, the EU integrated new member states with a different 
historical background in their relationship with Russia. Energy security issues were 
increasingly subsumed through the  lens of import dependence. The  reliability 
of Russia as an energy supplier was more and more questioned. Moreover, 
the Russia-Ukrainian transit crises in 2006 and in 2009/2010 raised the question 
of energy security. 
While the  institutionalized EU-Russia energy dialogue was guided from 
the  EU part during the  above described first period by the  idea of positive 
interdependence which not only builds upon physical trade and financial flows 
from both sides, but also constructively builds upon a  common definition and 
implementation of norms and rules up to legally binding arrangements, this 
strategy eroded after 2006/2007. Since the  start of the  dialogue, the  EU has 
been pushing for regulations and the  application of international law in order 
to facilitate trade, commerce and investments in the energy sector. The dialogue 
was geared towards establishing common norms and rules for a  level playing 
field or even one common market for energy from the EU part. Of course, this 
approach was also aimed at allowing western companies to have full access to 
the Russian energy market, but it was also perceived a crucial element to secure 
energy supply to Europe. 
In sum, the  differing interests between the  supplier and consumer became 
more and more evident: Russia as a  hydrocarbon rich country has pursued 
a strategy to maximizing resource rents and ensuring national sovereignty over 
natural resources. President Putin has also used the energy sector as an instrument 
of its power preservation. The  ‘old system of oligarchs’ which had dominated 
the oil industry in the 1990s under then President Yeltsin has been substituted by 
a web of ‘loyalists’ to President Putin. The turn of the oil markets and increasing 
oil prices backed his strategy. The  break-up of Yukos and the  detention of its 
CEO Khodorkovsky in 2003 proved to become a  watershed. Putin established 
a  “network state capitalism”19, which builds upon close control of the  Kremlin 
and personal ties to President Putin. The  big companies are managed by Putin 
“Loyalists” and have served as a  funding source to subsidize other economic 
activities of a circle close to the leadership.
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The EU, in turn, followed down a  different path as a  consumer market. 
The  EU has had contrasting interest in cost-efficient energy supplies and 
implementing competition. The Internal Energy Market Packages for Electricity 
and Gas (1996/1998; 2003; 2009) 20 were dedicated to this end. 
The most incisive change was the Third Energy Market Package of 2009. Since 
1998, the  EU has been passing through a  sensitive transition that has gripped 
on policies, market structures, companies and commercial transactions as part 
of the  Internal Market Packages. When the  EU Commission started to revise 
long-term delivery contracts and to bring an end to ‘bundled’ business models 
with the Internal Market Packages of 2003 and 2009, the market structures and 
business models changed fundamentally. In particular, the Third Energy Market 
Package of 2009 (together with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009) to implement a really 
competitive, functioning and integrated EU market for electricity and natural 
gas has changed the consecutive bilateral energy relations on different levels. It 
highly affected the business model of all gas undertakings, and Gazprom among 
those. Its fundamental impact was even intensified by the gas glut which enfolded 
in 2009/2010 as a consequence of the fracking revolution in the US and surplus 
of LNG volumes available. This turned natural gas markets into buyers’ market.
Russia has always been very clear about its historical preference for 
the  traditional organization of the  gas market, fitting with its market order. 
Moreover, the  business cases and economics e.g. for Gazprom’s infrastructure 
projects Nord Stream and South Stream have changed under the  Third Market 
Package. At the same time, Gazprom has also profited from the changes, because 
it enabled the  company’s downstream expansion in Europe, and mostly in 
Germany. The  Internal Market Packages of the  EU brought a  caesura in long-
standing relationships, because they brought an end to bundled business models 
and initiated a revision of long-term contracts.21
Despite the stated common goal of market harmonization, diverging positions 
over trade, transit and investment became evident during this phase. Moreover, 
the  issue of gas transit moved to the  forefront. The  transit countries Ukraine 
and Belarus that are geographically and physically part of the  market had not 
been included into the bilateral dialogue, and the Transit Protocol of the Energy 
Charter Treaty was under constant negotiation. The  year 2009 also marked 
a caesura in the transit dimension. The EU was affected by the Russian-Ukrainian 
gas crises. While in the aftermath, the EU made considerable improvements on 
the  functioning and the  interconnectedness of its internal market, the  division 
inside the  EU over the  perception of Russia’s role and performance as a  gas 
supplier became predominant. 
Finally, Russia had never ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, formally stepping 
back from it in 2009. A  major reason for this maneuver was the  investor-state 
dispute between former Western shareholders of the Russian oil company Yukos 
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and the Russian Federation, but the step also marked a further alienation between 
the EU and Russia. 
In sum, the energy market of the EU and Russia already drifting apart, have 
developed in different directions: Russia remained a  state-dominated ‘market’ 
and companies even experienced a  reinforcement of ties to the  political elite, 
while the  EU moved toward a  neoliberal competitive and integrated internal 
market. As a  consequence, the  common space has become more fragmented. 
The challenge for EU’s approach to liberalized (gas) markets lies in the geology, 
as most of the reserve base is outside EU jurisdiction.
A New Paradigm: Modernization and decarbonization?
Despite of these growing discrepancies over market structures and transit, 
the EU and Russia developed a common roadmap until 2050.22 It was the first (and 
so far the last) document which clearly focuses at the necessity of decarbonization 
of the relationship. 
Focusing on energy efficiency and renewable energy (RE) was not a  new 
idea  – it was part of the  modernization partnership of Germany and the  EU 
with Russia in 2009/2010. Yet, by then, it had not produced the  wished-for 
results. Since then, however, the overall environment has changed significantly in 
the energy and climate realm with the global oversupply and the consequent price 
decrease of hydrocarbons as well as the signing of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, 
the transitory character of EU energy policies towards a more sustainable energy 
system e.g. with the  German ‘Energiewende’ became a  predominant paradigm 
inside the EU. Notwithstanding, this would have a deep impact on the relationship 
with its major hydrocarbon supplier: Russia. At minimum, the energy transition 
adds to growing uncertainties, because the demand for fossil fuels proved more 
and more difficult to foresee.
Against this backdrop, Russia and the EU had confirmed this roadmap on 
the  basis of their energy strategies and with regard to existing energy ties and 
future relations. The  document was published in 2013; a  few months prior to 
the outbreak of the crises over Ukraine.
In the Roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, both outline 
the  political significance and the  economic relevance of the  energy relations 
which have always been perceived as having “most potential to lead the European 
subcontinent into deeper, mutually beneficial integration”.23 the document contains 
chapters on electricity, gas, oil, renewables, energy efficiency plus cooperation 
regarding energy scenarios and the  forecast. The  long-term dimension of an 
albeit transforming partnership is emphasized by both partners, as energy 
markets have become more globalized, and as the EU is aiming at having a low-
carbon energy system and the Russian Federation is “on path of an innovative and 
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efficient energy sector development”.24 Cross-sectoral issues of common interest 
and activities are energy demand developments, price volatility, the  climate 
challenge and the  Roadmap vision to deepen and intensify energy cooperation 
with steps till 2020, 2030 and 2050. The strategic target identified in the paper is 
a Pan-European Energy Space. This underlines the outstanding role of Russia for 
the continent’s energy supply.
Yet, the ‘decarbonization paradigm’ has failed to become the guiding notion 
for the  bilateral relationship. Over the  years, the  diverging positions have been 
manifesting. In some issues – as market harmonization and market transparency – 
the strategies fall apart. Moreover, Russia was increasingly requesting for a special 
role in the “common neighborhood” and competition over the so-called sphere 
of – then economic – influence arose. The EU had pushed the Energy Community 
since 2006 to export its Acquis Communautaire to the neighborhood. This was 
a clear strategy not only to extend its internal energy market principles, but also 
to break-up Russia’s political and economic power in gas transit countries such 
as Ukraine. Hence, the relationship became fraught with differences concerning 
legal norms, rules and guiding principles. This all happened against the backdrop 
of a profoundly changing international environment, tipping the power balance 
between producers and consumers. Whilst the 1990s saw a relatively low oil price 
level enabling consuming countries to set the rules (partly), the price grew with 
increasing demand from China and Asia till 2013. Since then, the shale oil and 
shale gas revolution in the US has tipped the power balance, making the buyers’ 
markets again. 
The case of Nord Stream 2 and the prevalence of geopolitics since 2014
The wish to diversify away from Russia was the  major impetus behind 
the  proposal of the  Energy Union by then-Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
in 2014 and this was clearly a  reaction to Russian annexation of Crimea and 
aggression in Eastern Ukraine. This meant a  qualitative change in EU energy 
policies with energy security ranking on top of the  five dimensions. Only over 
the  course of 2014/2015, the  Energy Union’s five dimensions were fleshed out 
by integrating the energy objectives of all EU-28 member states. The remaining 
four dimensions encompass creating a  fully integrated internal energy market, 
improving energy efficiency, decarbonizing the economy (not least by using more 
renewable energy), and supporting research, innovation and competitiveness. 
With ‘energy security and diversification’ on top of the priorities for the Energy 
Union, a  securitization of energy relations has happened and energy relations 
have become an issue of high politics. 
Against the  background of the  annexation of Crimea and the  situation in 
the Eastern parts of Ukraine, Germany and other EU member states have faced 
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a  dilemma between political principles and market realities. In 2017, Gazprom 
exported record volumes to the  EU (see graph  1). This means, that the  pure 
commercial, geographic and geological facts still persist: the proximity of Russian 
energy sources, existing and planned infrastructure as well as the complementarity 
of Russian resource abundance and the EU as the biggest net importer of fossil 
fuels. At the  same time, politically, the  functional logic of complementarity 
and interdependence lost its attraction in face of Russia’s course in Ukraine. 
The political framing of the gas relations was questioned with regard to functional 
interdependence, easy rapprochement and positive spill-overs.
Since 2014, the  crisis in and over Ukraine had not resulted in an energy 
crisis. Yet, it had three major consequences on the energy relations: 1) a spiral of 
sanctions and counter-sanctions has been started; 2) the energy dialogue was put 
on hold; and 3) the EU exerted regulation as a geopolitical mean with the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline in focus. 
First, the  West reacted with sanctions on Russia’s aggression. The  above 
described topography of Russian energy elites and their ties to the  Kremlin 
were reflected by Western sanctions which have been tailored to companies and 
key members of the  elite. The  EU has imposed sanctions in September 2014 
that are also targeted at Russian shale oil and deep-water Arctic off-shore oil 
development.25 Specific equipment could no longer be exported. Sanctions on 
the  financial sector target Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft, which are 
prevented from raising long-term funds from European capital markets. As major 
Russian banks are also on the  list, refinancing is getting more complicated for 
the whole energy sector. The EU sanctions have been prolonged ever since then 
for each half year (as of August 2018). 
Whilst the EU and the US administration under Obama pursued a concerted 
approach towards sanctions, the  new wave of US sanctions since the  2017 
elections of President Trump have increasingly impacted on EU’s energy relations. 
Russia reacted to Western sanctions by counter-sanctions, which reinforced 
the  isolationist economic and autocratic political course by cutting imports. 
Moreover, the Ruble’s devaluation made Russian goods more competitive.26
Second, the  Ukrainian crisis became a  breaking point  – it was a  political 
shock and impacts resulting in a  significant deterioration of the  “multi-layered 
architecture of Russia-EU political dialogue” established over the  last decades 
and the  end of EU-Russia energy strategic partnership established in 2011 and 
a  stalled EU-Russia energy dialogue established in 2000. The  official energy 
dialogue between the EU and Russia has been suspended with the exception of 
some workstreams of the EU-Russia Advisory Gas Council. Besides that, the two 
parties also met in the trilateral talks with Ukraine to secure natural gas transit. 
These talks achieved an agreement in December 2019 under the  mediation of 
Germany and the EU Commission.
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Third, the EU regulation has turned away from a liberal market driven tool 
into a geopolitical (and geoeconomic) instrument.27 While the split inside the EU 
over the  policy course with Russia had been evident since the  enlargement, 
the  issue of Nord Stream 2 tipped the  balance in favor of a  harder economic 
and political stance vis-à-vis Russia. The  project of a  gas pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany was inaugurated in summer 2015. Nord 
Stream 2 running almost in parallel to the  already disputed off-shore pipeline 
Nord Stream 1 was announced one year after the  Crimean Shock and against 
the backdrop of the creation of the Energy Union. Whilst a number of member 
states, including the landing state Germany, emphasized its economic character, 
others viewed it through the geopolitical lens and as contradictory to EU’s efforts 
to diversify. Last but not least, its character of a  circumvention of Ukrainian 
transit was emphasized. Since then, the opposition against the project has been 
fierce. Poland, the Baltic States and Nordic countries were backed in their efforts 
to stop the project by (parts of) Brussels, and also joined by the U.S. It became 
evident over the  course of 2015 up until today that the  conflict lines run deep 
across the  EU. What developed was a  struggle over the  legal authority to act 
in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Moreover, this struggle was 
reinforced by a conflict over substance on the matter whether regulation should 
become a means of geopolitics/geoeconomics rather than informed by market-
liberalism.28 These cleavages coincided and aggravated a  deep divide among 
member states horizontally, but also vertically, namely between the Commission 
and Berlin, first and foremost.
In sum, Nord Stream 2 and the tug-of-war between proponents and opponents 
have significantly altered the regulatory regime of the EU. The EU’s major tool, 
regulation, has been used for geoeconomic ends and to exert market power. In 
February 2019, an amendment to the  gas directive was passed, which foresees 
either implementation of the Third Energy Market Package in EU’s coastal waters, 
or derogation for existing pipelines or exemption for planned pipelines. This was 
a step to shake-up the business case for Nord Stream 2 and to reduce the rents 
from Russian gas sales.
Nord Stream 2 became no less the linch-pin for diffuse authority in the EU:29 
the traditional modes of consensual energy policy making failed given the deep-
cut differences over the policy course in substance and over the ends regulation 
should serve for. In sum, the  Commission bridged over the  cleavage, but at 
the expense of politicizing the toolbox and expanding its authority into external 
energy security.30 At the  time of writing,31 it remains to be seen how the  saga 
about Nord Stream 2 will continue. For Germany, the  landing state, which has 
taken a  stance based on market liberalism and the  then existing regulatory 
framework in Germany from the onset, the room of maneuver shrunk. Moreover, 
the  consensus on the  Amendment to the  Directive does not equal a  consensus 
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in substance. The divide over market versus states as the predominant paradigm 
persists as do the  diverging positions towards Russia inside the  EU.32 the  shift 
of authority towards the Commission is only one result. The other far-reaching 
development is the extended U.S. influence on EU’s external energy relations. As 
a result, the response to the Nord Stream 2 issue has not strengthened transatlantic 
energy cooperation, but has rather contributed to deepening existing divides. 
For the  critics of the  project it has become a  symbol of alleged disloyalty on 
the part of their allies, whom they accuse of selling out foreign policy interests 
of the EU and partner countries. For the proponents of the project, U.S. action 
is considered to be an inhibition of their energy policies. For Germany it was 
especially dissatisfying that Washington imposed sanctions despite Berlin’s 
support to reduce negative effects on Ukraine and a result ensuring the mid-term 
continuation of a considerable gas transit from Russia to the EU via Ukraine was 
reached at the end of 2019. 
Since the  announcement of Nord Stream 2, the  U.S. has joined the  choir 
of opponents to the  pipeline through the  Baltic Sea. Washington actively 
supported and pushed for a  harsh stance, also promoting sales of its liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) into Eastern Europe as ‘freedom molecules’. In December 
2019, the Congress achieved a stop of the construction work on the pipeline by 
integrating the ‘Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act’ into the national defense 
budget. Even though this step was applauded by some of the member states, it 
should not be overseen, that the constant exercise of U.S. sanctions has and will 
have far reaching implications for EU’s energy supply and freedom of choice.33 
Conclusion. What next: “normalization” instead of grand 
strategies?
Energy relations between the EU and Russia have undergone a fundamental 
change. Particularly, the gas sector has been subject to adaptations, altered forms 
of cooperation and various conflicts, which centers on pipeline politics, the future 
of the  Ukrainian transit, EU regulation under the  Third Market Package or 
Gazprom’s dominance in Eastern European markets. 
It is evident that EU-Russia energy relations are embedded in a multitude of 
contexts – and the relevance of these contexts is increasing. The broader foreign 
policy landscape in Europe and the world, especially the return of Great Power 
conflicts and US-Russian efforts to mutually hedge their influence particularly 
in Eastern Europe are certainly a key factor, which will rather gain intensity in 
the next years. Similarly, the above mentioned tendency towards “securitization” 
and the geopolitical as well as geoeconomic component have gained prominence 
in mutual energy relations. Also, developments on international energy markets, 
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like the “shale gas revolution” and above all the growing significance of LNG in 
(Central Eastern) Europe have also had impacts on EU-Russia energy relations. 
Moreover, there have been profound developments within the EU: driven by some 
member states and community institutions the EU has made efforts to improve 
its energy security. Hence, some EU member states have started ambitious 
policies of diversification in order to reduce the share of Russian hydrocarbons in 
their consumption – by building new infrastructures and/or using EU regulatory 
power. Also, as the EU General Court has shown in its ruling of September 2019 
on the so called OPAL pipeline, member states will have to take the principle of 
“energy solidarity” (which is per se a quite fuzzy notion) more seriously. Finally, 
the  shift of the EU towards an ambitious CO2-reduction policy is beginning to 
have considerable implications for EU-Russia energy relations – even though it is 
not quite clear when and how these consequences will emerge. For one strand in 
that debate, natural gas and especially gas from Russia is a necessary resource in 
the transition to a decarbonized EU. For another strand in the discussion, natural 
gas hampers the transition process and should be eliminated as soon as possible 
among other things by supporting synthetic and green gas as well as hydrogen. 
One of the  key implications of this multi-dimensional embeddedness of 
energy relations and the  various constellations of interest resulting from this 
is further conflict within the  EU about how to define the  overall approach 
towards Russia of the EU as a collective actor. This will mean a rather weak and 
limited political momentum for EU-Russia energy cooperation and the  further 
advancement of its conceptual frameworks. At the  same time, on the  level of 
member states, a broad range of attitudes will continue to exist, from pragmatic 
energy cooperation with Russia to the (at least declared) objective of far-reaching 
decoupling. As a result, the main cleavage concerning energy relations with Russia 
will not separate the  EU as a  whole on the  one hand and Russia on the  other 
hand, but rather cut through the EU. In the short run, this divide could lead to 
fragmentation of the EU energy markets, with some countries trying to protect 
their markets and costly infrastructure projects from Russian pipeline gas (like 
in the case of Poland). The emergence of more and more regulatory restrictions, 
externally imposed limitations and internal disputes seem to hamper the future 
development of energy relations between the EU and Russia – and some might 
even argue that a  genuine and substantial relationship will not be possible and 
there will be rather a  set of bilateral energy relationships of some EU member 
states with Russia. However, in the  long run, EU-Russia energy relations could 
embark on the way towards a sort of “normalization”.
A path toward normalization may sound surprising from today’s point of 
view. And of course normalization can only happen, if the broader geopolitical 
environment is not disruptive, i.e. it requires a  minimal level of political 
cooperativeness on the  part of Russia. Provided such circumstance exists, 
90
The Russian Economy: Prospects for Putin 4.0
the  internal developments in the  EU, in European energy policy and energy 
policies of member states could be conducive to cooperation with Russia. 
Especially two factors could play a  role: diversification efforts and EU energy 
policies on the on hand, the EU’s decarbonization efforts on the other hand. First, 
once member states, which have a reluctant position towards energy cooperation 
with Russia, have overcome dependency, they can be more relaxed about e.g. gas 
imports. The  example of Lithuania is instructive: even after the  floating LNG-
terminal went online, important consumers in the Baltic country buy gas from 
Russian producers (including Gazprom and Novatek). But Lithuania’s bargaining 
position is stronger and given the elastic infrastructure allows for swiftly changing 
the routes of import, if necessary. So, both from a business and security point of 
view, gas imports from Russia are not done in a situation of being locked in long-
term contracts and market domination by Gazprom. A  similar situation might 
emerge, once Poland finishes its gas infrastructure projects (Baltic Pipe, extension 
of LNG capacities in Swinoujscie and possible construction of an additional LNG 
terminal in the  Gdansk Bay)  – with the  year 2022 being the  planned date for 
these steps. Even though Poland then wants to be in a  situation, in which it 
does not have to buy Russian gas, it might not reduce its imports from Russia 
to zero if there are attractive offers (which is highly likely given LNG-prices). At 
the same time, among some member states with a traditionally positive attitude 
to energy cooperation with Russia, developments of the recent years have led to 
a sobering. They will continue to see Russia as an important supplier, but might 
also start a discussion about diversification or at least stop to consider Russia as 
a  “strategic” energy partner. All in all, diversification and EU regulatory power 
can lead to more realism on the part of the EU, whereas Russia will have to learn 
to accommodate to new rules governing access to EU markets. Moreover, the EU 
has to be aware about the potentially highly geopolitical effects of synchronizing 
the  Baltic States and Ukraine with the  European continental grid. Electricity 
cooperation will require more political attention than in the past. Second, so far 
the relationship has been based mainly on hydrocarbons, whereas electricity and 
renewables are less in focus. They could form a new and less politicized area of 
cooperation provided that both, the EU and Russia, will go ‘back to the  future’ 
by emphasizing the paradigm of decarbonization and innovation.
There are good arguments to rethink EU-Russian sectoral interfaces 
and redesign energy relations through the  lens of decarbonization and green 
development, as both sides have signed the Paris Agreement. Moreover, business 
relations as well as interconnections between the European continental grid and 
the Russian Unified Power System still exist. Finally, if an energy transition is to 
be accelerated globally, it makes much sense to develop partnerships between 
“frontrunners” and hydrocarbon-abundant countries. The  slow but steady 
shift in Russia toward supporting RE opens a  window for cooperation with 
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the  EU. There is considerable room for improvement and European expertise 
in the  areas of renewable, local, and decentralized energy; in technology and 
know-how exchange; but also in the  business-to-business format, which could 
contribute to a more transparent, flexible, and business-friendly environment for 
the Russian RE market. With regard to innovative technical solutions, mutual and 
cross-sectoral benefits can be exploited in the areas of hydrogen and other gases. 
Small-scale liquid-/compressed natural gas backup solutions could be taken into 
consideration as well, for example where co-generation in remote/decentralized 
areas is necessary, thereby exploiting ways to replace diesel generators. Small, 
local CHPs with the  flexibility to shift between power and heat production for 
large public buildings, shopping malls, etc., provide opportunities as well. 
If “normalization” really happens, it remains to be seen. But what seems to be 
clear is that the era of grand strategies based on the hope that energy cooperation 
will consolidate political relations as well or even provide for traction is over. 
Energy relations between the EU and Russia will not be easy, but they could be 
less ideological and less overburdened. 
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Russia-China Economic Relations under 
Putin Version 4.0
Vita Spivak
“Remembering the  history of the  Russian-Chinese relationship, we 
can confidently say that it has honorably withstood the  test of time”  – said 
the  Russian president Vladimir Putin to the  Chinese leader Xi Jinping while 
congratulating him on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the bilateral 
diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing. Despite the positive rhetoric 
of the current leaders in Russia and China, in the past seven decades, the bilateral 
relationship has undergone numerous ups and downs. In the  economic realm, 
the balance of power has changed dramatically: if 70 years ago Beijing depended 
on Moscow’s investment, trade, and technology, in the last five years Russia has 
grown dependent on China’s exports, financing and investment. 
Chinese and Russian economies are becoming more complementary. China 
is currently Russia’s #1 trade partner and has enjoyed this status for over a decade. 
The  shares of its investment and financing in Russia is gradually growing. 
Moreover, despite the regime of Western economic sanctions, it is willing to buy 
Russian hydrocarbons and weapons. Yet, the  economic pillar of the  Russian-
Chinese rapprochement uncovers Beijing’s upper hand in this relationship. While 
the mutual compatibility and dependency between China and Russia is growing, 
economic cooperation demonstrates how imbalanced this partnership is. 
Western sanctions against Russia play an ambivalent role in its relationship 
with China, especially in the economic sphere. Initially, Moscow had hoped that 
Beijing would replace the West as a  source of cheap financing, investment, and 
the  supply of critical industrial equipment, and the  sanctions boosted Russia’s 
“pivot to China”. Yet, the lack of long-standing economic ties between Russia and 
China, the  specific features of China’s own economic development, and its 
priorities of foreign economic cooperation with the outside world made Moscow 
face the  limitations of such relationship. Also, the  bumpy road of economic 
cooperation with China showed Moscow that it needs a  more competitive-
oriented approach in dealing with its eastern neighbor. 
Russia-China economic relations under Putin version 4.0
V. Spivak
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The economic relationship between China and Russia:  
increased compatibility and interdependence
To understand the  current tendencies of the  Sino-Russian economic 
cooperation and to estimate what is going for the years to come, it is important to 
trace back the events in the economic relationship that took place after 2013–2014. 
Around this time, Xi Jinping took power in China and Russia felt the first rounds 
of economic sanctions of the West induced by the Ukrainian crisis. Deprived of 
the cheap Western financing and long-established economic ties with European 
business partners, Moscow turned to its biggest neighbor in the East in the hope 
that China would substitute for the Western partners not only in geopolitical but 
also in the economic sphere1. 
After 2014, Moscow’s attitude towards its eastern neighbor has undergone 
several shifts, which underpinned the overall economic rapprochement between 
China and Russia in recent years. Before 2014, Moscow was primarily preoccupied 
with building its economic relationship with the West, supplying hydrocarbons 
to Europe, raising cheap financing on the  western capital markets, investing 
the  wealth of the  elite in the  real estate in the  luxurious areas of Europe and 
the US2. Moscow was cautious about letting the Chinese into the strategic sectors 
of the  Russian economy, hydrocarbon, and military industries, anxious about 
a possible intellectual property theft or strategic threat that China’s development 
posed for the Russian Far Easters regions. 
While the  attention to China’s economic rise was spurred in Moscow after 
2008, when Beijing outperformed almost every country in the world in handling 
the  global financial crisis, the  Russian “pivot” to China started to become 
increasingly apparent during Vladimir Putin’s visit to China in May 2014. Gazprom 
and CNPC signed a headline-making $ 400 bn gas supply contract, which included 
the  construction of the  “Power of Siberia” pipeline (the supplies have started in 
December 2019). As the tensions with the West were increasing in 2014, with this 
contract, Moscow managed to send an important signal to the outside world that 
it was able to diversify its foreign policy as well as the flows of its hydrocarbons. 
This message appeared to be way more important to Moscow than the  fact that 
the contract price per cubic meter of natural gas, according to expert calculations 
(the official price was never officially disclosed), is below the market level. 
After the  2013–2014, several important shifts in Russia’s attitude towards 
China and its economic activities took place. Moscow has become more willing 
to let Chinese companies and investors into the strategic sectors of the Russian 
economy, i. e., oil and gas industry. Also, Russia had started to sell China its most 
advanced weapons, unlike in the  period before that, when people in Moscow 
believed that the  Chinese would just steal its military technologies3. Finally, 
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Russia has grown to welcome Beijing’s Belt and Road development initiative, 
which includes massive investment in Central Asian states or Belarus that have 
long been considered as Moscow’s “sphere of influence”4. Russia is now starting 
to compete with former Soviet republics in order to attract Chinese loans and 
investments. In the spheres of hydrocarbon exploration and military technologies, 
Russia has somewhat of an advantage over China at the moment, which is seeking 
to diversify its energy consumption and develop its military capabilities. 
Investment cooperation: Russia as a junior partner, competing 
for Chinese FDI 
After years of growing investment expansion of Chinese companies, Beijing 
became one of the  foremost foreign investors in the  world5. Meanwhile, Western 
economic sanctions combined with changes in commodity prices and economic 
stagnation limited the  sources of FDI for Russia. In 2013, a  survey among over 
900  Chinese companies (including SOEs, private firms, and joint ventures) by 
the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada put Russia as a top-five preferred investment 
destination for the  next five years6. However, from 2013–2017, Russia did not 
considerably improve its position among the  investment priorities of Chinese 
companies, never ranking higher than the ninth place as an FDI destination, and 
usually remaining between 15th and 16th. According to MOFCOM’s reports in 
2013–2017, Russia’s share of China’s annual FDI flows globally hovered around 
0.5–1.%7. 
Graph: Chinese FDI in Russia according to the Central Bank of Russia and 
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China is also not the  biggest investor in Russia: its share of total annual FDI 
flows that came to Russia from 2013–2017 peaked in 2014–2015 at six to 
nine percent, while remaining at the  level of 0.5–1% in 2013, 2016–20179. 
The  rise in 2014–2015 can be explained by a  few multi-million-dollar Chinese 
investments into the Russian energy sector, which will be briefly described below. 
The quantitative data have discrepancies but provide a  rough sense of the  scale 
of China-Russia investment cooperation.
In 2017, 38.7% of China’s FDI in Russia targeted extractive industries, 
including oil, gas, and minerals. Another 18.7% of Chinese FDI in Russia 
targets agricultural, forestry, and fishing industries (they are joined together in 
MOFCOM’s reports). The  financial sector is the  third-largest sphere (8.7%) in 
the Russian economy for Chinese investment in 2017.
To attract more Chinese investments to small-sized projects, Moscow 
started to promote investment support mechanisms in the  Russian Far East, 
which is located right across the  border from China. After 2014, Russian 
authorities created several special economic zones (SEZs) in the  Russian Far 
East  – 19  advanced special economic zones (ASEZs) and the  Free Port of 
Vladivostok (FPV). According to the  idea of the creators, the Russian Far East 
as a  region should be attractive to Chinese business: it is geographically and 
culturally proximate to the Asia’s most rapidly emerging markets (such as South 
Korea and China) and should have benefitted from the general rapprochement 
of Moscow and Beijing. Nonetheless, out of $ 140 bn of Chinese FDI in Russia 
in 2017, only two percent has been invested in this region, despite Moscow’s 
establishment of SEZs to attract FDI10. Such a  modest amount of Chinese 
FDI can be explained by the  size of the  market in the  Far Eastern Federal 
District: even though it covers 40.6 percent or Russia’s territory, its share in 
the country’s GDP is only four percent. The analysis of the dynamics of Chinese 
investments in this region demonstrates the major issues with private Chinese 
investments in Russia. Furthermore, with the  development of the  investment 
support mechanisms and the  aspiration of the  Russian leadership to diversify 
its economic relationship with China, the case study of the Far Eastern special 
economic zones might become useful for understanding the  major issues of 
the bilateral economic relationship. 
Overall, there are 20 SEZs in the  Russian Far East, but only six of them 
managed to attract Chinese FDI, and the  results of this process are mixed at 
best. The  FPV has 34 Chinese-led projects, which pledged to invest $  510  mn 
within the  next three-five years. Five other SEZs together managed to attract 
11  Chinese-led projects, which promised to bring $  35  bn of FDI to. However, 
these investments are “contracted”, not actual: in 2015–2018, the  total amount 
of real Chinese investments in the Russian Far East has only reached $ 38 mn. 
Out of 45 projects in the six SEZs that attracted Chinese investments, only five 
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have started operating so far. The  majority of them have been at preparatory 
stages for years due to the  red tape and the  lack of infrastructure. Chinese-led 
projects in ASEZs tend to have manufacturing profile according to the industrial 
specialization of any given ASEZ that they reside at. The  majority of Chinese 
investments in the FPV goes into sea farming, the  real estate development and 
logistics (as there is lack of housing and transport infrastructure on the  vast 
territories of the FPV). Minor shares of Chinese FDI in the FPV come in forestry11 
and mining industries, respectively.12
Relatively small amounts of Chinese FDI in these zones can be attributed 
to the  lack of support from the  authorities amid weak formal and informal 
institutions in Russia. The  Russian subnational authorities tend not to trust 
Chinese companies, seeing them as competitors for resources and failing to provide 
adequate backing for the  existing FDI support mechanisms, such as the  FPV. 
In the absence of the authorities’ support, low-level Chinese companies become 
exposed to the long-standing flaws of the Russian investment environment, i. e., 
red tape, power abuse, lack of infrastructure. Sometimes, the personal connections 
between Chinese and Russian businesspeople substitute for the  lack of systemic 
formal and informal rules of the game and play a crucial role in attracting small- 
and medium-sized Chinese investors to the Russian market. Russian patrons of 
Chinese-led projects serve as the  point of entry to the  informal networks and 
provide protection. Such connections and support, nevertheless, remain sporadic 
and are unable to substitute for the systemic rules of the game13, 14.
Investment cooperation in the energy sphere: high-level support  
and large-scale projects
After 2013 Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia and became China’s leading crude 
oil supplier. As for 2018, Russia’s share among China’s crude oil suppliers reached 
15.8%. In comparison to 2017, the value of Russian exports of crude oil to China 
rose by 58.6%, while Saudi Arabia’s (its share among exporters to China accounts 
for 12.4%) value of crude oil exports increased only by 44.6%15. However, 
according to Platts Analytics, Russia might soon lose its leading positions again to 
Saudi Arabia. According to the 2018 data, Russia’s capacity to supply China with 
oil has already reached its ceiling, and the country does not have the necessary 
energy infrastructure in its eastern regions. 
Nevertheless, the  boost in energy-related economic cooperation between 
China and Russia in the  recent five years might be attributed to a  mixture of 
factors. As tensions with the  West over the  Ukrainian crisis started to emerge, 
Russia has not only started to diversify its energy exports in favor of China but 
also has welcomed more of Chinese investments into its energy sphere. Such 
openness to China’s investments is something that was not common before as 
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shares in energy projects, companies, and hydrocarbon fields were considered as 
assets of strategic state importance. 
In 2013–2018, Chinese and Russian companies signed several multi-million-
dollar deals that involved state or quasi-state actors from both Chinese and 
Russian sides and often took place amid the  high-level summits of the  state 
leaders. The  investments of CNPC and the  Silk Road Fund (SRF) into Yamal 
LNG run by Novatek are one of the examples for this kind of energy cooperation: 
Chinese investors jointly own 29.9% shares of Russia’s largest Arctic liquefied 
natural gas project. Other instances include the  acquisition of two 10% stakes 
in Sibur, a  Russian petrochemical company, by Sinopec, a  Chinese energy 
giant, and the  SRF. A  Chinese gas trader Beijing Gas Group Company bought 
a  20  percent stake in the  Verkhnechonsk gas field in East Siberia that belongs 
to Rosneft. Also, Chinese Highland Fund that is established with the backing of 
the provincial government of Yunnan province bought a 13.3% stake in a  joint 
venture of Norilsk Nickel for the development of a copper mining project сlose 
to the Russian-Chinese border16. 
These multi-million-dollar deals appear in the  spotlight of China-Russia 
broader rapprochement of 2013–2018 and often create an image of the blossoming 
investment cooperation. However, this high-level cooperation remains at the level 
of several deals and has not considerably expanded since 2016, despite Russia’s 
willingness to promote investment cooperation with China. The most recent deal 
on the acquisition of a 14% Rosneft stake by a Chinese energy giant CEFC did 
not follow through because of the  arrest of the  CEO of the  Chinese company 
upon corruption allegations.
Yamal LNG as a significant case of China’s energy investment in Russia 
Among several important investment deals with Chinese actors, Novatek’s 
Yamal LNG project stands out in terms of the scale and the diversity of forms of 
Chinese participation. At the moment, Yamal LNG is the most significant LNG 
project in Russia. Yamal LNG is located in the Russian Arctic, an essential area for 
Moscow’s strategic agenda due to its vast natural resources and the opportunities 
to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Chinese in vestments into Yamal LNG 
became one of the highlights of China-Russia broader cooperation in 2013–2018. 
Furthermore, this case might become a model for Novatek’s another project 
Arctic LNG-2 where two large Chinese investors, energy giants CNPC and 
CNOOC, are involved as well. Arctic LNG-2 is located just 70 kilometers away 
from Yamal LNG and taps the  resources of the  Utrennee gas field, the  proven 
resources of which reach 1.9 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The capacity of 
the three modules of the new project reaches 19.8 mn tonnes of LNG annually. In 
April 2019, CNPC and CNOOC pledged to invest $4bn to acquire 20% share of 
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this project, which will become one of the signature Chinese-Russian economic 
cooperation projects in the  years to come. Also, this is the  biggest investment 
Chinese companies have ever made in Russia. Notably, Chinese side is the biggest 
foreign investor in this project: 60% of the  shares belong to Novatec, 10%  – 
to the French company Total, and another 10% to a Japanese consortium of Mitsui 
and Jogmec. To estimate the  scope of Chinese-Russian cooperation within this 
ambitious project, it is useful to investigate the details of the partnership between 
Novatek and Chinese companies within Yamal LNG, the project of similar nature 
and scale.
Yamal LNG received significant China’s interest and support from Moscow. 
It taps the  resources of the  South Tambey gas field with proven and probable 
natural gas reserves of 926 bn cubic meters. Yamal LNG went into full operation 
in late 2018, increasing Russia’s share in the  world’s LNG exports from four to 
eight percent. In 2018, Yamal LNG produced 17.4 mn tonnes of LNG, and once 
the project goes into full capacity, the production level will reach 18.5 mn tonnes 
annually17.
Yamal LNG is resource-rich and located in a  strategic area, but it is clear 
how the investments in it could be risky for Chinese firms. Novatek experienced 
sanctions pressure after the Ukraine crisis because of its two principal shareholders, 
Gennady Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson both are the  top-five richest 
individuals in Russia who belong to an “inner circle” of Vladimir Putin. In 2016, 
after the Ukraine crisis, Novatek was placed under “sectoral sanctions” that closed 
its access to Western capital markets and energy equipment. Gennady Timchenko 
was also personally placed under the  US sanctions. These factors considerably 
compromised Novatek’s ability to receive foreign investments and financing.
China’s FDI in the  sanctioned Yamal LNG were politically significant for 
Moscow and Beijing who sent a signal to the outside world about their ability to 
orchestrate multi-layered cooperation amid geopolitical difficulties. It also became 
a manifestation of the “geopolitical rapport” between Putin and Xi: they personally 
oversaw the signings of both deals between Chinese investors and Novatek18. In 
December 2015, Moscow and Beijing signed an intergovernmental agreement on 
cooperation within Yamal LNG, confirming its high status for bilateral relations.
Since the anti-Russian sanctions limited Moscow’s access to Western finan-
cing and technology, it has been seeking to develop the  Arctic’s resource and 
logistical potential with China’s help, which has the financial and technological 
resources for it. The role of Yamal LNG for Moscow’s strategic interests allowed 
the Russian government to provide it with multidimensional support that will also 
be applicable for Arctic LNG-2. In December 2013, Moscow liberalized the LNG 
export from Russia, which eliminated Gazprom’s long-standing monopoly. 
This legislation change is significant for Arctic LNG-2 project as well  – it is 
also primarily export oriented, and China most likely will become the  largest 
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consumer of its LNG. The Russian government changed ecological requirements 
for the  Arctic exploration projects in order to reduce the  environmental costs 
for Yamal LNG19. Moscow also exempted the  project from export, equipment 
imports, and severance taxes for 12 years. In 2014, Moscow recognized Yamal 
LNG as a project of strategic significance to the state, which entitled it to a low-
interest loan of 150 bn rubles ($ 2.3 bn) from the National Welfare Fund of Russia. 
The  Russian government sponsored the  infrastructure construction around 
the Yamal LNG facilities and purchased the icebreaking fleet for the project that 
determined Novatek’s successful completion of the project20.
The state support was the “insurance” of Yamal LNG existence and attracted 
foreign investors to it. The  costs of the  Russian government related to Yamal 
LNG reached $ 5.75 bn. Considering all other exemptions, Yamal LNG is hardly 
profitable for the  Russian state. Nevertheless, such concessions supported by 
President Putin’s influence provided Chinese investors with guarantees and 
secured their participation in Yamal LNG. 
The support from Moscow was justified by the  level of Chinese investors in 
the project. The investments of two Chinese companies in Yamal LNG conform to 
the state-driven pattern of Chinese FDI. Their state-owned status and Xi Jinping’s 
in volvement allowed both of them to overlook the risks of Russia’s investment cli-
mate and the Western sanctions that prevent many companies from investing there.
In January 2014, CNPC bought a 20% share in Yamal LNG. The acquisition of 
Yamal LNG stake worth of $ 940 mn is the biggest deal CNPC has ever signed in 
Russia. In March 2016, amid Moscow’s intensifying clash with the West, the SRF 
established for the  purposes of investing in the  BRI projects, acquired a  9.9% 
stake in Yamal LNG. Although strictly speaking, it was a portfolio investment21, 
this acquisition is significant as it was worth $ 1.3  bn and happened despite 
the political risk related to the anti-Russian sanctions. 
CNPC’s investments in Yamal LNG are complemented by a 20-year contract 
signed in May 2014 for the supply of three million tons of LNG annually (in July 
2018, Novatek started its first supplies to China). Overall, 27% of all of the LNG 
produced by the  project will go to Chinese buyers22. Vast resources of Yamal 
LNG are attractive to Beijing as it strives to find new suppliers of LNG. China 
is becoming increasingly interested in natural gas in its quest for decreasing 
the dependence on coal in its energy consumption and replacing it with natural 
gas23. LNG as a  form of gas transportation has a  comparative advantage to 
the natural gas supplied via pipelines to Beijing as it does not involve the pipeline 
construction costs China has to face, for example, in the case of Turkmenistan. 
In order to diversify its LNG supply base, Beijing has increased its participation 
in the Russian Arctic projects 
Researchers link China’s interest in Yamal LNG to Beijing’s environmental 
priorities and its ambitions in the Arctic exploration alongside the development 
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of the BRI. In 2013, Beijing proclaimed itself a “near-Arctic” state and received 
observer status in the Arctic Council, which promotes cooperation in the region. 
After the launch of Yamal LNG, it was labelled as a BRI project: Beijing announced 
its first Arctic strategy and introduced a concept of the Polar Silk Road, as part 
of the  BRI. Beijing’s strategic interest in the  Arctic is related to the  logistical 
potential of the  NSR, which provides a  possible solution to Beijing’s “Malacca 
Dilemma”. Currently, three-quarters of China’s energy supplies pass through 
the Malacca Strait in the South China Sea, a region where Beijing is experiencing 
major geopolitical tensions with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the US. Beijing is 
seeking ways to avoid the Malacca’s “bottleneck” in the future, including through 
the  means of the  NSR. China’s participation in Yamal LNG, therefore, is an 
attempt to secure its presence in the Arctic. Arctic LNG-2 will become a second 
serious Arctic project in Beijing’s NSR endeavour. 
Chinese FDI to Yamal LNG brought Chinese equipment and contractors to 
the project. Facing domestic technological limitations in the Arctic exploration, 
Novatek welcomed Chinese vendors as the  anti-Russian sanctions considerably 
denied its access to Western equipment. China Offshore Oil Engineering 
Company (COOEC) built modules for natural gas processing and also delivered 
LNG trains for the project (the contract between Novatek and COOEC is valued 
at $ 1.6 bn)24. This was the first project of this scale for COOEC that increased 
its profile as a global energy equipment supplier. Furthermore, a number of other 
Chinese companies of smaller scale provided the project with production lines, 
drilling equipment, and pipe support devices that contributed to their profile as 
high-class international suppliers25.
Chinese contractors brought Chinese financing to Yamal LNG. Indeed, 
Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank provided Yamal LNG with 
two loans of the  total worth of $  12.1  bn. Part of this joint financing was an 
RMB 9.8 bn loan for the project ($ 1.47 bn) that was used to pay for the works 
of Chinese contractors for the project.
Financing from the  ExIm Bank and CDB for Yamal LNG is an important 
precedent for China-Russia cooperation amid the  anti-Russia sanctions. It was 
received despite the background of the unfolding problems of Russian business 
and individuals in partnership with Chinese banks. They proved to be sensitive 
to the  anti-Russian sanctions: although Beijing never officially supported 
them, Chinese state and commercial banks have been denying service to 
Russian companies and individuals. But in the  case of Yamal LNG, because of 
the  involvement of the  high-level state actors and interests from both Moscow 
and Beijing, Chinese state-owned banks, which are not obliged to too much risk 
assessment, managed to provide Yamal LNG with generous support. As anti-
Russian sanctions intensify (the new round came in the  beginning of 2018), 
Arctic LNG-2 will face similar limitations, and Novatek is likely to seek financing 
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from the Chinese investment institutions and supplies from the Chinese vendors 
as well in the future. 
Military trade: groundwork for a military alliance? 
After 2014, the  military trade between China and Russia has grown 
substantially and continues to evolve. Aside from strategic significance for 
the  bilateral Sino-Russian relationship, it is also important from the  economic 
point of view. In October 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow is 
assisting Beijing in creating a  system to warn against ballistic missile launches. 
He has not gone into specifics, but it looks like Russia is selling its most advanced 
missile defence technology to its Eastern neighbour. Even ten years ago such 
cooperation was not in the cards – Moscow unofficially banned military sales to 
China in the mid-2000s as it was anxious about China’s well-known practices of 
intellectual property theft and reverse-engineering in the  military sphere. Such 
caution stemmed from the  idea that China “abused” and stole Russian military 
technology in the 1990s, whereas in reality such practices were merely the result 
of the weak Russian legislation at that time26. 
The strategic stance of Russian military circles in regards to China shifted 
after 2014, which gave the  green light to large scale military cooperation that 
boosted military trade accordingly. The  nature of these strategic shifts lies in 
the understanding that China is not interested in invading the Russian Far East 
and is more preoccupied with the  regions of East and South China Seas, Tibet 
and Xinjiang at home rather than the territories of its northern neighbour27.
In 2015, Russia and China signed a deal on the  supply of 24 Russia’s most 
advanced jet fighters SU-35 for $ 2.5 bn. Also, at that same year Russia’s Rostech 
reached an agreement with China on the  supply of its most sophisticated 
anti-aircraft missile system S-400 for $  3  bn. While the  sums of the  deals were 
not extremely significant  – the  fact that Russia is selling its weapons to China 
underpins a  strategic shift in the  bilateral relationship that will continue in 
the  years to come. The  newly announced cooperation on the  early warning 
missile defense systems also involves a  significant amount of commercial deals 
that underscore Moscow’s interest in such cooperation with Beijing. 
Russia’s growing dependence on China in the financial realm 
Initially, when the Sino-Russian rapprochement just started, the financial part 
of the  bilateral relationship between Moscow and Beijing has not been the  top 
priority due to the volatility of the Russian currency and the lack of experience on 
both sides in interacting with each other. However, as the economic dependency 
of Russia on China is growing and the  sanctions pressure is turning into 
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a permanent feature of Moscow’s foreign policy and economic relationship with 
the outside world, the financial cooperation with Beijing is becoming increasingly 
important. With the introduction of the new package of western sanctions against 
the state-sector of the Russian economy and a number of Russian individuals close 
to the  “inner circle” of the  president Vladimir Putin in the  beginning of 2018, 
Moscow needed to send another signal to the  outside world about its growing 
economic ties with China. The  importance of financial cooperation between 
the two countries, therefore, is becoming increasingly prevalent in the high-level 
geopolitical rhetoric of the top officials. 
Right after the  new package of sanctions hit in 2018, the  Russian Central 
Bank transferred 15% of its reserves into RMB. Currently, the Central Bank holds 
25% of the global reserves in RMB. However, in 2019 RMB fell to its lowest level 
in over a decade due to the trade war between the US and China, and the losses 
of the Russian Central Bank already account for $ 3 bn (yet, they could be won 
back due to the high yields on the Chinese capital markets). 
The major part of such rhetoric is an aspiration of Moscow and Beijing 
(that is being renewed at every high-level bilateral summit between the  two 
countries) to increase the share of national currencies in the bilateral trade that 
would inevitably lead to “de-dollarization”. One of the means to reach that goal is 
the bilateral currency swap established in 2014 and renewed in 2017. The volume 
of the  swap line is 815  bn rubles and 150  bn yuan28. Yet, the  share of RMB in 
the trade flows that go from China to Russia accounts for 25% (the share of ruble 
is only 4%); in the  trade settlements on the  trade flows from Russia to China 
the  share of RMB accounts for 10% and the  share of ruble is 7%. Moscow and 
Beijing did manage to decrease the  role of the  US dollar in the  bilateral trade 
settlements over the last few years, but it mostly happened due to the increase of 
the euro’s share. RMB and ruble cannot replace the traditional currencies used in 
the bilateral settlements: Chinese yuan is not fully convertible, and the Russian 
ruble is overly volatile29. 
Conclusion
Over the past five years, Sino-Russian economic ties have transformed into 
a  complicated yet complementary relationship. Moscow is willing to cooperate 
with Beijing in strategic spheres of the  economy and to make concessions for 
China to receive its investment financing and technology. Beijing is using Russia’s 
energy and military to achieve its strategic economic and geopolitical goals. 
The China-Russia economic relationship is highly practical, yet largely 
depends on the  political background. Moscow’s steps to facilitate its economic 
relationship with China are caused by the  lack of European alternatives in 
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financing, investment, and technologies. As sanctions are becoming a  reality 
that Moscow has to adjust to, its economic dependence on China is growing. 
The personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are also pro-
viding an important boost to economic cooperation where energy and military 
components prevail. 
Moscow is aware that there is a  room for diversification of its economic 
cooperation with China and is likely to put the certain effort in promoting different 
types of cooperation in the  future. There is a  prospect for Russian agricultural 
exports in China, especially in the  light of the  trade war between China and 
the  US. There are prospects in technological cooperation between China 
and Russia, which includes 5G network and electronic commerce development. 
Nevertheless, the economic pillar of the larger relationship between China and 
Russia is overshadowed by military, diplomatic, and political ties between the two 
countries. This aspect of the bilateral relationship is the most vulnerable to economic 
sanctions against Russia and is not the  key driver for the  relationship. In most 
cases, the scale and intensity of the economic ties between Moscow and Beijing are 
defined by low competitive ability of the Russian economy overall, Russian firms, 
and Russian products. The  potential of this cooperation is largely dependent on 
the state of the Russian regulatory climate, Russian business savviness in entering 
the Chinese market, and the stability of the Russian economy as a whole.
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Eurasian Economic Union: Numbers 
and Trends
Mārcis Balodis
The fall of the  Soviet Union created a  lot of uncertainty in the  post-soviet 
space regarding its future, but perhaps the country most affected was the successor 
state of the USSR – Russia. As a possible solution for the geopolitical reality in 
which the  USSR had ceased to exist, thereby drastically reducing political and 
economic power of Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was 
established by the  sovereign states of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. By the  end 
of 1991 the  CIS was joined by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Georgia joining in 1993. The CIS 
integration effort evolved further in September of 1993, when the CIS member 
states signed the Charter of the CIS with the aim of establishing common economic 
space. At the very start of 1995, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
signed an agreement on the Customs Union to further promote the creation of 
mutually beneficial economic relations among the  members of the  Economic 
Union. From the outset this appeared as a genuine effort to enhance stability in 
the region, especially considering the fact that quite recently they had been tightly 
integrated. The active participation of Russia already signaled the importance of 
regional integration for Russia in purely strategic terms – it did not necessarily 
need the  former Soviet states to support its own economy. Instead, it definitely 
needed them not to stray too far from Russia’s sphere of influence and to be kept 
in orbit. The recent political and cultural ties provided an ideal common ground 
upon which the former superpower could cooperate with its much weaker partner 
states to salvage what prestige and political power it retained.
The next stepping stone towards closer integration was set in 2000 in 
Kazakhstan, when Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan founded the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with the sole 
and quite ambitious aim of creating a  customs union among its members.1 
the  EurAsEC served its function as a  framework for future integration as in 
January 2010 the Customs Union (CU) was formally launched by Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. The  newly formed CU had an executive function, namely its 
Commission had the power to change import duties, setting tariff exemptions and 
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quotas as well as introducing regulations and systems on tariff policies. Political 
friction notwithstanding, the  ambition was to create a  deeply integrated and 
coordinated economic union in the post-Soviet region. The CU came into effect 
in July 2011 when the three member states agreed to remove all customs borders. 
This very same path of development seems reminiscent of the  development of 
the European Union (EU) when it grew from an economic union into a political 
one. However, this specific route differs in that the  integration is occurring in 
a region once combined under the flag of the USSR, sowing doubts about the true 
nature of the entire project.
It was quickly followed by several other transformations as the  goal was 
to create a  Single Economic Space by early 2012 and a  fully integrated union 
by the  start of 2015. To reach this end, the  Eurasian Economic Commission 
(EEC) was established in July 2012. The  EEC was a  supranational executive 
body composed of deputy prime ministers of the  member states.2 Finally on 
May 29, 2014 the  treaty establishing the  Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 
was signed. The EAEU differs from its predecessors in that it not just promotes 
economic relations but also establishes common standards and practices. It also 
has dedicated institutions and regulations along with a  bureaucratic apparatus3 
necessary to run a union of such magnitude. 
This moderately quick evolutionary path then leaves an impression of fairly 
successful integration. However, it has also encountered significant obstacles. 
Most notable of these are Russia’s foreign policy and its attitude in bilateral 
relations which has effectively accelerated the  disintegration within the  CIS 
space twice already. During the  Georgia-Russia war in 2008, Georgia initiated 
the  procedure of withdrawal from the  CIS as a  response to the  armed conflict. 
Then-president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili even explicitly stated that the CIS 
has failed as a regional institution in preventing a conflict among the CIS member 
states to happen.4 While in 2018, following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, 
the then-president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko recalled Ukraine’s envoys from 
CIS bodies, criticizing the ineffectiveness of the CIS as an institution to denounce 
Russia’s aggression.5 
This issue highlights an important systemic issue when trying to achieve 
cooperation with much bigger and more powerful states, in this case  – Russia. 
Powerful states do not wish to be bound by rules. Instead, they would much rather 
create a  system that appears to be rule-bound while also maintaining freedom 
of exercise of power. This allows great powers to attract smaller states under 
the pretense of rule-bound regimes, giving an impression of consensus and respect 
for sovereignty, while keeping a  significant power over these same regimes and 
smaller states to further their own goals. In practical terms, these two occasions 
meant that one significantly more powerful member state of a  cooperative 
institution could either attack or at least not abstain from aggression against 
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a smaller member state of the same cooperative institution while the institution 
itself remains silent for all intents and purposes. Furthermore, the same country 
has remained at the helm of integration efforts.
Russia’s foreign policy conduct, or rather misconduct, vis-à-vis the  former 
Soviet countries is also a  symptom of its heightened sensitivity regarding its 
neighborhood and its geopolitical predicament. To the  West lies the  European 
Union – the richest and largest trading block in the world. 11 of its 28 member 
states were ruled by communists until mid-1990’s and have recorded strong and 
fairly consistent growth since their accession6, providing an example of what 
political and socioeconomical integration is capable of. Furthermore, in 2009 
the  EU created the  Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative to effectively spread its 
values to its neighboring region in the east, including such countries like Armenia, 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. Naturally, Russia has been largely dismissive 
of  the  initiative, seeing it as a  way for the  EU to interfere in Russia’s sphere of 
influence7. Having said that, the  EU also provides support on conditionality  – 
the states have to enact reforms to gain support of the EU. At the same time China 
in the  east provides a  different challenge. China’s modern day power is largely 
built on its vast financial resources and its willingness to invest in infrastructure 
projects and funds without demanding any political liberalization. In the context 
of Eurasian region, China’s One Belt One Road initiative of creating a  land 
connection between China and the EU also provides an avenue for smaller states 
to cooperate with China.
As a  result of these two challengers, to the  East and to the  West, Russia 
itself faces a  conceptual challenge. Integrating with the  smaller countries in its 
close vicinity is imperative to keep them in Russia’s sphere of influence while 
being alert of what the EU and China are up to. However, the smaller states also 
must acknowledge the potential dangers of cooperating with Russia and that its 
conduct can have detrimental effects on each country that has close enough ties 
to Russia, while also acknowledging the potential benefits of either cooperating 
with the EU and/or China or at the very least leveraging them against Russia. This 
forces Russia to look for options to limit the foreign policy alternatives of smaller 
states by exercising its own power, for example through concessions, without 
stepping over the line which could alienate the smaller states and effectively drive 
them away.
The  post-Soviet space had seen an emergence of a  regional integration 
regime within 15 years since the dissolution of the USSR. However, the obvious 
imbalance of political and economic power as well as their differing foreign 
policy challenges as well as objectives beg a question of the grand strategy behind 
the EAEU. Is the EAEU an economic union between historically tightly con nected 
countries with the  sole altruistic aim of using the existing co-dependencies for 
mutual economic benefit and impetus for development or has the  union been 
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established for political gains by creating a  regional institution to legitimize 
political and geopolitical ambitions.
Differing political perspectives: reasons for regional integration
Regarding the  potential imbalance of power due to Russia’s participation 
in the  EAEU, it is worth to explore the  foreign policy concepts of Russia for 
the potential role of integrating the CIS and its successor institutions as a means 
of furthering Russia’s goals. The  foreign policy concept of 2000 clearly states 
that Russia will seek further integration in the CIS region in terms of economic, 
political and security integration. However, it is also explained that Russia will 
define the  character of its involvement with the  CIS region as a  whole due 
to different levels of integration in the  region, therefore priority is given for 
strengthening of relations with Belarus.8 Meanwhile the  foreign policy concept 
of 2008 already states a specific aim – to establish a customs union and common 
economic space through EurAsEC and to strengthen it as a core mechanism of 
economic integration9, thus emphasizing a  clear difference not just in the  end 
goal of integration, namely the EAEU, but also in integration as an end in and of 
itself. The foreign policy concept also clarifies that Russia’s willingness to be a part 
of subregional institutions in the CIS region depends on multiple factors, one of 
which is their compatibility towards already existing cooperation mechanisms 
such as EurAsEC.10 the change in policy planning indicates a shift in perception, 
in that EurAsEC has now become a  fixed element in the  post-soviet space and 
its function is vital for further development.
By 2013 Russia’s attitude towards integration in the CIS region had evolved 
further and was clearly reflected in the  Foreign policy concept. Creation of 
the  EAEU now had become a  priority with the  goal of not just strengthening 
economic development in the region and becoming a model of association open 
to other states, but also to become a  link between Europe and Asian-Pacific 
regions.11 This marks a considerable difference in foreign policy strategic planning 
as the EAEU is apparently intended to become a true actor on the global stage, 
which is in stark contrast of purely economic integration in the region that was 
formulated just five years earlier. 
Finally, the  Foreign policy concept of Russia of 2016 clearly states that 
strengthening of the integration within the EAEU is a key objective to promote 
development, technical advancement, competitiveness of the member states and 
improvement of living standards. The most interesting addition is the claim that 
one of the goals of the EAEU is the harmonization of integration processes not just 
within the CIS region but also in Europe, Eurasia as a whole and Asia-Pacific.12 
Thus it is apparent that the regional integration effort has become a priority for 
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Russia with the  aim of establishing a  regional union as a  major political actor 
on par with the major actors in the East and the West. It becomes obvious that 
Russia has noticed a significant trend and is looking to follow it – the world has 
divided itself into smaller regional blocks that use resource pooling to consolidate 
power,13 therefore creating a regional block with Russia at the helm is a means to 
secure Russia’s position in the current world.
An article written by then-Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin in 
2011 sheds lighter on this development. In the  article V. Putin explains how 
the integration of post-Soviet space has promoted economic growth even through 
the  financial crisis of 2008 and how the  initially purely economic institutions 
and concepts have evolved further, for example, by establishing the  EurAsEC 
Court that has the  power to make rulings on matters regarding discrimination 
or violation of competition.14 He also notes that the creation of EAEU was based 
on the experience of Europe during the creation and evolution of the European 
Union. Regarding the role of the EAEU on the global stage V. Putin clearly states 
that it will become one of the  attraction poles in the  modern world based on 
the  natural resources, capital, and human resources available for the  member 
states of the  EAEU, thus giving it a  strong position in the  technological race15. 
By acknowledging the role of the EAEU V. Putin essentially explained the grand 
strategy, i. e., the vast amount of resources pooled by the member states is bound 
to materialize in a significant increase in combined political power. Interestingly 
enough, it already hints at a possible cause for friction, namely, the asymmetry 
of economic power. Russia absolutely dwarfs Kazakhstan and Belarus in terms 
of economic power, hinting at the  difficult reality the  smaller states will have 
to deal with – Russia is the biggest and most powerful partner in this deal and 
therefore will likely make its demands the main ones and will also demand a lot 
of political contributions from the smaller states. It is also worth noting that due 
to this asymmetry Russia does not gain much in economical terms, at least in 
the  short term. What it can do, however, is use its power within the  EAEU to 
make sure the institution represents the needs of Russia, while operating behind 
the façade of a regional integration organization with multiple member states and 
its own bureaucratic apparatus.
Interestingly an article written by then-President of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev published just three weeks after V. Putin’s article shows a similar, but 
not necessarily identical perspective when it comes to regional integration. He goes 
on to explain his four principles of integration. First, the primary driving force 
of integration is economical pragmatism, not geopolitical ambitions. Secondly, 
integration must be voluntary and each state should independently arrive to 
the  conclusion that regional integration is necessary and beneficial. Thirdly, 
sovereignty is imperative. Lastly, the  supranational institutions of the  EAEU 
should make decisions based on consensus to ensure that all the different interests 
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of member states are taken into account and that the powers of said institutions 
must be clearly defined. However, the  supranational institutions must not limit 
or overrule national political sovereignty just like the European Union does not, 
which N. Nazarbayev calls successful.16 
It is clear, then, that Kazakhstan was clearly in favor of economical integration, 
however, some of the points hint at some potential differences in interpretation 
of the  inner workings and the  end goal of the  EAEU, especially the  emphasis 
on respecting national sovereignty. Taking into consideration that at this point 
the  integration happened mainly among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan it 
seems that Kazakhstan was worried about the potential power abuse of Russia, 
for the EAEU could potentially be a thinly veiled attempt to impose Russia’s will 
on its neighboring region behind the  façade of regional integration. Moreover, 
Kazakhstan’s economical ties to other regions, such as the European Union, are 
an important aspect to take into consideration when economical integration 
with Russia is a possibility. The president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko also 
made similar points, claiming that relationships among member states should be 
based on mutual benefit and equality17, which again suggests reservations about 
asymmetry of power and Russia’s potential abuse of power within the  EAEU 
framework.
These very same reservations seemed to be justified following Russia’s conduct 
in Ukraine. Following the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, Russia did not hesitate 
to use force to change the borders of a smaller state. Both Belarus and Kazakhstan 
opposed Russia’s suggested trade restrictions on Ukraine and Moldova as a punitive 
measure for their movement towards the EU. Belarus used this chance to position 
itself as a  middle man to allow sanctioned Western products access to Russian 
markets through their own market. Even more so, Belarus swiftly recognized 
the new president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, took part in the  inauguration, 
as well as supported the anti-insurgency campaign of Ukraine against Moscow-
backed separatists. Meanwhile the same events caused worry in Kazakhstan and 
its territory of North Kazakhstan that has a  large Russian population and could 
potentially be used to cause political instability the same way Crimea was used.18 
Russia’s aggressiveness and apparent willingness to use force to impose its will has 
definitely caused a  great deal of stress to other EAEU members and effectively 
forced them to look for room to maneuver in their own foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Russia, and it is only exacerbated by the  fact that Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity on the condition of denuclearization, effectively providing an 
example of Russia going back on its word and taking what it wants by force.19 For 
example, in November 2019 Belarus secured a 500 million USD investment deal 
from China following Russia’s reluctance to provide finances20, most likely using 
China to leverage benefits and a  more favorable treatment from Russia while 
also indicating that Belarus is not completely sealed off of the rest of the world.
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It cannot be denied that Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as the  most of 
the region altogether, are too closely integrated in Russian economy and politics 
to significantly change their foreign policy strategies and it is unlikely that 
cooperation with Russia will be ceased. At the same time Belarus and Kazakhstan 
do realize that it is best to not step on Russia’s toes too much. What Russia’s 
continued behavior has created, however, is a certain feeling of discomfort seeing 
how a single state can relatively easy cause massive instabilities in other countries. 
As a  result it is very likely that smaller countries will continue to seek a policy 
of hedging21 to leverage better deals from Russia to at least offset its potential 
aggressiveness. 
It is also worth noting that EAEU consists of non-democratic countries. 
For smaller countries this can create uneasiness considering Russia might use its 
influence to determine the result of internal power struggles. On the same note, 
Russia can use Ukraine as an example of how the West can cause a political stir 
and then abandon their allies, while Russia will remain loyal and supportive. 
Additionally, Russia’s financial and political support is not conditioned by 
demands of democratization or political reforms. However, this also creates a risk 
for Russia. Considering the  non-democratic regimes lack a  system of seamless 
transition of power, it is possible that a  new leader could potentially decide to 
distance themselves from Russia, therefore deepened integration could become 
a  tool in securing unwavering political support of smaller states by effectively 
limiting their room for maneuver. 
Accession out of necessity: Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
If Russia’s goal is to create a  geopolitical power with Russia at its center, 
the  accession of Armenia is an obvious example of Russia throwing its weight 
around to attract or even coerce new members. In April 2012 the then-president 
of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan explained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia 
that for Armenia joining the Customs Union makes “no sense” because Armenia 
does not have a  land border with any other Customs Union member state and 
therefore does not have a  trade relationship that would stand to benefit from 
streamlined customs procedures and regulations.22. At the same time Armenia was 
negotiating with the European Union a potential Association Agreement, which 
would have included a  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement 
and would grant access to certain sectors of the  free market of the  European 
Union. However, in September 2013 the  President of Armenia after a  meeting 
with V.  Putin unexpectedly announced that Armenia would join the  Customs 
Union and would also participate in the integration processes within the EAEU. 
To explain the  sudden change of course, President referenced the  creation of 
116
The Russian Economy: Prospects for Putin 4.0
the  military security structure within the  CIS region  – the  Collective Security 
Treaty Organization, of which Armenia was a  part of  – whose members were 
now creating a  new platform of integration, and “participating in one military 
structure makes it unfeasible and inefficient to stay away from the  relevant 
geo-economic area”.23 As a  result, Armenia withdrew from negotiations with 
the European Union and became an EAEU member in January 2015.24 
This decision without a  doubt was heavily influenced by Armenia’s most 
pressing security issue, namely the Nagorno Karabakh territorial conflict against 
Azerbaijan, the  latter being supported by Turkey, effectively forcing Armenia to 
go along with Russia25 in hopes it would provide political backing for Armenian 
position in the conflict. As an added benefit, some Armenian goods were exempt 
from duty taxes within the EAEU, as well as specific imports from Russia such as 
natural gas, petroleum products, and rough diamonds. However, due to the tight 
economic ties with Russia, EAEU-related economic benefits were moderate at best 
due to international sanctions put on Russia,26 thus providing an example of why 
economic diversification is important. Interestingly enough, the  pro-European 
Union dialogue within Armenia has not disappeared and following the  Velvet 
revolution in 2018, Armenia is looking to improve its relations with the European 
Union. For example, in July 2019 Armenia adopted the  Comprehensive and 
Enhanced Partnership Agreement implementation roadmap which provides 
new cooperation possibilities, including financial support and access to research 
and development programs.27 This indicates Armenia is looking to gain access 
to the European Union despite its membership in the EAEU, and that the EAEU 
accession was encouraged by security concerns.
Undoubtedly the  weakest member of the  EAEU is Kyrgyzstan, whose 
accession in May 2015 was clearly an effort to stabilize itself both in terms 
of internal politics as well as economy. The  small republic has suffered from 
internal divides, civil wars, chronic mismanagement and border disputes, thus 
membership in a  Russian-led integration project was deemed the  best way to 
secure internal stability.28 On top of that, Kyrgyzstan and Russia have established 
a  1 billion USD29 Development Fund which Kyrgyzstan will have to utilize to 
upgrade its customs infrastructure to meet the EAEU regulations30. 
Institutions of the EAEU
The institutional structure of the  EAEU appears to be modeled after 
the  institutions of the  EU, corresponding to the  claim made by V. Putin in 
2011. However, after closer inspection, it becomes apparent that national states 
have much more say in the  decision making process. The  EAEU has a  four-
tiered government structure. At the  top of pyramid lies the  Supreme Council 
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(at the  level of heads of state), the  Intergovernmental Council (at the  level of 
heads of government), and two-tiered Economic Commission, that consists 
of  the Council (at the  level of deputy heads of government) and the Collegium 
(at the  level of ministers). All these bodies make decisions by consensus except 
for the Collegium which uses qualified majority voting. However, all politically 
sensitive questions are decided by the  upper level of Commission to restrict 
Russia’s ability to impose its will unto others31, seemingly mitigating reservations 
about Russia’s potential behaviour. 
Yet, the  decision making within the  EAEU is largely based on political 
bargaining and securing certain benefits from member states to effectively buy 
their support and loyalty. In late 2016 Belarus boycotted the  EAEU meeting 
effectively blocking the  Customs Code from entering into force and also used 
this as a bargaining chip to force Russia to adjust its gas prices.32 This is indicative 
of Russia’s goal – it is willing to suffer short-term losses by giving in to fairly low 
scale short term demands, in return receiving political loyalty of member states. 
Moreover, if Russia is seemingly willing to make such deals to break deadlocks and 
ensure participation, Russia has little interest in adhering to supranational rules 
set forth by the EAEU and it can just use its influence to get what is necessary. 
Meanwhile this sets precedent for the smaller states of the EAEU that have their 
own reasons to doubt Russia’s efforts to achieve economic integration on a basis 
of consensus and respect for sovereignty, therefore in this type of situation smaller 
states can force Russia into making concessions to offset the  risk of being in 
a  loosely organized institution with one heavily dominating state.33 Thus Russia 
may have to give in to these kinds of demands from time to time to placate 
and appease smaller states in return for medium and long term contributions.
If the EAEU is looking to achieve ever greater state of integration, it is definitely 
going to need strong common institutions with the authority to intervene in matters 
usually left for national sovereignty, especially considering the overall low quality 
of governance in the  region.34 the Commission is the  institution responsible for 
further integration and its decisions are nominally binding to all member states, 
but member states that disagree with the  Commission’s decision can take it up 
to the  higher bodies35. Moreover, the  main decisions are made by the  Council, 
i. e., the national governments and heads of state, effectively creating a top-down 
hierarchy and opening the door for political negotiations, bypassing the common 
institutions and their decisions altogether. On top of that, the Commission is no 
longer authorized to bring the member states before the court for non-compliance, 
thus not allowing the  institution to enforce decisions made by the  institution 
itself and opening the door for more bilateral negotiations. Even at times when 
the  decisions of Commission are deemed to be enforceable, the  member states 
define their enforceability according to their national constitutions, as did 
the Russian Supreme Court, when it challenged the ideas of “direct applicability” 
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and “supremacy” of the  Eurasian law.36 In a  similar fashion the  official judicial 
body of the  EAEU does not have the  power to change any norms or create 
new norms of the  law,37 essentially allowing the national governments to decide 
for themselves which decisions they wish to follow and to what extent, calling 
the ultimate goal of economic integration into question altogether.
Marriage of economic convenience
When assessing the  motivation of the  smaller member states to join 
the  regional integration project, it is important to look at economic data that 
could potentially elaborate on the reasoning. Moreover, if the EAEU is supposed 
to become an economic institution, it would not be unreasonable to assume at 
least a decent level of economic activity among the member states.
Table 1: Basic economic information on member states (as of 2018) 
  GDP, USD billions % of EAEU total
Russia 1,658 86.9%
Kazakhstan 170 8.9%
Belarus 59 3.1%
Armenia 12 0.6%
Kyrgyzstan 8 0.4%
Total EAEU 1,907  
Source: World Bank38
In case of Belarus and its mostly concentrated trade profile, Russia alone 
accounted for almost 44 percent of Belarus’ exports in 2017, while also receiving 
significant discounts for energy.39 That being said, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suggests that being a part of the EAEU could at least partially be responsible 
for the  growth of GDP in 2018 relative to 2017.40 Even despite that, Belarus 
accounts for only 3.1 percent of the  total GDP of the  EAEU,41 while trade with 
the EAEU members constitutes over 46 percent of its trade overall in 2017 worth 
just over 13 million USD, the vast majority of which – worth about 12.8 million 
USD – comes from exports to Russia.42 Meanwhile exports to the EU accounts for 
roughly 20 percent of its overall exports, making the EU the second main partner 
in trade, while in terms of imports the  EU accounts for roughly 15 percent of 
Belarus’ total imports. However, China is a significant exporter to Belarus, whose 
imports are responsible for almost 8 percent of all imports, while exports to China 
account for only just over a single percent of exports from Belarus.43
This shows an obvious reality for Belarus – access to Russia’s economy is of 
utmost importance, and presumably any project that promises improved access 
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and favorable terms of trade with Russia, is deemed worthwhile, especially 
considering its limited foreign policy options due to its political isolation.44 
At the same time it sends a clear signal to Russia that Belarus’ integration efforts 
directly correlate with the economic relations with Russia, and failure to provide 
preferential treatment will possibly create friction between the two governments. 
This strategy has been implemented multiple times by Belarus, threatening 
to leave the  EAEU in the  face of Russian lack of cooperation.45 Interestingly 
enough, this mutually beneficial relationship also corresponds to the institutional 
weakness of the  EAEU mentioned earlier in that decisions made by the  EAEU 
as a regional institution can be effectively blocked by national governments over 
bilateral issues.
Meanwhile Kazakhstan’s participation in the EAEU is dictated not necessarily 
by its dependence on Russian resources and market but by its relative economic 
strength and already existing trade relationships both in the  East and West. 
Kazakhstan is the second biggest economy of the EAEU, even though it accounts 
only for 8.9 percent of the total GDP of the EAEU.46 In 2017, Kazakhstan exported 
more than 48 billion USD goods and services, and Russia accounted for less 
than 10 percent of that total while China accounted for nearly 12 percent, with 
the EU member states combined accounting for over 40 percent.47 This is further 
corroborated by the  World Bank data, according to which trade with EAEU 
members amounts to only 10.5 percent of its trade overall in 2017.48 
Considering the  statement of the  former president N. Nazarbayev, 
the membership of Kazakhstan is mostly dictated by economic pragmatism and 
the benefits offered by a  functioning economic union. However, N. Nazarbayev 
emphasized that such endeavors should not be politicized, indicating Kazakhstan’s 
realistic perspective, i. e., a closer integration within the EAEU or even the growing 
geopolitical significance of the  EAEU could severely damage its existing trade 
relationships, hence it is more inclined to uphold an economic union and 
generally good relations with Moscow without being a part of a  larger struggle 
for power between Russia and its perceived rivals49. Moreover, membership in 
the EAEU by itself can create an opportunity to at least tame Russia’s ambitions 
and clout50 by common rules and institutions.
In terms of economic importance, Kyrgyzstan definitely stands to gain 
the most out of at least partial economic integration. It is by far the economically 
weakest member state of the EAEU, accounting for only 0.4 percent of the total 
GDP of the EAEU51, while trade within the EAEU constitutes over 40 percent of 
its total trade.52 Although, trade with China brings over 33 percent of the  total 
trade of the  small country53, while imports from the  EU account for less than 
5 percent of total imports. Interestingly enough, exports to the  EU constitute 
around 12 percent of total exports, with almost 11 percent of Kyrgyzstans total 
exports going to the  United Kingdom.54 However, perhaps the  most important 
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factor in favor of accession was the dependence on remittances from its citizens 
living and working abroad, mostly in Russia, that in early 2015 roughly 9 percent 
of the entire Kyrgyz population were reported to be in Russia.55 On top of that, 
it is safe to assume many migrants are in the  country or work there illegally, 
thus making the  entire situation even direr. Additionally, about 13 percent of 
households receive remittances which constitute up to half of their income.56 
As a  result, Kyrgyzstan has one of the highest rates in the world of reliance on 
remittances,57 and membership in the EAEU along with its freedom of movement 
provides definite gains for the Kyrgyz economy. The benefits of easier access to 
Russian and Kazakhstan’s markets are obvious as they both combined constitute 
around 30 percent or 520 million USD58 exports of Kyrgyzstan in 2017. 
The story is similar for Armenia, which, despite its lack of land borders with 
other EAEU members, generates around 26 percent of its trade total in trade 
with other EAEU member states, of which Russia is single-handedly the  most 
important one, accounting for over 25 percent or 540 million USD of Armenian 
trade total within the EAEU of 551 million USD in 2017.59 China is an important 
trade partner for Armenia, constituting almost 12 percent of Armenia’s imports 
while also being responsible for over 5 percent of Armenia’s exports.60 Similarly 
trade with the EU is of importance, accounting for over 26 percent and 11 percent 
of Armenia’s exports and imports respectively.61
At the same time, Russia’s trade with EAEU members accounts for only just 
over 8 percent of its total trade in 2017,62 with Belarus being the top destination 
for Russian exports. Russia also dwarfs the  economy of the  entire EAEU  – 
Russia’s GDP constitutes 87 percent of the  entire GDP of the  EAEU.63 When 
put into perspective, the  economic significance of EAEU member states seems 
to dwindle even more. For comparison, in 2017 trade with China accounted for 
almost 10.5 percent of Russia’s overall trade, while trade with the EU countries 
combined attributed to over a quarter of Russia’s exports.64 
Table 2: Trade among the EAEU member countries
Exporting 
country, 
USD million, 
2017
Importing  
country,  
USD million, 2017
Russia Kazakhstan Belarus Armenia Kyrgyzstan Total EAEU
Russia – 11,924 15,537 0,868 1,388 28,849
Kazakhstan 4,515 – 95 4 503 5,117
Belarus 12,835 587 – 34 123 13,579
Armenia 540 4 6 – 1 551
Kyrgyzstan 265 266 7 0,1 – 538
Total EAEU 18,155 12,781 15,645 38 2,015
Source: World Bank65
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The data seems to strongly suggest that in terms of economic development 
Russia does not score any significant wins from the EAEU. The share of EAEU 
economies overall is very small. Moreover, the EAEU member states are generally 
poorly developed and/or do not offer diversified economies which would grant 
Russia access to technologies to strengthen its position economically and politically. 
On the flipside, access to Russian economy is without a doubt a very significant 
aspect to all the other EAEU members, thus corroborating the practical reality of 
the entire integration project. Even though the smaller states may not be interested 
in geopolitics, the cost of not being a part of the EAEU (and, by extension, not 
gaining access to the Russian economy) is too great to bear in purely economical 
terms, while allowing Russia to employ a carrot-and-stick tactics by attracting less 
developed nations through the promise of tighter economic integration. This, in 
turn, allows Russia not just to increase its reputation but also employ the EAEU 
as its own foreign policy tool behind the façade of multilateralism.
Conclusion
Within 24 years since the  collapse of the  USSR the  post-soviet region 
experienced, on the  surface at least, a  significant development in the  form 
of the  EAEU. Through many different formats it evolved as a  nominally 
economic institution with the sole aim of improving integration and furthering 
the development of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Upon 
close inspection, though, it becomes more and more apparent that the EAEU is 
a  peculiar institution in that it is claimed to be created for economic purposes 
but its internal structure and inherent asymmetry of power indicates it is a part 
of a bigger picture in Russian foreign policy planning.
Russia dwarfs the entire institution in terms of political and economic power, 
while also acknowledging the  importance of regionally integrated blocks as 
a means to turn economic power into political power. The institutional structure, 
albeit said to be designed after the example of the European Union, is toothless 
as an institution while also allowing for political bargaining and bilateral deal 
making, giving Russia room to use its power and influence. The membership of 
smaller countries is dictated either by their dependency on Russian markets or 
at least the necessity to uphold good relations with Russia. 
Russia has entered into an economic union with 5 smaller and less developed 
states that does not bring Russia any economic benefits per se. Instead, it allows 
Russia to hold these countries within its reach for the  foreseeable future and to 
secure their cooperation in exchange for some fairly short-term economic benefits. 
As a result Russia has been able to create a regional supranational institution that 
contains 4 Davids and a single Goliath but with a twist – the Davids are unable 
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to significantly affect Goliath’s actions due to the asymmetry of power and their 
limited foreign policy options. That is not to say, however, that they are unable to 
chip away at Goliath’s power by effectively vetoing resolutions made by the EAEU 
and by making loud statements in order to force Russia to make concessions. 
Ultimately the states may have their reservations about Russian power but their 
membership in the  EAEU achieves Russia’s goal  – to create a  supranational 
regional institution with Russia at its helm to solidify and legitimize Russia’s 
geopolitical ambitions.
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Money River from Russia to the West. 
How Toxic is it?
Marius Laurinavičius
French economist Gabriel Zucman has made his name on the  extensive 
research of capital flow and hidden wealth of countries. When he had looked at 
Russia, as he pointed out in his book “Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of 
Tax Havens”, he found that around 50 percent of Russia’s wealth resided outside 
the country.1 
When applying different research approaches with his colleagues Filip 
Novokmet and Thomas Piketty for the research paper “From Soviets to Oligarchs: 
Inequality and Property in Russia 1905–2016” he has come to the same conclusion: 
Russians own about half of total financial wealth offshore2.
Zucman and his colleagues primarily draw attention to the problem of tax 
evasion and distribution of income and wealth in Russia. However, there is 
another problem which is posed by such flow of Russian money abroad. Namely, 
the toxic effect this money has on the Western countries and Western societies. 
This paper examines the  scope of toxicity of Russian money and the  historical 
context, which makes the argument of a snow-ball effect plausible, when it comes 
to neglection of the problem.
The first dimension of the threat that Russian money poses to the West refers 
to sophisticated criminal activities they bring with it. Russian mafia’s infiltration 
into Western businesses and financial institutions has been recognized as a threat 
for decades. However, it has been largely neglected as such for just  as  long. 
The events of recent years have made clear the futility of attempting to differentiate 
between the Russian mafia and the Russian state3.
We live in perilous times when Western law enforcement agencies not 
only tie biggest cybertheft campaigns of the  last decade to Russian hackers, but 
also suspects in the crime are allegedly related to Russian security services4 and 
leaders of Russian criminal world5 at the  same time. These are the  times when 
Europol highlights Russian money as the biggest laundering threat6 and considers 
mafia in general a bigger security threat than terrorism or migration7. That is just 
a context in which Russian money flow to the West should be considered as well.
The second aspect which, without any doubt, should be considered when 
Russian money flows to the  West is discussed as a  hybrid warfare Kremlin 
Money River from Russia to the West. How Toxic is it?
M. Laurinavičius
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wages against the  West. In that context it is important to take into account 
that the  Kremlin doesn’t restrict itself to governmental and non-governmental 
organizations when pursuing its hostile goals in the  Western countries. For 
example, all or almost all publicly known financing of anti-European or anti-
Western activities coming from Moscow are conducted through private Russian-
led businesses rather than governmental organizations. 
 As Mark Galleotti points out, “Moscow must also be considered the master 
of “hybrid business,” of developing illegal and legal commercial enterprises that 
ideally make money, but at the  same time can be used for the  state’s purposes, 
whether technically private concerns or not. Russian commercial institutions not 
only provide covers for intelligence agents and spreads disinformation, but acting 
notionally on their own initiative, they are also used to provide financial support 
to political and social movements Moscow deems convenient”8. 
All that makes money flow mentioned and kleptocratic means in particular an 
indispensable tool for Russian hybrid warfare efforts. The more so, when the same 
applies not only to the money, which isn’t so much dark as murky, as Ben Judah 
and Nate Sibley put it. They draw attention to “funds that are not necessarily 
flat-out illegal, stolen, or laundered but instead from state-owned companies, 
oligarchs, or enterprises that may pose a strategic threat to the national security”.9
Historic overview
“A capital flight is a capital flight”. According to Fritz Ermarth, former officer 
for Central Intelligence Agency, that was the answer of US political establishment 
to an appeal for CIA to help finding vast sums essentially stolen by the KGB on 
behalf of itself and the Communist Party of the USSR and deposited abroad in 
the bank accounts and front companies10. In 1992 the logic behind such a decision 
was described in simple terms: it doesn’t matter who has the  money or how it 
was acquired, even if by theft; as long as it is private, it will return to do good 
things if there is a market11.
As history has proved, such an assumption was tremendously wrong. From 
well-documented plans made public long ago, we know that the  KGB and 
Communist Party were not interested in doing good things, neither they were 
interested in functioning of a real market. They sought to establish hundreds of 
business enterprises in the West that would provide cover for the KGB and party 
members to transfer assets abroad with the assistance of organized crime12.
As the outcome of the Western approach called “capital flow is capital flow”, 
instead of good things that should have been done by money stolen by KGB and 
Communist Party, a full-fledged mafia state has been established in Russia13 over 
the years. Moreover, corruption has become greatest export of Putin’s regime, as 
David Kramer, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 
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Human Rights, and Labor puts it14. Though the transformation has not occurred 
over the  night, red flags have not been noticed, warnings have not been heard 
and lessons have not been learned.
For example, on September 21, 1999 Richard L. Palmer, a  former CIA 
officer and an expert on Russian organized crime publicly warned the  United 
States Congress on the  threat of Russian kleptocracy infiltration into the  West. 
He himself referred to conventional wisdom, which holds that “corruption and 
the  power of Organized Crime will diminish as capitalism and free enterprise 
improve economic conditions, and democratic reforms will gradually reshape 
the  government and infrastructure of Russia, causing criminal enterprises 
to spontaneously “legitimize” their operations”15. However, in his testimony 
before the  House Committee on Banking and Financial Services R.  L.  Palmer 
provided tons of information and a  full bunch of arguments in order to prove 
that conventional wisdom mentioned is totally misplaced. He warned that 
the values of the kleptocrats could become America’s own and pointed to the fact 
that “paper” firms make “political donations to the U.S. politicians and political 
parties to obtain influence.”16
Since 2010, a testimony of Spanish prosecutor Jose Grinda Gonzalez should 
have been taken into account. As it was made public by “WikiLeaks”, a prosecutor, 
who spent decades investigating crimes of Russian mafia in Spain, “stated that 
he considers Belarus, Chechnya and Russia to be virtual “mafia states”. For each 
of those countries, he alleged, one cannot differentiate between the activities of 
the government and OC groups”17.
In the context of Russian money flow Grinda’s warning was not less grave. 
“Grinda suggested that there are two reasons to worry about the Russian mafia. 
First, it exercises “tremendous control” over certain strategic sectors of the global 
economy. The second reason is the  unanswered question regarding the  extent 
to which Russian PM Putin is implicated in the Russian mafia and whether he 
controls the  mafia’s actions. Grinda cited a  “thesis” by Alexander Litvinenko, 
the former Russian intelligence official who worked on OC issues before he died 
in late 2006 in London from poisoning under mysterious circumstances, that 
the Russian intelligence and security services – Grinda cited the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the  Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and military intelligence 
(GRU)  – control OC in Russia. Grinda stated that he believes this thesis is 
accurate”18.
Having in mind his experience in a  modus operandi of a  criminal world, 
Grinda with shocking accuracy managed to predict a  problem with Russia we 
face now. Spanish prosecutor noticed that money-laundering investigations have 
a two-fold objective: to prevent the targets from profiting from the original crime 
and to prevent the targets from gaining enough clout to enjoy economic influence, 
which Grinda suggested sooner or later always reaches political power19. That 
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is exactly the  issue, which should be discussed first, when the  threat Russian 
money poses to the West is taken into consideration. In 2017 the foreign affairs 
committee at the House of Commons of the United Kingdom in its report titled 
“Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the  UK”20 accused its own country 
of turning a  blind eye to Russia’s “dirty money” and by that putting national 
security at risk. As it was mentioned above there is a good argument to take into 
consideration not just “dirty” or “dark” money in that context. 
The more so, when the report itself refers almost to the same: “President Putin 
and his allies have been able to continue “business as usual” by hiding and launder-
ing their corrupt assets in London. These assets, on which the Kremlin can call at 
any time, both directly and indirectly support President Putin’s campaign to subvert 
the international rules-based system, undermine our allies, and erode the mutually-
reinforcing international networks that support UK foreign policy”. Jack Reed, a U.S. 
Senator from Rhode Island, one of his speeches on Russia’s hybrid warfare opera-
tions against the West in the Senate in 2018 devoted entirely to Russian financial 
influence abroad21. In his speech he rightly pointed out to the modus operandi of 
Putin’s system rather than to individuals just committing crimes.
The argument he made is worth quoting in full:
“The Russian system of corrupt financial influence rests on Putin’s domestic 
power structure. The Putin regime is fundamentally a  kleptocracy, which is 
a system where corrupt leaders use their power to exploit their country’s people 
and natural resources in order to extend their personal wealth and personal 
power. Putin has systemically fostered kleptocratic conditions by exploiting state 
funds and resources to reward a  group of close associates, commonly referred 
to as oligarchs. [...] In exchange for wealth, privilege, and often impunity, 
this group of Putin’s cronies are readily deployed to act on behalf of Kremlin 
interests. [...] Russia’s kleptocratic system reinforces Putin’s power in several ways. 
First, he controls who profits from state coffers, making the  recipients of state 
largess indebted to him. Second, he can outsource projects of financial influence, 
which provides him with access to private wealth streams and gives him plausible 
deniability if the projects have a nefarious aspect. Finally, this system allows Putin 
to ensnare oligarchs who may have enriched themselves through a corrupt deal 
or committed crimes that were state-sanctioned”22.
All these conclusions have been drawn since at least 1999 and warning have 
been publicly made since then are not based on any personal assumptions. They 
belong to people who are not just simple researchers on Russian kleptocratic and 
mafia-type regime. These are conclusions, which have been drawn by officials 
from the  security services, prosecutors’ offices and members of parliaments of 
the  democratic world and are based on crystal clear evidence. Nevertheless, it 
seems not much of that has been publicly accepted as a real threat definition and 
even less of lessons have been learned.
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Dropping illusions
In order to drop some wide-spread illusions about Russian money flow, several 
arguments from the report “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK” are 
worth mentioning separately. The report comes almost to the  same conclusion 
Senator Reed has come to: “There is a direct relationship between the oligarchs’ 
wealth and the ability of President Putin to execute his aggressive foreign policy 
and domestic agenda. [...] You have to look at the  Russian oligarchs as a  class. 
No matter how different they seem to you  – one owns a  football club, another 
donated money to Oxford for a school of government, another sat in a Russian 
jail for six years under communism, another was a civil servant – they all have 
very particular things in common. [...] They are not self-made businessmen in 
the American sense. Every one of them made money through a relationship with 
the  Russian Government. That bond forces them to do all sorts of chores for 
Putin, whether hidden, visible or invisible.”23
These conclusions are fully supported by tons of public information on 
the  Kremlin’s attacks against the  West. Putin’s strategy to deploy his oligarchs 
can be examined in detail from the  special counsel Robert Mueller’s report on 
Russian interference in the U.S. presidential elections in 201624. Take the episode 
of Russians offering illicit funding to Italian far-right party25, infamous loan 
to French National Front26, meddling in Montenegro elections27 or any other 
Kremlin’s attempt to exercise its influence in the  West, an opaque network of 
high-level Russian political figures, businessmen and even spies can be traced.
Nevertheless a wide-spread illusion that Russian oligarchs and even Russian 
money should not be measured by one yardstick still prevails. When former 
Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, who has been a  well-known Kremlin 
critic, accepted the offer to join Russian oligarchs owned LetterOne group as an 
adviser28, numerous other Kremlin critics jumped not only to his defense, but 
to the defense of Russian oligarchs behind LetterOne as well29. The assumption 
was made that differentiation between Russian oligarchs and their readiness to 
serve the  Kremlin interests is essential. On top of that a  new image building 
campaign in order to whitewash Putin’s kleptocracy30 could have been noticed 
with the same oligarchs involved. 
However, Mueller report shed a light on a role Putin assigned on Petr Aven, 
one of the  owners of LetterOne, in the  Kremlin’s campaign to achieve its goals 
concerning president Trump. Though, he and the  other LetterOne principals 
were noticeably absent from the list of Russians sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury 
on the grounds of election meddling, many questions on their other involvement 
has left unanswered31. While taking into consideration the  threat of potential 
criminal activities Russian money flow brings with it, LetterOne owners have 
raised doubts about their modus operandi as well. Oligarchs mentioned have been 
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grilled by Spain’s top court over accusations that they used methods ‘typically 
used by the Russian mafia’ to devalue firm they sought to buy32.
Since “Troika Laundromat” accusations were made public, another Russian 
oligarch Ruben Vardanyan has been cast in a new light33. Before the scandal he was 
mostly known as generous philanthropist in the West and “enjoyed a reputation 
as a Western-friendly representative of Russian capitalism”. However, the scandal 
exposed not only an almost $ 9 billion alleged global money-laundering scheme, 
but one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s oldest friends, as one of the main 
beneficiaries of the scheme, as well34.
Before Maria Butina, a Russian agent jailed for infiltrating the U.S. political 
groups35, was publicly exposed, hardly few in the U.S. have heard about Konstantin 
Nikolaev. Though another Russian oligarch invested in the  U.S. energy and 
technology companies36, he kept a low profile and didn’t draw attention to himself. 
After Butina was exposed, not only his financial support for Butina came into 
the  spotlight, but his extensive connections to Russian security services were 
made public as well37. Despite all that a  group of former advisors to Donald 
Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign have accepted the  offer to lobby on behalf 
of the gas company Nikolaev co-owns38.
All that goes in line with the testimony Garry Kasparov, a prominent critic 
of Putin’s regime, submitted to the House of Commons of the United Kingdom 
for the report titled “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK”: “They are 
agents of a rogue Russian criminal regime, not businessmen. They are complicit 
in Putin’s countless crimes. Their money is not truly theirs, it is Russia’s. Their 
companies are not mere international corporations, but the  means to launder 
money and spread corruption and influence”39.
Some evidence suggests the same can be applied to oligarchs, who publicly 
pretend to distance themselves from Putin’s regime and even hold passports of 
the Western countries. For example, Russian oligarch and former UK newspaper 
owner Alexander Lebedev responded angrily to media allegations that a British 
government report on Russian interference could contain damaging information 
about his relationship with Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Lebedev complained of 
feeling victimized in Britain after he “did the British people a service” by investing 
in the media. “I definitely felt more comfortable when I worked as a Soviet spy 
in England,” he was quoted by AFP40. However, even if Lebedev doesn’t work as 
a spy anymore, he has been caught trying to help Putin to win Western approval 
for the annexation of Crimea, as so called “Surkov leaks” revealed41. 
Evgeny Lebedev, the  son of Alexander Lebedev and a  personal friend of 
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson complained that “Russophobia has infiltrated 
Britain” when information about his private party with Johnson was made public. 
He urged to judge him on what he has done for the country, and what he intends 
to continue to do, rather on the fact that he is Russian42. An appeal might sound 
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plausible, however Evgeny Lebedev himself has been instrumental in promoting 
the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals43. 
A major donor to the UK Conservative Party Alexander Temerko presents 
himself as a  critic of Putin. However, he is not shy praising Russian security 
officials, including the current and former heads of the Federal Security Service 
(FSB). On top of that Leonid Nevzlin, one of Temerko’s former business partners, 
confirmed to Reuters that Temerko had long-standing ties with Russian security 
agencies, though declined to say whether he believes those ties remain active44.
The US politicians as well as Western think-tanks and universities cannot 
stop taking Len Blavatnik’s money45. Blavatnik prefers to be called a  global 
industrialist and philanthropist. He is always positioning himself as an outsider 
in Russia and a local in the West and makes all efforts to distance himself from 
Russian politics and, in particular, from Putin46. However, there is no secret that 
he made his billions together with such well connected to Kremlin oligarchs 
as Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg. The latter tries to position himself 
being “pro-American” but has been under sanctions for suspected meddling in 
the 2016 U.S. election47. 
The strategy of capturing: from individuals to entire states
All mentioned is not just separate cases or any coincidences. That makes 
the Kremlin’s strategy. In order to fully understand the toxicity of Russian money 
flow to the  West, that strategy should be thoroughly examined. The Kremlin 
foreign policy advisor Sergey Karaganov, with characteristic cynical openness, 
describes Russian foreign policy as one that seeks to buy the elites of neighboring 
countries “with money that was then stolen, likely together.”48 These words 
form a  compelling narrative illustrating how Russia exports kleptocracy and 
buys influence abroad. More than that, one could hardly find a  more accurate 
description of Russia’s “weaponization of kleptocracy”  – albeit with one small 
correction: Russia has not been limiting itself merely to bribing the politicians of 
neighboring countries49.
The strategy of such weaponization which ultimately can lead to the  state 
capture, is analyzed in detail in two studies of the U.S. based Centre for Strategic 
and International studies: “The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian 
Influence in Central and Eastern Europe” and “The Kremlin Playbook  2: 
Enablers”. “The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central 
and Eastern Europe” lays out the Kremlin’s mechanism for exercising its influence 
abroad: “Russia has sought to maintain its influence by cultivating a  network 
of local affiliates and power-brokers who are capable of advocating on Russia’s 
behalf. These affiliates are often wealthy and influential businessmen or former 
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high-ranking public officials who are able to influence decision-making. Typically, 
Russia entices these individuals into its service by offering them lucrative business 
opportunities, in which the  Russian government is involved, and provides 
premium returns to its clients”50. 
According to the report, this is the way how Kremlin “captures” individuals 
in order to use them advancing Russia’s interests politically and economically. 
It’s not a  surprise that such individuals, pursuing their own interests, are often 
the  most vocal advocates of Russian-led projects. At the  same time they are 
strongly opposed to efforts to diversify commerce away from Russia. “In this way, 
Russia appears to have created a mutually reinforcing network of patronage that 
rewards loyalty with loyalty—with increased financial compensation”51, the report 
concludes. How effective such mechanism can be one can learn from the Latvian 
example. After Latvian law enforcement officials secretly taped conversations 
between three main Latvian oligarchs, they and later also the  Latvian society 
learned not only that Putin, according to oligarchs view, “managed to bring order 
to Russia”. One part of these conversations illustrates exactly the  mechanism 
described by “Kremlin’s playbook” in play. Namely, oligarchs discussed an option 
for one of Latvian politicians becoming a  prime minister, because “Moscow 
thinks she would be a good candidate”52. It seems there is no need to mention, 
that the business of all three oligarchs is dependent on Russia. 
The same opaque networks of Western politicians and businessmen related to 
Russia apparently had much to do with successful efforts to compromise Western 
sanctions policy. For example, a  long-time associate of Putin from his KGB days, 
Vladimir Yakunin is under the  U.S. sanctions for the  involvement in Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. However, Yakunin managed to avoid European and Canadian 
sanctions. According to some reports, Yakunin was omitted from the  European 
Union’s blacklist after Latvia lobbied strongly to have his name removed53.
Yakunin suggested himself that his close business relationships, notably with 
“Bombardier” chairman Pierre Beaudoin, may have helped to shield him from 
Canada’s list54. “Bombardier” denies the claim. Though Yakunin is also a board 
member of the  “Russkiy Mir” organization which plays a  key-role in Russia’s 
orchestrating Russian governmental influence abroad, he has been granted a visa 
to visit the EU Member States, was invited to speak at the EU-funded conference 
and even established a think-tank in Berlin55.
It is obvious that Russian oligarchs have spent considerable resources trying 
to get their names removed from the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions list, 
injecting foreign money into a  vast complex of influence peddlers formally 
employed as lobbyists, lawyers, public relations consultants, private investigators, 
and other professional service providers56. 
Greg Barker, a  member of Britain’s House of Lords and the  chairman of 
En+ Group Plc, was awarded a  bonus of about 3 million to 4 million pounds 
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for negotiating the removal of U.S. sanctions on the Russian company, according 
to Bloomberg report57. Lord Barker has a  long history working for Russian 
oligarchs. As Bloomberg reports, a  former associate partner at public relations 
firm Brunswick Group, he moved to Russia in the late 1990s to work for another 
oligarch: Roman Abramovich. Barker was hired as the head of one of divisions 
at Sibneft, Abramovich’s oil company, around the  same time that Abramovich 
was merging his aluminium assets with Deripaska to form Rusal. Two decades 
later, a  recommendation from Abramovich’s group helped persuade Deripaska 
to appoint Barker as a  chairman of En+, according to a  person familiar with 
the matter. He took the role in October 2017, just a few weeks before the company 
floated in London58.
To put it into context, according to press reports, Deripaska for quite 
a  long period of time has been denied even the  U.S. visa over alleged criminal 
connections59. In 2018 Switzerland denied Abramovich residency over suspected 
criminality60. In the  study titled “The Kremlin Playbook 2: Enablers” authors 
directly address the  problem of Russian money flow to the  West: “Every year, 
billions in investment and profits move in and out of European countries through 
the  enablers’ financial systems. These financial systems offer specific tools that 
are designed to obscure the  origins of certain investments and conceal illicit 
financing. It has become almost impossible to disentangle Russian capital outflows 
from other financial flows, including for the  most capable oversight bodies in 
the world. Russian private holdings abroad total an estimated $ 1 trillion”61. 
Authors of the report point out to the additional problem, which is related 
to these significant capital flows. They draw attention to the  risk of damaging 
national security “by corrupting government officials who can alter policies, 
impeding the free flow of capital, reducing the efficacy of sanctions regimes, and 
distorting entire markets and industries”62.
For example, according to French senators, France’s national interests and 
President Emanuel Macron’s security had been put at risk63when Macron’s 
personal security advisor Alexandre Benalla had been selling protection services 
to another Russian billionaire Isklander Makhmudov. The latter is suspected of 
ties to Russian organized crime as well64. 
Weaponized “business” deals and charity
Over the past decades money laundering has become to seem an indispensable 
part of Russian money flow to the West. But only over the past years the number 
of European banks involved65 points to snow-ball effect of the  problem, which 
has been more or less neglected for years. On top of that, experts have started to 
discuss Russian money laundering in the  context of the  dark art of it reaching 
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new and innovative heights. An analysis of major Russian money-laundering 
scandals exposed in the  last decade reveals four new particularly sophisticated 
techniques66.Besides, Russian money laundering doesn’t limit itself to the banking 
sector. “Dark” money, which needs to be laundered goes into big, anonymous 
real estate deals in the  United Kingdom,67 Germany68 and other countries. 
American real estate became a  “giant magnet” for Russia’s kleptocratic fortunes 
after lobbyists pushed to allow anonymous shell companies to buy properties69.
In such a  context not only experts have started to discuss a  phenomenon of 
weaponized finance interfering70 , but the  Baltic states bankers have coined 
a term “weaponized financial crime”. Russian investments into football clubs have 
come under scrutiny after at least two cases of money laundering through such 
investments were exposed in Europe71.
Finland has been forced to introduce a new law for foreigners buying property 
in the  country. It will require from foreign buyers of Finish real estate to seek 
permission from the country’s Ministry of Defense. The law was introduced amid 
concerns that hostile intelligence agencies might use investments for the hostile 
actions against the county. The Finnish Ministry of Defense insists that the new 
laws are “not directed to any specific country or actor(s).” However, concerns 
about the  intentions of foreign investors were raised last year, when Finnish 
officials mounted a  huge military style raid on properties linked to a  Russian 
businessman called Pavel Melnikov. Hundreds of officers backed by helicopters, 
a surveillance plane and a no-fly zone stormed 17 separate properties owned by 
Melnikov’s tourism company. Police said the raids were connected to allegations 
of financial crimes, but they sparked speculation that authorities were also 
concerned that the properties could have been used for spying72. 
The comprehensive report on the Kremlin’s propaganda-related institutions 
and their connections with Western and Russian academia was released in 
2019. The report is titled “Hybrid Analytica: Pro-Kremlin Expert Propaganda in 
Moscow, Europe and the U.S. A Case Study on Think Tanks and Universities” The 
key conclusion authors of the report make is that the current Russian government 
pursues a  coherent “knowledge weaponization” strategy, including through 
Kremlin-related oligarch donations to Western institutions73.
Conclusion
All mentioned taken into account, the  answer to the  question “how toxic 
Russian money flow is” seems to be crystal clear. Putin’s regime and its cronies, 
who own Russia’s wealth, have blurred lines between legitimate economic activity, 
corruption and other financial crimes, between cooperation and malign influence, 
between economy and weapons in a war the Kremlin wages against the West. As 
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Mark Galeotti puts it, “in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that his 
country was becoming “a superpower of crime.” Today, Vladimir Putin appears 
to be courting that very same status, but in a profoundly different way, regarding 
Russian-based organized crime abroad not as a  threat or embarrassment, but 
a  potential opportunity. As Russia’s geopolitical competition with the  West 
continues, understanding the nature of this threat will be increasingly important 
for European security”74.
However Galeotti refers only to pure criminal activities related to the regime. 
In view of the author of this article the same should be applied to almost everything 
that is related to Russian kleptocracy and money flow to the  West. Insofar as 
the West continues to consider Kremlin-led mafia state “open for business” it will 
be easy for Putin to pursue its goals by means of corruption. As Ben Judah and 
Nate Sibley advocate it, instead of viewing the problem ”merely as the actions of 
bad actors, in bad countries, seeking bad people to bribe in the  West, Western 
powers need to develop a  national security strategy that recognizes economic 
crime as a  systemic threat to democracy and security worldwide. But first they 
need to define it clearly—and explain to the public why it matters75.
Democracies can’t be overtaken by kleptocracy, which always comes along 
with autocracy, as long as citizens trust their democratic institutions and 
the  functioning of the  system as such. Therefore, Putin’s kleptocracy, which 
could not otherwise hope to compete with democratic, free market system, hopes 
to infect Western countries with its own kleptocratic virus, refashioning them 
in Russia’s image. Any failure to push back against kleptocracy, which comes 
with Russian money flow, stipulates further attacks on democracy, the  erosion 
of the  rule of law and market economy. By that, threats to national security 
and vulnerability of the  West in the  hybrid war Russia wages against it further 
escalates and the risk of a snowball effect increases.
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Russia’s Economic Narratives Towards 
the Baltic States: Structural Elements and 
the Potential of Ideological Alignment
Mārtiņš Kaprāns
Economic narratives have not always been at the  frontline of Russia’s dis-
information strategy towards the  Baltic states. In the  2000s, they were over-
shadowed by the narratives of historical revisionism and violation of the Russian-
speakers’ rights. Then, disinformation was primarily focused on strengthening 
the Russian-speakers’ diasporic identity and undermining the international image 
of the  Baltic states. However, the  salience of economic topics has significantly 
increased since global financial crises (2008–2010) that hit hard Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia.
Ever since the global financial crises and economic recession Baltic countries 
have experienced a  rapid recovery. Along with a  persistently rising GDP and 
salaries and declining unemployment rates, they have been among the  fastest 
growing economies in the  European Union. Although the  growth might slow 
down and stabilize, it is expected that Baltic economies will continue growing 
in the  next years to come1. The remarkable performance of Baltic economies, 
among other factors, can be attributed to the  growing manufacturing industry, 
transport services and telecommunication, computer and IT services. It should 
be also added that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been consistently rated as 
top countries for the ease of doing business by the World Bank (19th, 14th and 
16th respectively out of 190, as of 2018)2. Contrary to this optimistic economic 
outline, the  Baltic states have faced with crucial socio-demographic challenges 
(e.g.  emigration, aging society, labor shortage, income inequality) that may 
constrain the  economic development in a  long-run perspective and increase 
anxiety in Baltic societies. Such reverse conditions where objective economic 
growth contrasts with detrimental social changes and people’s subjectivities therein 
set the stage for Russia’s contemporary narratives towards Baltic economies.
The goal of this chapter is to explore the basic elements of Russia’s current 
economic narratives towards the  Baltic states and to examine their potential 
to align with the  public opinion of Baltic societies. This analysis is based on 
secondary sources that have produced a valuable analytical material on Russian 
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disinformation activities undertaken within the last five years (cf. EU vs. Disinfo, 
Digital Forensic Research Lab, CEPA Stratcom Program). Likewise, the chapter 
explores cross-national sociological data from the  public opinion survey 
“Ideological polarization in Baltic societies” conducted in 2019.
The grammar of parallel economic reality
Russia’s economic narratives towards the  Baltic states (henceforth called 
the  pro-Kremlin economic narratives) operate on two levels. Firstly, Baltic 
countries are addressed as a  uniform region, Pribaltika. The Pribaltika region 
in the  Russian media parlance evokes associations with a  Russian/Soviet geo-
political understanding of Baltic countries as not being sovereign political 
entities. Secondly, economic narratives construct a  distorted image of a  single 
country that is occasionally used to symbolize all Baltic countries. In both cases 
the  pro-Kremlin economic narratives have the  same purpose: to undermine 
Baltic economies and their advancements since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The claim that Baltic countries do not have a  viable economy provides 
a template for Russia’s economic narratives. Pro-Kremlin media usually juxtapose 
this formative statement to the  popular Soviet-era brands and products that 
the  Baltic Republics produced during the  Soviet period, making them famous 
in the  whole USSR. Today, it is argued, the  Soviet-era factories are dismantled, 
driving Baltic countries to depopulation, poverty, high unemployment and weak 
economies. In particular, such economic narratives point out a high emigration rate 
from Baltic countries to Western Europe, implying that Baltic nations will cease to 
exist in a  foreseeable future and will be replaced by people from other cultures3.
Along with self-styled experts on the  Baltic states, prominent Russian 
politicians are regular sources of various apocalyptic statements. That clearly 
demonstrates the strategic character of the above-mentioned narrative template. 
The mythology of a  successfully functioning Soviet economy in general and  of 
specific industries in particular primes the  post-Soviet accomplishments 
of the  Baltic states. Arguably, Latvia is most often used as a  showcase of 
the  imagined post-Soviet economic devastation, misleadingly claiming that “no 
serious manufacturing has remained in Latvia”4 or “the population has declined 
by 50 percent since 1990”5, or “the country’s budget is hardly sticking together”6. 
Such priming, of course, ignores any economic successes and overlooks the fact 
that the economic situation and conditions for market economy in three Baltic 
countries are much better than in Russia; per-capita GDP, average salaries and 
pensions are all much higher than in any of the  other 12 ex-Soviet republics. 
Beyond the  glorification of the  Soviet-era economy, pro-Kremlin media 
primarily interpret the  unsustainability of Baltic economies as an outcome 
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of unfriendly attitude towards Russia or Russophobia that has emerged after 
the collapse of the USSR. This subtly broadens the scope of economic narratives to 
non-economic realms. Specifically, it is insisted that the allegedly discriminatory 
attitude towards Russian-speakers, wrong understanding of history (e.g., WWII, 
the  Soviet period), and international criticism of Russia’s policy towards other 
countries (Georgia, Ukraine) have damaged pragmatic and mutually beneficial 
economic relations with Russia. In order to emphasize the destructive economic 
consequences of bad relations with Russia, pro-Kremlin narratives tend to 
exaggerate the role of the Russian cargo transit in Baltic countries, presenting it 
as the  last economic branch that “made these countries important”7. This helps 
to create a  parallel reality in which the  impact of Russia’s decision to reduce 
the cargo transit through Baltic ports is presented in fatalistic terms.
The dependence of Baltic economies on good relations with Russia was 
particularly highlighted after the  introduction of EU sanctions in 2014. While 
pro-Kremlin media framed the  so-called Western sanctions as a  non-problem 
for Russia8, they produced many dramatic stories about the devastating impact of 
Russia’s countersanctions on Baltic economies. Reports on shrinking cargo transit 
as frequently presented in conjunction with selective and hyperbolic stories on 
how the Russian countersanctions decrease the  intensity of production in some 
industries or how the number of Russian tourists in the Baltic states is in decline9. 
Such stories, among other goals, intend to foster support for lifting EU sanctions. 
As a matter of fact, the pro-Kremlin media accounts ignore the actual irrelevant 
effect of Russia’s countersanction on the  GDP of Baltic countries; they are also 
silent about the  volatility of Ruble and the  general unpredictability of Russian 
market as crucial factors that may have objectively worsened economic relations 
with the Baltic states during the first years of Western sanctions.
With the  introduction of sanction after the  annexation of Crimea Russia’s 
criticism of the  EU has become more explicit and ardent. In this respect, two 
different storylines are fostered in Russia’s economic narratives towards the Baltic 
states. The first storyline frames the EU as an exploiter who sees the Baltic states 
as only a  market for their goods and a  source of cheap labor. Therefore, pro-
Kremlin media argue, the EU on behalf of Germany, France and other powerful 
member states are not interested in supporting the actual development of Baltic 
economies. Instead, it wants to eliminate industries in the Baltics thus reducing 
competition10. To be sure, the exploitation frame is embedded in a more general 
meaning-making framework that interprets the  Baltic states as failed and 
provincial economies whose labor keeps migrating to other EU countries. The 
second storyline presents Baltic countries as totally dependent on EU money. 
Pro-Kremlin media insist that Baltic countries can only relay on the EU financial 
support as they do not have viable economies11. This financial dependency frame 
again shall lead to conclusion about the appalling prospects for the Baltic states 
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which will cease to exist when EU money is over. It should be noted here that 
the  share of financial support from the  EU structural funds makes just a  few 
percent in the GDP of the Baltic states. 
Pro-Kremlin media exploit similar economy-based framing to explain 
the  role of NATO in the  Baltics. This has been of particular importance after 
the  deployment of NATO multinational battle groups in Poland and the  Baltic 
states. The pro-Kremlin disinformation ecosystem has framed the 2016 deployment 
of NATO battle groups as a manifestation of hidden business interests of larger 
NATO countries (e.g. US, UK) to obtain control over Baltic resources or to sell 
outworn weapons12. The association of the  NATO and also EU activities with 
the hidden economic interests of some superior powers echoes with Watanabe’s 
conclusion about the  Sputnik News articles where conspiracy frames are more 
likely to be used in articles about economy and politics13. Another narrative 
thread as regards NATO insists that Baltic countries support the deployment of 
NATO forces in their territories because that provides new job opportunities 
to local people and gives chances to new businesses14. As a  result, this it’s-all-
about-business frame endorses a  demoralizing explanation that Baltic countries 
welcome the NATO multinational battle groups merely out of economic interests 
rather than profound security considerations. 
In a  nutshell, the  EU and NATO function as proxies in the  pro-Kremlin 
economic narratives that help to illustrate and contextualize the  economic 
devastation in the  Baltic states. The excerpt from Russia’s one of the  leading 
state-controlled TV channels, NTV, is a case in point to demonstrate the nexus 
between these proxies and the main narrative template:
“The Baltic states [Pribaltika] are now one of the most backward economic 
regions in Europe, mainly supported by subsidies from Brussels. Back in 2004, 
for the  sake of joining the  European Union, virtually all industries were shut 
down in Baltic countries, manufacturing plants and factories were closed to meet 
the requirements of the EU. [...] Even the successful agriculture of the Baltic states 
was, so to say, forced out. [..] Highly qualified Balts with brains and hands are 
leaving not just for work, but for permanent residence […] Villages are empty, 
farms disappear, cities lose their status and turn into villages, but this half-empty 
territory is seen as a good training ground for NATO. Politicians are not ashamed 
of this. Let it be so, they say, as this gives money in return. [..] Some Baltic 
politicians even call for the  activation of NATO forces [...] in order to receive 
another funding.”15
Apart from the structural elements of pro-Kremlin economic narratives, it is 
important to take into consideration more conditional disinformation activities. 
That is to say, specific economic projects that have strategic relevance across 
the Baltic states are also the targets of disinformation. The pro-Kremlin economic 
narratives have specifically addressed Baltic energy policies over the last decade. 
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Not only do these narratives remind that Russia is the  main energy provider 
in the  Baltics, they also contest the  opposition of Baltic countries to the  Nord 
stream 2 project, a  project of a  new gas pipeline that crosses the  Baltic Sea16. 
Likewise, pro-Kremlin media have sought to delegitimize the  ideas of Baltic 
energy independence and Baltic solidarity in terms of the  Ostrovets nuclear 
power plant that Belarus and Russia have jointly built at the Lithuanian border17. 
Another specific economic initiative that pro-Kremlin media have been 
focusing on is Rail Baltica, a  rail transport infrastructure project with a goal to 
integrate the Baltic states in the European rail network. This project has caused 
noticeable controversies in and between Baltic countries. Pro-Kremlin media 
have tried to downplay the  economic dimension of these discussions. Instead 
they have sought to militarize this project by pushing forward a  narrative that 
Rail Baltica is a measure to build up the NATO military infrastructure18. Likewise, 
they have fostered a  claim that the  Baltic states do not have enough money to 
implement this project, therefore Rail Baltica is “permanently “frozen”19.
This outline of the  structural elements of economic narrative suggests that 
pro-Kremlin disinformation ecosystem uses economic context in order to address 
the actually existing social vulnerabilities of Baltic societies, such as depopulation, 
emigration, and social inequality. In additions, the myths of ‘the lost Paradise’ (the 
Soviet-era extensive industrial policy) and ‘apocalypses now’ (the reality of market 
economy) are used to contest the  Baltic success story. Framing Baltic countries 
as failed states rather than the most successful ex-Soviet republics is the way how 
Russia attempts to impose its post-Soviet transformation as a role model. 
Aligning with opinion groups in the Baltics
In order to understand to what extent public opinion in Baltic countries might 
align with the pro-Kremlin economic narratives, this section examines the 2019 
data from a fully representative cross-national survey “Ideological polarization in 
Baltic societies”20. These data give an insight into the size and profile of opinion 
groups that are more likely to accept the pro-Kremlin economic narratives.
According to the survey data, the core claim of Russia’s economic narratives 
that the  Baltic states do not have viable economies elicit significant differences 
between the  Baltic societies (Graph 1). That is, Estonians demonstrate 
a  moderately strong opposition to the  statement that the  economy of their 
country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the  sufficient and long-term 
development. The  majority of Lithuanians and Latvians, in turn, agree upon 
a  negative assessment of their state’s economy. Incidentally, the  Eurobarometer 
cross-sectional data confirm such differences, showing that Estonians have 
a  significantly more positive opinion about their country’s economic situation 
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than Latvians and Lithuanians21. Hence, Latvian and Lithuanian public opinion 
is relatively more likely to align with the narrative template of Russia’s economic 
narratives. 
Graph 1: The economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure 
sufficient and long-term development*
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59% 61%
60%
35% 35%
8% 6% 4%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Agree Disagree Hard to say/NA
Note: all graphs in this section present the  data from a  reduced scale. Originally, 
the survey items were measured by Likert scale (Completely agree, Tend to agree, Tend 
to disagree, Completely disagree)
Social inequality is a  specific dimension of Russia’s economic narratives 
that shall reinforce the  image of failed Baltic economies. In the  2019 survey, 
Baltic respondents were asked to express their attitude towards the  statement 
that poverty and unemployment prevails in their countries. The survey results 
yields a complex picture (Graph 2). While Estonians hold a moderate consensus 
that poverty and unemployment do not dominate in their country, Lithuanians 
hold a  strong consensus that they do. In comparison with other Baltic states, 
Latvian public opinion is divided into two equally large opinion groups: those 
who support and who do not support the  poverty and unemployment claim.
Emigration, as I have argued in the previous section, is often emphasized in 
the pro-Kremlin economic narratives as a tangible evidence of dysfunctional Baltic 
economies. The 2019 survey measured the  attitude of Baltic societies towards 
the statement that every day many residents leave their country and do not want 
to live there. The data demonstrate a very strong consensus among Latvians and 
Lithuanians toward accepting this claim (Graph 3). Conversely, a  situation in 
Estonian public opinion is highly polarized between supporters and opponents 
of such a  claim. Although recent migration statistics suggest that the  pace of 
emigration has slowed down in Lithuania and Latvia, the  society’s formative 
experience of high emigration during the economic recession (2008–2011) most 
likely still retains strong support for the  narrative that many residents do not 
149
M. Kaprāns. Russia’s economic narratives towards the Baltic states: structural elements ..
want to live in their countries. Perhaps findings from Estonia goes in line with 
the fact that emigration in this country has been significantly smaller, thus giving 
limited space for ‘the everyone-is-leaving’ claim. 
Graph 2: Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country
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Graph 3: Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live 
here (2019)
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In light of demographic prospects that are systematically elicited in Russia’s 
economic narratives, Baltic respondents were also asked for opinion about the more 
general apocalyptic statement that the  people of their country is on the  edge 
of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years. Identical or similar statement 
can be noticed in the pro-Kremlin economic narratives. The country-level data 
again reveal significant differences between Baltic societies (Griaph 4). While 
Estonians hold the strongest consensus that they are not on the edge of extinction 
as the  nation, Lithuanians and Latvians demonstrate much weaker agreement. 
This shows that insecurity on the basis of national and cultural sustainability is 
more salient in Latvia and Lithuania than in Estonia. The pessimistic mood of 
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Lithuanians and Latvians can be partly explained by more negative demographic 
trends that have marked the  last 15 years or so. In contrast, the  demographic 
situation in Estonia has stabilized, if not improved over the last decade22.
An opinion about the statement that the existence of one’s country depends 
on the EU financial assistance alludes to what extent Baltic societies could align 
with the  financial dependency frame in the  pro-Kremlin economic narratives. 
The 2019 data indicate that Lithuanians and Latvians hold a  strong consensus 
that their countries existence depends on EU financial support (Graph 5). In 
Estonia, this attitude also prevails, but consensus is much weaker, as a  sizable 
opinion group support the belief that Estonia’s existence does not rest on the EU’s 
money. Overall, these data illustrate a diverse perception of the country’s economic 
autonomy across the  Baltic societies. While the  dependency narrative is more 
common in Latvian and Lithuanian public opinion, the economic self-sufficiency 
narrative is more pronounced in Estonia. Regardless of these results, it should 
be added that the Baltic states are among the member states where the negative 
image of the EU is the least supported23.
Graph 4: The people of my country is on the edge of extinction and will cease to 
exist in 100 years
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Graph 5: My country’s existence depends on the EU financial assistance (2019)
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Regarding the  EU sanctions, the  2019 aggregate data reveal a  rather 
pluralistic attitude in Baltic societies. The country-level data (Graph 6) reveal 
that Latvians are the least likely to support either the tightening of sanctions or 
the maintaining of the status quo, but are more likely to support the softening of 
sanctions or to express uncertainty with respect to this issue. On the  contrary, 
Estonians demonstrate significantly higher support for the  tightening of EU 
sanctions on Russia. Lithuanians, in turn, are more likely to maintain the current 
form of sanctions, and they are also the  least likely to support the  idea that 
sanctions should be softened. Hence, public opinion in each Baltic country takes 
a  different stance on the  EU sanctions on Russia. Overall though, support to 
sanctions is more pronounced in Lithuania and Estonia. The findings do suggest 
that narratives against sanctions have somewhat limited chances to find backing 
in the Baltic societies. Arguably, Russia’s attempts to frighten the Baltic states with 
the  destructive effects of countersanctions have largely not worked. Although 
geopolitically many Baltic respondents who believe that sanctions should be 
softened demonstrate a profound anti-Western orientation, it is remarkable that 
53% of this opinion group think that their country should still work closely with 
the US and other Western powers. Perhaps this alludes to the syncretic and multi-
layered nature of their geopolitical imagination.
Graph 6: The current sanctions against Russia by the EU should be:
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The cross-sectional analysis indicates that support for the tightening of EU 
sanctions has deteriorated in all three Baltic states since 2015, particularly in 
Lithuania and Estonia where support has fallen by 22 pp and 20 pp, respectively 
(Graph 6). These changes, however, have reinforced support to maintain 
the current sanctions rather than to revise and soften them. Therefore the most 
significant increase in support for maintaining the status quo can be observed in 
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Lithuania (17 pp) and Estonia (12 pp). Notably, Latvian public opinion, unlike 
public opinion in other Baltic countries demonstrates a  significant decline 
in support for the  softening of sanctions on Russia (11  pp). This shows that 
the sanctions have been normalized by Latvian public opinion in particular and 
by the  Baltic societies in general. It should be also mentioned that according 
to the 2019 survey data Baltic respondents who see Russia as a military threat 
are more likely to support Western sanctions. Although this relationship has 
weakened since 2015, it remains relatively strong, showing that insecurity, even 
if today less salient than during the  escalation of the  Russia-Ukraine conflict, 
is still a  relevant motif for why the  sanctions against Russia hold rather strong 
support in all Baltic societies.
A broader look at the 2019 survey results demonstrates that the vast majority 
of Baltic respondents who believe their country cannot exist as an independent 
state also support the pro-Kremlin economic claims that are reflected by the above-
mentioned survey items. On the one hand, these generic doubts about the state’s 
viability can be interpreted as a discontent that is rooted in specific socio-economic 
issues (e.g. poverty, depopulation, country’s financial dependence). Namely, 
people are inclined to generalize their specific disappointment. On the  other 
hand, the equally strong discontent with the state’s performance that intertwines 
specific fields may allude to an opinion group that is by nature sceptical about 
the current state as such, including its economy. 
According to the  2019 survey, the  national pride variable on the  aggregate 
level indicates another conspicuous fault line between those who strongly feel 
proud to be the citizens of their country and those who express no pride at all 
(a relatively smaller group). While the former disagree with the failed economy 
claims, the  latter accept them. Moreover, the  aggregate data suggest that those 
who distance themselves from political discourse in media as well as in private 
communication with friends are more likely to accept these claims. However, 
the differentiating role of political alienation is less pronounced in Latvia where 
people who, judging from their self-assessment, are actively engaged in political 
discourse also demonstrate a  rather high likelihood to support the pro-Russian 
economic narratives. Last, but not least, one’s satisfaction with life may provide 
one more significant explanatory angle. Generally speaking, data show that 
people who are more satisfied with their lives are more likely to disagree with 
the pro-Kremlin economic narratives.
The socio-demographic analysis reveals somewhat inconsistent and 
country-specific patterns. The most consistent pattern can be observed in terms 
of education. That is, the  less educated segments of Baltic societies are more 
likely to support the pro-Kremlin economic claims. Household incomes are also 
a  relevant factor that helps to understand the  susceptibility to the  pro-Kremlin 
narratives. According to the  2019 findings, the  wealthiest residents of Baltic 
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countries are less likely to agree that their country’s economy is underdeveloped 
and cannot ensure a sufficient and long-term development, or that poverty and 
unemployment prevails in their country or that every day many residents leave 
their country and do not want to live there. Notably, various age groups and thus 
various generations largely do not indicate significant differences with respect to 
the pro-Kremlin economic narratives.
Public opinion in Latvia and Estonia is significantly differentiated also along 
the  ethno-linguistic lines, as the  Russian-speaking segment is more likely to 
support the  pro-Kremlin economic narratives. As a  matter of fact, the  regional 
factor provides more consistent results across the  Baltic societies, but here one 
should take into account the underlying ethnic differences in Latvian and Estonian 
regions. The data show that almost all survey items, explored in this section, 
trigger regionally diverse reactions. In Latvia and Estonia, the  pro-Kremlin 
economic narratives are more often accepted in Russophone regions or counties 
(the Latgale region and the  Harju and Ida-Viru Counties). Nevertheless, some 
less Russophone areas have also contributed to generating significant differences, 
such as the  Zemgale region in central Latvia and Hiiu County in Estonia. This 
suggests that regional differences have not only ethno-linguistic, but perhaps 
also a socio-economic character. Moreover, the Estonian and Latvian data show 
that the failed economy claim is more often supported outside capitals or other 
big cities. Lithuanian public opinion approves such asymmetry, indicating that 
people who live in less populated areas (towns, villages) are more likely to accept 
pro-Kremlin claims. In particular, the  residents of Western Lithuania (Telsai, 
Taurage, Marijampole Counties) are more likely to agree with such claims.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to outline the building blocks of the pro-Kremlin 
economic narratives towards the  Baltic states. Manifold as they may be, these 
narratives strictly follow to the Kremlin’s strategic logic: to create and maintain 
a  negative image of Baltic economies. To be sure, this undermines the  Baltic 
success story of transition from the Soviet economy to market economy that in 
the West is often juxtaposed to failures in other former Soviet republics, including 
Russia. The economic narratives disseminated by the pro-Kremlin disinformation 
system particularly address the  issues of demography and income inequality 
in Baltic countries, presenting them as the  tangible outcomes of dysfunctional 
economies. However, these narratives do not primarily target the Baltic states as 
such, but rather their political elites that have, allegedly, taken wrong geopolitical 
decisions by joining the EU and NATO and by internationally criticizing Russia. 
In short, the pro-Kremlin economic narratives have more to do with geopolitics 
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than with the actual economic reality in the Baltics. In this respect, these narratives 
construct an alternative reality. 
The pro-Kremlin economic narratives, no doubt, can gain from the existential 
anxiety and anti-establishment sentiment that are nurtured by the demographic 
problems of Baltic societies. These problems have set the  scene for ideological 
parallelism, the  conditions in which the  pro-Kremlin socio-economic claims 
should not necessarily define the alternative reality, as it is in the case of defending 
Russian-speakers in the  Baltics. Instead, they should merely nudge the  present 
and highly sensitive social issues that are already invoked by local incumbent (not 
necessarily pro-Kremlin) political actors. Such nudging, as Wilson has argued, 
is one of the  basic types of Russian propaganda that affects and strengthens 
opinions which already exist24.
The analysis of survey data in this chapter suggests that nationally alienated, 
politically (self-)isolated, and territorially/ethno-culturally marginalized in di-
viduals who are disappointed with their life trajectories and socioeconomic status 
form the most vulnerable segment of Baltic societies in terms of the pro-Kremlin 
economic narratives. In other words, the  ethos of the  failed Baltic economies 
is more likely to align with the  socio-economically anxious and left behind 
individuals. Such a permanent resentment towards a state and anti-establishment 
feelings define the political identity of a considerable, but not dominant segment 
of Baltic societies. In light of this segment, the  survey data, however, suggest 
that Latvian and Lithuanian societies might be more vulnerable vis-à-vis the pro-
Kremlin economic narratives than Estonian society.
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The Russian political model assumes that the interests of the state are defined 
by the needs of a narrow elite, which also plays a key role in the national economy. 
The task of the political system is to protect and reproduce the long-term existence 
of this elite, so that the  welfare of the  state is only an instrument to maintain 
the  power in the  hands of the  rulers. State institutes do not fulfill their direct 
functions; the  country is run using unwritten laws and informal agreements 
instead. The existing facility is characterized by a high level of corruption, which 
leads to increased costs for society. Public administration tends to be associated 
with organized crime. National security services are used to protect the interests of 
the elite. Over the longer term, the share of state influence in the Russian economy 
has also increased, forcing out private companies. Russia is characterized by legal 
nihilism that ignores property rights and commits economic crimes, which do 
not make it attractive to foreign investment. The existing system does not allow 
for economic modernization, which would also require political modernization, 
not envisaged in the constitutional changes announced in early 2020.
Russia’s current power elite’s positions are closely related to the  energy 
sector, because it has provided easy profits and serves as a  source of significant 
financial volume for various political projects. The elite have no incentive to 
think about economic innovation and ‘technological breakthrough’ declared 
by Russian propagandists before the  2018 presidential elections. However, 
nothing is forever and global trends indicate that future demand for fossil fuels 
will undergo irreversible changes, and the  question is no longer ‘whether’ but 
‘when’ the fossil energy era will end. The driving forces behind these changes are 
the increasing development of new energy sources and the growing demand for 
greener technologies. The most appropriate solution to break the dependence on 
fossil energy revenues would be to diversify the  economy by developing other 
sectors. However, Russian authorities will not pick up with real diversification 
“until the horse is stolen.” The Putin’s power system itself does not allow changes, 
which would create a  culture of entrepreneurship promoting private initiative, 
foreign investment, innovation, fair competition, etc.
Energy exports provide 42 percent of Russia’s budget and help build up 
savings in the National Welfare Fund. Russia has taken a dominant position in 
the European Union among other suppliers; it also seeks to exploit its dominant 
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position in the  political sphere; how can you otherwise explain the  attempt to 
restrict free trade by the  application of different pricing policies to different 
countries. Since the  annexation of the  Crimea and the  war in Ukraine, 
the  geopolitical situation in the  region has changed dramatically, with the  EU 
seeking ways to diversify energy supplies and improve security of supplies. 
At the political level, the EU is also committed to actively moving towards more 
climate friendly energy. Several EU countries have invested in infrastructure 
projects using alternative forms of energy, such as liquefied gas, and suppliers, 
leading them either to restrict energy imports from Russia or to force Russia to 
supply at lower prices.
Military spending has been a very important item in Russia’s federal budget 
in recent years. The equipment and military capabilities of the Russian army have 
been significantly improved as a result of the arms program implemented in recent 
years. The contents of military expenditures are hidden from the general public 
with the status of secrecy. With the  lack of transparency, the Kremlin itself has 
lost control of how this money is spent, as military equipment manufacturers are 
delaying deliveries and make them in a smaller extent than initially anticipated 
at inflated prices, with administrative machinery bloating around manufacturers. 
Against this background, there are many cases of corruption that have resulted in 
massive thefts. Part of the military expenditure is spent on the production of old-
fashioned combat equipment. The lack of competition between companies, which 
usually have a monopoly in their field, also limits the effectiveness of the military 
sector. Russian military industry limits the living standards of the people, because 
education and health care are not sufficiently funded. Russian military companies 
should operate in conditions of greater competition, which would lead to more 
efficient and successful modernization of the armament and military equipment 
in the  future, but Putin’s system does not foresee such a  scenario of promoting 
competition.
How has the  progress of Russian farming developed during Putin’s reign? 
Regional policy has not been consistent and efficient enough – it is mostly directed 
to the  concentration of resources in the  center, thus ensuring the  Kremlin’s 
control and power. Some attention has been paid to the  regions, but only for 
selected periods, to prevent total degradation of peripheral areas. Russia has had 
a  negative experience of economic centralization since Soviet times. The  main 
drivers of centralization in Russia have usually been linked to the  desire of 
the authorities to concentrate their resources on militarization, aggressive foreign 
policy and the consolidation of their ideology. At the same time, it is accompanied 
by the  elite’s fear of losing control over peripheral territories and the  desire of 
the administrative apparatus to retain its influence.
Centralized economic policy has led to a  dramatic difference in living 
standards between regions of Russia, with Moscow, St. Petersburg and those 
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richest in natural resources (Tyumen and Sverdlovsk areas), on the one hand, and 
the rest of the territory on the other, especially the ethnic republics. The viability 
of deprived areas becomes dependent on Kremlin subsidies, as they are often 
deeply indebted and unable to switch to permanent economic activity. Their local 
administration is not intrinsically interested in addressing its own backwardness 
and improving the  quality of life of its citizens, since it is comfortable with 
the current situation where it is possible to redistribute central funding without 
specific reporting on the efficiency of its use. As a result, a breeding ground for 
corruption is created (which will be not properly eradicated if the local authority 
is loyal to the  Center), but all the  burden of backwardness must be borne by 
the  local community. If the  inhabitants of these regions want to improve their 
living conditions, then all they have to do is go to a  big city or immigrate to 
Western Europe.
Existing Kremlin policies provide limited subsidies to the  poorest regions 
of Russia, which allow them to exist, but exclude the possibility of development 
to get rid of their backwardness. From the  point of view of the  existing 
Russian authorities, such a  model is convenient because the  poor regions are 
easily manipulated and retain their political loyalty. However, in the  long run, 
the consequences can be dangerous and unpredictable, especially if Russia starts 
to lose its export earnings rapidly. In such circumstances, the level of aggression, 
conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups, etc. will increase, which 
may lead to the partition of Russia’s territory.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 led to EU and US sanctions 
against Russian officials and companies, which was one of the reasons for faster 
rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. Russia needed to show that it was 
not ‘hurt’ by sanctions because there was an alternative – economic cooperation 
with China. If China was once economically dependent on Russia’s predecessor – 
the  USSR, which was then one of the  two world powers, today it is the  other 
way around. It is obvious that in this relationship, the  oldest brother is China 
and the  youngest is Russia, and such division of roles will continue. Russia is 
showing unprecedented benevolence against China in the  form of access to 
strategic areas, including military technology and the  energy sector. However, 
this cooperation is unable to maximize the  interests of Russia, for example, 
a  recently signed long-term contract provides for gas sales to China cheaper 
than the market price. Despite special favors, the Chinese investors do not view 
the Russian market interesting enough with other alternatives in the background. 
Active cooperation mainly takes place in large-scale investment projects carried 
out under the supervision of senior officials of both countries. Average Chinese 
investors who want to develop their business in Russia are stuck with the attitude 
of local officials, which is characterized by suspicion, passive support, reluctance 
to let in competitors.
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The Asian dimension is present in the  Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
which as a potentially significant regional block has a  role of building a bridge 
between Europe and Asian Pacific region among its main tasks. Integration 
practice shows that it is and remains more a  political than economic project, 
although Russian politicians claim otherwise. Russia is the biggest player in this 
union, as its economy is almost seven times bigger than the other EEU countries 
combined. Russia’s large size and desire to dominate the  region allow it to play 
a position of power by dictating its own conditions. The closest allies in the CIS 
integration projects Kazakhstan and Belarus are reluctant to fully surrender their 
sovereignty to the Kremlin, which has led to tensions in the region since 2014. 
Russia’s economic stagnation and maintenance costs for Crimea do not allow 
Moscow to generously subsidize Belarus with relatively low gas and oil prices, 
thus increasing pressure on Minsk to integrate more closely into the  Union of 
States. Russia needs Belarus for military strategic purposes to maintain a buffer 
zone between itself and the  West. However, it is costly to support Alexander 
Lukashenka’s regime. The coming years in Russia’s internal development will show 
which of the vectors in the relationship between the two countries – integration 
or disintegration – will dominate after 2024.
Russia’s instruments of influence go far beyond its neighbors. Russian-
origin capital in Western countries has been underestimated through recent 
years. The money flowing from Russia into the  West is not only distinguished 
by its large volume, but also by its specific origin, character and behavior. 
This capital has been obtained by stealing from the  Russian population, with 
authorities collaborating with organized crime. Russian capital is characterized by 
a strong link and dependence on the Kremlin, and hence the future uses of this 
money. Official Russia in the West consists of a wide and branched companies, 
institutions and assets network to infiltrate and build their support centers in 
other countries. To increase the  Kremlin’s influence, national political parties, 
think tanks, universities, football clubs, charity projects are being financed and 
over a longer period of time become dependent on this funding. In such a way, 
the  Kremlin is buying supporters who become Russia’s political advocates at 
international level. It should be noted that the transfer of funds to the West is also 
seriously damaging to Russia itself as the  money is no longer used for internal 
infrastructure, economic development and the  improvement of the  general 
level of prosperity. Thus, the  policy pursued by the  Kremlin is very costly to 
the Russian people themselves – huge resources are spent virtually without any 
meaningful return.
Not only gray money flows from Russia to Europe, the official propaganda 
and misinformation are full of economic narratives. Russian trolls on social 
networks and media controlled by the Kremlin continue to spread the message 
that the  Baltic states are ‘failed states’ whose ‘industry has only been destroyed 
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after the collapse of the USSR’. Propagandists purposefully compare the economic 
performance of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia with the richest European countries, 
rather than other former Soviet Republics, which are far worse off than the Baltics, 
whose economies are growing and the  grow rates for a  number of years have 
surpassed many other European countries. Deceptors do not care about real 
facts, they operate with ‘alternative facts’, or more precisely, lies. Attempts are 
being made to create nostalgia for the ‘good times in the USSR’. The purpose of 
disseminating such economic messages is to undermine the trust of the citizens 
of the  Baltic states in their public institutions and to increase the  pro-Moscow 
views on foreign policy. 
Putin’s Russia has been keen to become an influential superpower, but it 
has failed and will not succeed in the  short and medium term. High oil and 
other natural resource prices of the beginning of the century created comfortable 
conditions for Russia’s political elite, but at the  same time produced a  stifling 
effect so powerful that Russia’s authorities did not seize the opportunity to shift 
its economic model to an internationally competitive alternative. The Russian 
elite under Putin does not have effective public administration to work for 
their fellow citizens. Huge resources are wasted in an inefficient and opaque 
way, including outside the country, loosing an opportunity to use them locally. 
On the  other hand, the  Russian public is not stringent enough in this regard; 
it is easy to manipulate and its attention can be diverted to other issues such 
as raising Russia’s international influence and fight against external enemies, 
large infrastructure projects (the Kerch bridge linking Russia’s mainland with 
Crimean peninsula) and large sports events. Putin’s Russia has experienced 
a  powerful massive propaganda, which already exceeds the  scale of the  Soviet 
Union Communist efforts to dominate the  minds and hearts of the  people. 
The Kremlin is not only organizing brainwashing of its own people, it is also 
actively disseminating misinformation in the  West. A significant part of this 
misinformation is related to lies about Russia’s economic ‘power’ and failures in 
other countries.
The Russian elite is characterized by a  symptomatic fear of losing control 
over the country, which takes form in both centralization of resources (depletion 
of regions, selective support for strategic companies and projects) and lack of 
support for private sector development as well as distrust of foreign investment. 
The state system serves to maintain the positions of the ruling elite rather than 
to improve the general living conditions of the society. Putin’s power system has 
helped Putin to elevate himself and his circle of trusted individuals, whose wealth 
is estimated at billions of dollars. At the  same time, the  same system has held 
the  general public hostage and prevented Russia from achieving the  economic 
development and prosperity rates it would have if it had the rule of law, internal 
market principles and fair competition.
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Russia is carrying out destructive actions in the  countries of the European 
Union aimed at internal divisions and mistrust in the  public administration. 
The Russian elite have a  high level of tolerance against organized crime and 
corruption of officials (both internally and abroad), which serve as important 
tools for achieving the Kremlin’s political goals. Russia’s further development is 
marked by a number of risks that may affect its political stability. In the future, 
the country faces risks of a significant drop in export earnings (which it will not 
be able to recover in the foreseeable future), which currently accounts for a large 
part of budget expenditure, including social needs, infrastructure maintenance, 
subsidization of poor regions, etc. If in the  future a  default strikes Russia as in 
1998–1999, it seems unlikely that Russia will borrow money from the IMF and 
other international creditors. Rather, it might already be China, which would 
certainly take advantage of such situation. 
The West must take into account that Russia is an unpredictable partner, 
and economic cooperation with it should always be pursued having alternative 
cooperation partners in mind. Macroeconomic indicators and gold/currency 
reserves allow Russia to avoid economic cataclysms in a short term; it is impossible 
to be as sure for a longer period of time. Russia will be interested in continuing 
to buy technologies as it will only be able to produce them on a  limited scale. 
Western governments must continue to look carefully at financial flows from 
Russia, given that they can be used for destructive influence.
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1. World’s Top Economies
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2. GDP annual growth rates – Russia vs. world
GDP annual percent change, constant prices
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4. GDP per capita, PPP
Gross domestic product per capita, current prices (‘000 $))
Purchasing power parity; international dollars
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6. High technology export share
High‐technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
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8. Poverty
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10. GINI index
Gini coefficient (0 = complete equality; 1 = complete inequality)
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11. Foreign Direct Investments in Russia
Foreign direct investment positions in Russia (bn USD)
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12. Foreign Direct Investments in Russia by countries
Foreig Direct Investment in the Russian Federation:  
positions by Partner Country
Rank Country billlions of US dollars percentage of total
- TOTAL 536.8 100.0%
1 CYPRUS 159.5 29.7%
2 NETHERLANDS 55.9 10.4%
3 LUXEMBOURG 50.1 9.3%
4 BAHAMAS 28.8 5.4%
5 IRELAND 28.2 5.2%
6 BERMUDA 23.7 4.4%
7 UNITED KINGDOM 23.5 4.4%
8 FRANCE 21.0 3.9%
9 GERMANY 20.1 3.7%
10 SWITZERLAND 16.4 3.1%
11 VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH 12.8 2.4%
12 JERSEY 11.3 2.1%
13 FINLAND 7.2 1.3%
14 AUSTRIA 6.8 1.3%
15 ITALY 5.3 1.0%
16 SWEDEN 5.1 0.9%
17 SINGAPORE 4.6 0.9%
18 UNITED STATES 4.6 0.8%
19 CHINA 3.5 0.7%
20 KAZAKHSTAN 3.3 0.6%
21 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 3.3 0.6%
22 UKRAINE 3.1 0.6%
23 JAPAN 2.3 0.4%
24 BELGIUM 1.9 0.3%
25 TURKEY 1.5 0.3%
26 HONG KONG 1.3 0.2%
27 BELARUS 1.2 0.2%
28 LATVIA 1.0 0.2%
29 UZBEKISTAN 0.9 0.2%
30 DENMARK 0.9 0.2%
Foreig Direct Investment in the Russian Federa�on:
posi�ons by rtner Country
As of June 30, 2019
Source: Central Bank of Russian Federation.
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13. Government surplus / deficit
General government budget surplus (+) / deficit (–), % of GDP
(from 2019 – estimates and forecasts)
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,  
October 2019.
14. Credit rating
Russia’s long‐term foreign currency issuer ratings
Baa1
Baa2
Aaa
Aa1
Aa2
Aa3
A1
A2
A3
Baa3
Ba1
Ba2
Ba3
B1
B2
B3
Caa1
Caa2
Caa3
Ca
C
not rated
Ba2
Ba3
B1
B3
B2
Ba3
Ba2
Baa3
Baa2
Baa1
Baa2
Baa3
Ba1
'97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19
ra�ng
minimum investment grade
Source: Moody’s.
173
Attachment
15. Government expenditure on defence
Defence expenditures, as % of GDP
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16. Reserve funds of Russia
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17. Government expenditure on education
Public spending on education (primary to tertiary), % of GDP
2016 or latest available
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18. Corruption Perception
Corruption Perceptions Index rankings of Russia
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19. Ease of Doing Business
Doing Business Index rankings of Russia
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Source: World Bank.
Notes: Current calculation of Russia’s “Doing Business” index is based on valuation of 
2  cities – Moscow (70% weight) and St. Petersburg (30% weight) – it does not reflect 
overall business environment in Russia.
In the past years, several revisions of “Doing Business” methodology have been made – 
rankings calculated according different methodologies are not comparable over time.
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20. GDP per capita in countries – former part of USSR
GDP per capita, in current prices
Purchasing power parity; international dollars
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